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Abstract 
 
 
 Through much of the 1950s, intense drought afflicted the Southern Plains 
and American South.  Dry conditions and dust storms fostered new soil and water 
conservation strategies, and stronger ties between agricultural producers and 
technical experts.  Federal and state officials appreciated the disaster’s broad 
economic implications and the need to consolidate relief administration.  
Oklahoma cattlemen integrated their industry as they responded to the drought.  In 
southwest Oklahoma’s WashitaBasin, state officials and local residents reversed 
their support for upstream flood control dams to protect agriculture in favor of 
bigger dams to supply municipal water.  Following the drought, Congress passed 
new legislation to increase federal assistance for municipal water supplies. 
This dissertation has two purposes.  First, it examines a drought that has 
not received much attention from historians.  Second, it argues that the 1950s 
drought revealed new priorities and tensions during the regional economic 
development that followed World War II.  Unlike the 1890s and 1930s droughts, 
both of which have commanded extensive scholarship, the drought that seared the 
Southern Plains through most of the 1950s occurred during a relatively prosperous 
decade.  Contemporaries identified the disaster’s economic implications more 
broadly than before.  In Oklahoma, the drought fostered statewide irrigation and 
complementary technology, and it increased the state’s responsibility to administer 
relief.  Across the Southern Plains, the drought fostered newassistance to small 
businesses and part-time farmers, and it catalyzed the region’scattle feeding 
industry.  Nationwide, it contributed to more accessible municipal water supplies.
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Introduction: The 1950s Drought in Oklahoma 
 
 Less than twenty years after the infamous 1930s drought and Dust Bowl, 
severe drought again afflicted the Southern Plains and large portions of the United 
States.  From Arizona during the 1940s, dry conditions spread to Texas, then north 
and east, reaching up through Oklahoma to Missouri and neighboring states by 
1952.  By August 1954, states calling for emergency drought assistance stretched 
from New Mexico and Texas in the Southwest, to Alabama and Georgia in the 
Southeast, up through Kentucky and Illinois in the Midwest.  For southern plains 
states, the drought was the most severe since officials had begun keeping records 
in 1895.  By some accounts, it was the worst drought in nearly 300 hundred years.  
It fostered starving livestock, dust storms and economic despair.  For disaster relief 
and to support livestock prices, the federal government spent nearly 800 million 
dollars from 1954 to 1956.  As the drought finally neared its end in early 1957, one 
observer called it “the worst thing that has happened in modern history.”1 
In Oklahoma, the drought was widespread and intense.  During just the last 
six months of 1952, sixty-five Oklahoma towns and cities faced water shortages.  
                                                          
1
 R.L Nace and E.J. Pluhowski, Drought of the 1950’s with Special Reference to the Midcontinent.  
Geological Survey – Water Supply paper 1804 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1965), pp. 17-19; Falko F. Fye, David W. Stahle and Edward R. Cook, “Paleoclimatic Analogs to 
Twentieth-Century Moisture Regimes Across the United States,” Bulletin of the American 
Meteorological Society, vol. 84, no. 7 (July 2003), p. 907; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on 
Agriculture, Drought Program, Hearing, 83
rd
 Congress, 2
nd
 Session, 6 August 1954, p. 
2;“Drouth,” a report on drought in the Great Plains and Southwest, prepared under the direction 
of the Special Assistant to the President for Public Works Planning (October 1958), p. 20; U.S., 
Congress, House, Committee on Agriculture, Drought Relief Program, Hearings, 85
th
 Congress, 
1st. session, 23, 25 January and 4 February 1957, p. 2.  Texas congressman Ovie Fisher made the 
comment. 
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For two-thirds of the period 1952 to 1957, almost all of Oklahoma experienced 
unusually dry conditions.  Some parts of the state suffered through drought for 
nearly fifty of those sixty months.  “Never in the history of Oklahoma have we had 
such a general drouth throughout the state” declared Oklahoma Farmers Union 
secretary Z.H. Lawter in 1954.  That year, cattlemen estimated their pasture and 
range conditions to be only 10-15% of normal.  And during 1956 the state 
measured its lowest runoff on record.  Custom haulers trucked drinking water to 
townsfolk, businesses closed, and Department of Agriculture (USDA) food relief 
activities spiked.
2
 
Despite its magnitude, few historians have studied the 1950s drought.
3
  
This limited attention is surprising for two reasons.  First, the drought was long, 
severe and widespread.  For much of the 1950s, it affected farms, ranches, towns 
and cities across the southern United States.  Second, historians have devoted 
considerable attention to other droughts, especially those of the 1890s and the 
1930s.  Studies of the 1890s drought have commonly emphasized the limited 
federal assistance to desperate farmers during the nineteenth century, as well as 
                                                          
2
Report to the Governor of Oklahoma on the Problem of Municipal and Industrial Water Supplies 
for Oklahoma, p. 9; Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture(OSBA) Annual Report for fiscal year 
ending 1953, p. 51; Nace and Pluhowski, Drought of the 1950’s, pp. 24, 36; The Oklahoma Union 
Farmer, September 1954, p. 13;Johnston Murray 21 July 1954 telegram to Dwight Eisenhower, p. 
1, in OCA Papers, Series II, box 1, folder 42; OSBA Annual Report for the year ending June 30, 
1957, pp. 64, 24;“Drouth,” p. 20. 
3
 The few studies that have focused entirely on the 1950s drought include: R. Lambert, “Drought, 
Texas Cattlemen and Eisenhower,” Journal of the West 16 (1977): 66-70; Rana Williamson, “The 
Heat From the Forge”: Aspects of the Seven Year Drought of the 1950s in Texas, Ph.D. 
dissertation, Texas Christian University, 1993; and John Caraway, “The Texas Mohair Industry and 
the Seven Year Drought of the 1950’s,” West Texas Historical Association Yearbook, vol. 84 
(2008): 74-84.  R. Douglas Hurt ended his book on the 1930s dust bowl with a chapter focused on 
the events in the dust bowl area during the 1950s drought.  This chapter was an extended version of 
an article he had written in 1979.  See R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural and Social 
History (Chicago: Nelson Hall, 1981).  Additionally, novelist Elmer Kelton provided an astute 
fictional account of the drought; The Time It Never Rained (1973). 
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technical and legal innovations to mitigate dry conditions.
4
  The 1930s drought 
included an ecological and social ‘dust bowl’ disaster as enormous dust storms 
scoured farms and ravaged communities on the Southern Plains.  Historians have 
since debated its causes and consequences, and the unprecedented government 
relief and agricultural reforms that followed.
5
  Extensive attention to the 1930s 
Dust Bowl owes partly to its dramatic presentation by photographers, filmmakers 
and novelists.  So overwhelming was the disaster, observed historians Anne H. 
Morgan and H. Wayne Morgan, that “[t]he Dust Bowl became synonymous with 
drought.”  Indexes to histories and encyclopedias of the American West make their 
point.  Many important books contain ‘dust bowl’ entries, but nothing for 
‘drought’.6  This strong association magnifies the Dust Bowl’s significance to the 
                                                          
4
 See, for instance: Sam Kepfield, “‘They Were in Far Too Great Want’: Federal Drought Relief to 
the Great Plains, 1887-1895,” South Dakota History, 28 (Winter 1998), pp. 244-270;Sam Kepfield, 
“The Nebraska Drought of 1890,” Journal of the West 34 (January 1997), pp. 47-53;Herbert Schell, 
“Drought and Agriculture in Eastern South Dakota during the Eighteen Nineties,” Agricultural 
History 5 (October 1931), pp. 162-180; Kevin Sweeney, “‘And the Skies are Not Cloudy All Day’: 
Drought and the Cherokee Outlet Land Run,” Chronicles of Oklahoma, vol. 81, no.4 (December 
2003), pp. 436-457. 
5
 See, for instance: Paul B. Sears, Deserts on the March (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1935) and James Malin, The Grassland of North America: Prolegomena to its History (Gloucester: 
Peter Smith, 1967).  Two other strongly divergent interpretations belong to Donald Worster and 
Paul Bonnifield.  Worster contends that the 1930s dust bowl was the inevitable outcome of a 
capitalistic agricultural system and culture that ignored nature’s limits.  Bonnifield argues that 
southern plains farmers who lived through the dust bowl were heroes for withstanding nature’s 
vicissitudes and the incompetence of federal planners.  Somewhere between the two is R. Douglas 
Hurt, who explains that southern plains farmers rendered the region vulnerable by plowing 
submarginal lands, but also that they took lessons from the Dust Bowl to prevent subsequent 
disasters.  See Donald Worster, Dust Bowl (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Paul 
Bonnifield, The Dust Bowl: Men, Dirt, and Depression (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico 
Press, 1979); and Hurt, The Dust Bowl (1981).  In a subsequent essay William Cronon explains that 
the historians’ different conclusions owes to their time frames and narrative end points.  In William 
Cronon: “‘A Place for Stories’: Nature, History and Narrative, Journal of American History (March 
1992): 1364. 
6
 H. Wayne Morgan and Anne Hodges Morgan, Oklahoma: A Bicentennial History (New York: 
W.W. Norton and Company, 1977), 164.  For indexes without ‘drought’ entries, see: Michael 
Malone and Richard Etulain, The American West: AModern History, 1900 to the Present(Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2007); Richard White, “It’s Your Misfortune and None of My Own”: 
A History of the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Clyde A. Milner 
II and Carol O’Connor, The Oxford History of the American West (Oxford: Oxford University 
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general exclusion of droughts beyond the Southern Plains and during other 
periods.  Historians contend, for instance, that contemporaries understood soil and 
water conservation after the 1930s, as though later droughts produced few new 
lessons or solutions.
7
 
This dissertation has two purposes.  First, it examines a drought that has 
not received much attention from historians.  This study does more than simply fill 
a ‘gap’ in drought historiography, however.  Unlike the 1890s and 1930s droughts, 
both of which occurred during general economic depressions that smothered the 
nation, the drought that seared the Southern Plains through most of the 1950s 
occurred during a relatively prosperous decade.  Consequently, the drought’s 
economic implications appeared more broadly than before.  Second, this study 
argues that the 1950s drought revealed new priorities and tensions during the 
regional economic development that followed World War II.  In Oklahoma, the 
drought fostered a greater use of agricultural technologies, land consolidation, an 
expanded state apparatus to administer federal relief, protection for small 
businesses, integrated livestock production, and more accessible municipal water 
supplies.   
Oklahoma is uniquely instructive (along with Texas, perhaps) as a case 
study for the 1950s drought.  Because its climate ranges drastically from its semi-
arid Panhandle to its more humid southeast, and because the 1950s drought 
afflicted the entire state, this study reveals responses to drought in typically wet 
                                                                                                                                                                
Press, 1994); Charles Phillips and Alan Alexrod, editors, Encyclopedia of the American West, vol II 
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996); and Howard R. Lamar, editor, The New Encyclopedia of 
the American West (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
7
 Hurt, The Dust Bowl, p. 154; Worster, Dust Bowl, p. 228. 
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areas beyond the area typically affected by southern plains droughts.   The 1950s 
drought reached beyond the ranches and farms of the Southern Plains to penetrate 
all of Oklahoma.  The drought fostered discussions, debates, and a new program 
for agricultural conservation, but it was more than just an agricultural disaster.  To 
relieve part-time farmers, small businesses and thirsty towns required a new 
perspective and more inclusive policies. 
“Oklahoma’s Forgotten Drought” is divided into five thematic chapters.  It 
draws mostly on the Carl Albert and Robert Kerr papers, the Oklahoma 
Cattlemen’s Association papers, Oklahoma Governor Raymond Gary’s papers, as 
well as congressional hearings and reports, state reports, newspapers and 
agricultural journals, especially The Farmer Stockman, which circulated widely in 
Oklahoma and Texas.  In its editorial content, The Farmer Stockman clearly 
promoted its advertisers’ interests, but the journal also served as a forum for 
advice, discussion and debate, with letters and articles from practicing farmers, 
college scientists, agricultural extension officials and federal soil conservation 
agents. 
The opening chapter surveys Oklahoma’s agricultural history to provide 
context for the state’s experiences during the drought.  From the cattle drives that 
crossed the state during the 1870s and 1880s to the technological revolution that 
followed World War II, Oklahoma agriculture continuously changed.  Farmers 
came to expect federal support for crop prices and relief from periodic droughts 
and floods.  Farm numbers shrank, farm sizes increased, and surpluses grew as 
technology facilitated crop production.  During the 1930s depression and drought, 
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massive dust storms ravaged the Southern Plains.  By decade’s end, the federal 
government had introduced sweeping legislation and programs to limit 
overproduction, conserve soil and water, increase farm credit, relocate desperate 
farmers, and control vulnerable land.  Agriculture’s social and economic 
importance declined, especially after World War II, as towns and cities grew, 
small farmers took off-farm jobs, and state leaders pushed to industrialize their 
economy.  The 1950s drought afflicted a state with persistent agricultural concerns 
but also growing municipal and industrial priorities. 
The second chapter examines soil and water conservation and agricultural 
production techniques during the 1950s drought.  Beginning with an overview of 
dust storms that afflicted the Southern Plains during the late 1940s and 1950s, this 
chapter traces the development of the Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP), 
authorized by Congress in 1956.  Instead of public control or ownership of broad 
areas, GPCP reflected the sense that flexible, long-term conservation plans for 
individual farms and ranches would best protect and enhance the diverse 
patchwork of Great Plains farms.  The program signified that soil and water 
conservation efforts continued well after the profound lessons learned during the 
1930s.  But GPCP applied only to drier areas of the Plains – including western 
Oklahoma and the Panhandle – and so the program only partially reflected 
conservation and production initiatives during the drought.  Consequently, this 
chapter examines techniques – like grassland farming and irrigation – that 
followed the drought eastward into Oklahoma’s normally humid regions.  The 
flexibility and independence that producers acquired through GPCP contrasted 
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with their heightened and growing reliance on new agrarian technologies and 
advice to produce crops in dry conditions. 
The third chapter examines challenges facing officials tasked to identify 
the drought’s physical and economic boundaries and to administer drought relief.  
To be expedient and to exclude undeserving speculators, the federal drought 
program restricted relief to designated counties and full-time farmers.  Gradually, 
however, part-time farmers and urban small business owners pushed officials 
toward more inclusive policies.  Amendments to the Small Business 
Administration Act and more relaxed Farmers Home Administration credit under 
the Rural Development Program signified a growing appreciation of drought’s 
broad consequences.  This chapter also examines local, state and federal 
administrative control over drought-related USDA commodity relief foodstuffs.  
Under federal pressure, the authority to certify relief recipients shifted permanently 
from local county commissioners to bureaucrats in the Oklahoma Department of 
Public Welfare during the drought.  The process echoed relief distribution issues 
and patterns from the 1930s, including patronage, corruption, local resentment 
toward government “experts,” and the expansion of state responsibility to 
administer federal assistance. 
 The fourth chapter examines challenges and changes to Oklahoma’s cattle 
industry during the drought.  By the early 1950s, the southern plains cattle industry 
faced ruin as the drought scorched pastures and ranges and cattlemen dumped their 
herds to avoid ballooning feed costs.  Cattlemen organized to request an 
emergency federal cattle purchase program to stabilize prices, which they 
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received.  However, Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson’s aversion to price 
supports, along with practical and philosophical divisions among cattlemen, meant 
that the long-term solution to stabilize prices came through increased marketing to 
generate demand, not federal price supports to absorb surplus cattle.  To increase 
beef consumption, cattlemen connected with marketing specialists and retailers.  
And as they fed relief grain to their herds, cattlemen connected to animal health 
and nutrition specialists.  The experience convinced many local producers to fatten 
their cattle in Oklahoma instead of shipping them north and served as a catalyst for 
new feedlots and processing facilities.  Through the drought, Oklahoma cattlemen 
integrated their industry through new and stronger relationships with state and 
federal agencies, college researchers, processors, retailers, and consumers. 
The fifth chapter is a case study of changing local and state attitudes 
toward flood control and water supplies during the drought.  The chapter begins by 
describing the inter-connected droughts, erosion, and flooding that plagued the 
Washita Basin in southwest Oklahoma through the 1930s.  In 1937, following 
several exceptional flood disasters, Congress funded USDA upstream flood 
control research in the WashitaBasin.  During the late 1930s and early 1940s, local 
residents and state officials opposed big dams on the WashitaRiver’s main stem 
and at its mouth in favor of upstream agricultural flood control dams on its 
tributaries.  During the 1950s drought, however, local and state priorities shifted 
away from the USDA upstream flood-control program as Washita basin towns and 
cities faced severe water shortages.  Local booster organizations and Oklahoma’s 
congressional delegation pushed for Bureau of Reclamation dams to avert future 
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water shortages and to meet anticipated future municipal demands.  The region’s 
desperate drought circumstances and political pressure convinced Congress and 
President Dwight Eisenhower to approve the dams despite their failure to meet 
existing cost-benefit requirements.  Ultimately, the episode was an important 
ingredient of and pretext to greater federal assistance for municipal water supplies 
by the decade’s end. 
This study’s title, “Oklahoma’s Forgotten Drought,” reflects the relative 
lack of attention paid by historians and the general public to the 1950s drought.  
The disaster’s historical neglect by scholars seems ironic, at least partly since the 
Southern Plains’ current demographic, technological and economic landscapes 
share more qualities with the 1950s than with the 1930s.  Because the disaster was 
so pervasive and because it generated a rangeof responses from agricultural 
producers, relief administrators, small towns and public officials, its many themes 
contribute to fields including agricultural and environmental history, western 
history, and Oklahoma history.  For instance, the study reveals changing 
perceptions about the term “farmer” during the 1950s and drought’s role in the 
growth of mechanized production systems.  Similarly, this study shows how the 
drought helped to reorient southern plains cattle producersas they reconsidered 
their region’s agricultural and economic potential and their own production 
systems following World War II.  This study also illustrates the national 
significance of small southern plains towns – not just big western cities like Los 
Angeles, Phoenix and Denver –to the municipal water supply and dam-building 
controversies that characterized the twentieth century. 
 10 
 
Chapter 1 – Oklahoma’s Agricultural History, 1870s-1950s 
 
 From the 1870s through the mid-twentieth century, three broad patterns 
characterized Oklahoma’s agricultural development.  First, agriculture in 
Oklahoma continually changed as producers adopted new technologies and land-
use patterns to meet environmental and economic circumstances.  Broadly, that 
change tended toward bigger, more highly capitalized farms in western Oklahoma 
and cattle’s growing economic importance throughout the state.  Second, drought 
and low prices eroded producers’ sense of independence and increased the federal 
government’s role in the agricultural economy.  And third, agriculture’s economic 
and social importance declined as cities grew and leaders pursued the state’s 
commercial and industrial future.  These three broad patterns accelerated after 
World War II, to intensify what political scientists have called the state’s historical 
“struggle to emerge from a traditional rural background into a more modern and 
progressive state.”1 
Oklahoma lies above Texas, with Arkansas to its east, Kansas to its north, 
and New Mexico and Colorado at the state’s western Panhandle extremity.  So 
located, “at the seams of the American West[,]” the state represents a range of 
geographic and climatic features.  With its northwest Panhandle squarely in the 
Southern Plains and its southeastern corner near Louisiana swamps, the state 
occupies a “transition zone” between cool, semiarid and subtropical, humid 
climates.  Average temperatures range from about fifty-five degrees in the 
                                                          
1
 David R. Morgan, Robert E. England and George G. Humphreys, Oklahoma Politics and 
Policies: Governing the SoonerState(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 4. 
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Panhandle to sixty-three degrees in the state’s southeast.  More drastically, average 
annual precipitation ranges from about sixteen inches in the Panhandle to more 
than fifty-five inches in the southeast.
2
 
Throughout Oklahoma, summer temperatures routinely exceed 100 degrees 
and rainfall often comes during intense storms, so that “[w]ide, shallow rivers [can 
be] torrents one day, then sluggish, meandering streams…or broad strips of 
blowing sand on still another.”  High temperatures and strong winds intensify dry 
conditions, especially in the Panhandle, where evaporation rates can reach seventy 
inches per year.  The unpredictable weather has prompted historians and 
geographers to call western Oklahoma and the Panhandle “a land of climatic 
extremes, of irregularities, uncertainties, and the unexpected in weather” where 
winds “descend with a biting cold in the winter…and in the summer searing 
blasts…seem to come from the bowels of hell.”  During the early stages of the 
1950s drought, cynical journalists observed: “A summer drouth is so common an 
occurrence in the Southwest that we would almost be disappointed if it did not 
come.”3 
                                                          
2
 “One seam joined East and West;” wrote Donald Pisani and Donald Dewitt, “another joined 
South to West; and a third joined the Great Plains to the Rocky Mountain West.” In Donald Pisani 
and Donald Dewitt, Guide to Manuscripts in the Western History Collections of the University of 
Oklahoma (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2002), p. xix; H. Wayne Morgan and Anne 
Hodges Morgan, Oklahoma: A Bicentennial History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1977), p. 7;Howard L. Johnson, “Temperature and Growing Season,” in Robert Charles Goins, ed., 
Historical Atlas of Oklahoma (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), p. 20.  
3
 Morgan and Morgan, Oklahoma, p. 7.During the 1956 drought year, a county irrigation specialist 
reported seventy-two inches of open pan evaporation near Goodwell, in the Oklahoma Panhandle.  
In Arthur H. Doerr and John W. Morris, “The Oklahoma Panhandle: A Cross-Section of the 
Southern High Plains,” Economic Geography, vol. 36, no. 1 (January 1960): 74-5.  Arrell Gibson 
wrote: “One year might be wet, the next dry, even of drouth proportions.  One-fourth to one-half of 
the annual quota of rainfall might fall in a single day.” In Arrell Gibson, “Ranching on the 
Southern Great Plains,” Journal of the West, vol. 6, no. 1 (January 1967): 136; Farmer Stockman, 
March 1953, p. 103.In 1957 they asked readers: “who ever saw a normal season in the 
Southwest?”InFarmer Stockman, March 1957, p. 51. 
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Two major rivers drain Oklahoma toward the Mississippi River.  The 
Arkansas River flows through northeastern Oklahoma from Kansas and Colorado, 
and drains much of the state’s upper half.  The Red River flows from Texas along 
Oklahoma’s southern border and drains most of the state’s southern and 
southwestern regions.  Oklahoma’s eastern streams and lakes are relatively clear, 
but the state’s western and central parts have sandy and red-colored water, 
reflecting the landscape’s red sandstone, shale and clay surfaces.  Gypsum also 
colors western Oklahoma water, particularly the WashitaRiver which drains much 
of southwestern Oklahoma into the Red River.  To supplement surface water 
supplies, many Oklahoma farms and cities tap aquifers and other groundwater 
sources, including alluvium and terrace deposits along present-day and ancient 
streams.
4
 
Like its climate, Oklahoma’s soil and vegetation types range widely, from 
dry, mineral-rich aridisols under western Panhandle short-grasses, to wet and 
relatively infertile ultisoils under eastern Oklahoma forests.  Darkly-colored 
mollisols support a wide variety of crops in much of the state, including irrigated 
grains and cotton in the Panhandle and southwestern region.   Moving from west to 
east, the state’s vegetation reflects different agricultural activities and climates.  
Where they have not been plowed up and converted to wheat or grain sorghum 
(milo) production, drought-hardy and protein-rich shortgrasses, especially blue 
                                                          
4
 Bruce Hoagland, “Arkansas and RedRiver Basins,” in Robert Charles Goins, ed., Historical Atlas 
of Oklahoma(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), p. 10.  Kenneth Johnson explained: 
“The thickness of these aquifers generally ranges from 100 feet to several thousand feet.  The depth 
to freshwater ranges from a few feet to more than 1,000 feet, and most wells producing water from 
these aquifers are 100-400 feet deep.  Wells drilled into these aquifers generally yield 25-300 
gallons per minute, although some wells yield as much as 600-2,500 gallons per minute.”  In 
Kenneth S. Johnson, “Aquifers,” in Goins, Historical Atlas, p. 14. 
 13 
 
grama and buffalo grass, support Panhandle grazing.  Mixed-grass prairie, 
including dropseeds, little bluestem and sideoatsgrama are common in western 
Oklahoma.  The state’s more humid central region contains tall-grass prairie 
remnants including little bluestem, big bluestem, Indiangrass and switchgrass.  
And the state’s eastern region contains oak-hickory and oak-pine forests in the 
Ouachita Mountains and Ozark Plateau.
5
 
 During the late nineteenth century, Oklahoma was Indian Territory, the 
land where federal officials relocated Native American tribes from across the 
country.  In eastern and southern Indian Territory, sharecroppers who emigrated 
following the Civil War rented tribal land to grow cotton.  By the mid-1880s, 
explains historian Arrell Gibson, “the Washita valley was almost one continuous 
farm for fifty miles, most of the holdings farmed by white and black 
tenants.”6Western Indian Territory’s expansive grasslands supported cattle drives 
and ranching.  Between 1867 and 1887, nearly ten million head of Texas cattle 
moved through the region to Kansas railheads.
7
  The industry’s transitory nature 
fostered an early sense of independence; cattlemen in Indian Territory were less 
formally organized than other Plains stock-growers.  In the south, cattlemen 
negotiated individual leases on Cheyenne-Arapaho and Kiowa-Comanche 
reservation land.  Ranchers who grazed cattle on Cherokee land to the north 
                                                          
5
 Bruce W. Hoagland, “Soils,” in Goins, ed., Historical Atlas, p. 17; Bonnie Lynn-Sherow, Red 
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organized the Cherokee Strip Livestock Association in the early 1880s only to 
resist a federal order to remove their recently-built fences.
8
 
 During a series of land runs in 1889 and the early 1890s, farmers settled 
much of western Oklahoma.  Many of the settlers came from wetter sections of the 
country or from northern sections of the Great Plains where a wet cycle during the 
1870 and 1880s reinforced the sense that the region was universally suited to 
agriculture and cultivation methods practiced in more humid climates.  Following 
the provisions of the 1862 Homestead Act, they settled on 160 acre farms laid out 
in square grids.  Many settlers believed that they were destined to civilize the 
region and that agriculture was a virtuous lifestyle.  They were encouraged by 
pamphlets that advertised Oklahoma as a place “well watered, well timbered, rich 
in soil, [with] a most enchanting clime[.]”  Scientific advice that ‘rain follows the 
plow’ reinforced their faith that they could succeed in Oklahoma and even change 
the climate.
9
 
Settlers ignored warnings that 160-acre homesteads were “ill adapted to the 
realities of the arid West[,]” including the border region between western 
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Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle.  From the 1870s, United States Geological 
Survey (USGS) head John Wesley Powell urged officials to classify western lands 
before settlement.  He also recommended administrative boundaries that respected 
regional water supplies.  Politicians, businessmen and settlers eager to populate the 
West and ignorant of the region’s drought cycles dismissed Powell’s suggestions.  
Consequently, many settlers occupied lands unfit for homesteading.  In western 
Oklahoma during the 1890s, explains historian Michael Reggio, “[n]ot even food 
or water could be taken for granted….It was a happy event when one was lucky 
enough to find good water.”  The grid settlement system also affected subsequent 
municipal water supplies, explains historian Bonnie-Lynn Sherow, since “[s]mall 
towns emerged, not as a consequence of environmentally favorable location, but 
simply because of their placement on the survey.”10 
 The first settlers to charge into OklahomaTerritory during the 1889 Land 
Run suffered through a drought that rendered many of them destitute in 1890.  In 
an unusual departure from the prevailing belief that “government had neither the 
power nor the duty to provide relief and that to do so would weaken character[,]” 
Congress approved nearly fifty thousand dollars to relieve the Oklahoma settlers.  
                                                          
10
The ‘arid West’ received less than 20 inches of rain per year and began at the 100th meridian, 
which formed the border between southwestern Oklahoma and the Texas Panhandle.  In William de 
Buys ed., Seeing Things Whole: The Essential John Wesley Powell (Washington, D.C.: Island 
Press, 2001), pp. 19, 217.Drought cycles were misunderstood in the nineteenth century in large part 
because there was no framework to collect and analyze climatic data on the Great Plains.   Only in 
1870, with the creation of the U.S. Weather Bureau, did the Army Signal Corps begin to 
systematically collect temperature and precipitation data from western weather stations.In 1897 the 
Weather Bureau acknowledged “the primitive state of knowledge about precipitation and admitted 
that there were few observed patterns regarding droughts.”  And not until 1916 did the federal 
government establish a Division of Agricultural Meteorology to study weather patterns.  In Gary D. 
Libecap and Zeynep K. Hansen, “‘Rain Follows the Plow’ and Dryfarming Doctrine: The Climate 
Information Problem and Homestead Failure in the Upper Great Plains, 1890-1925,” The Journal 
of Economic History, vol. 62, no. 1 (March 2002): 93; Michael H. Reggio, “‘Troubled Times’: 
Homesteading in Short-grass Country, 1892-1900,” Chronicles of Oklahoma, vol. 57, no. 2 (June 
1979): 201; Lynn-Sherow, Red Earth, pp. 27-8. 
 16 
 
Drought conditions also plagued settlers following the 1892 land run into the 
Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation in western Indian Territory and the 1893 run 
into the Cherokee Outlet along the Kansas border.  One settler later recalled that 
“the summer of 1893 was one of the driest ever known to Oklahoma, so terrible 
that no wheat was raised and no farm work was to be found anywhere.”  
Sandstorms drove many farmers from the Cherokee Outlet in 1893, and many 
western Oklahoma settlers left their claims following crop failures in 1894 and 
1895.
11
 
Despite dire circumstances, the territorial booster press, needy settlers and 
legislators discouraged relief assistance during the 1890s.  During the 1890 
drought year, for instance, boosters feared the drought’s adverse influence upon 
potential newcomers and investors.  The Oklahoma City Journal feared that the 
new territory might acquire a repellant reputation like “‘drouthyKansas’” after that 
state had similarly solicited assistance.
12
  And settlers struggled to preserve their 
independence.  After surveying conditions near Guthrie in 1890, one official 
reported to his superiors: “Many [homesteaders] are anxious to keep from the 
public the actual condition of things and seem to prefer to die rather than ask for 
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aid.”13  In September 1890, Oklahoma’s newly-formed territorial legislature 
established strict guidelines for drought relief eligibility and distribution, including 
prison terms for misappropriating funds or falsely declaring need.  Moreover, 
territorial legislators who had quickly spent $15,000 on a commercial exhibit at the 
Chicago World’s Fair “debated long and hard” before loaning desperate western 
Oklahoma farmers $10,000 to purchase seed.
14
 
In addition to drought, falling prices burdened Oklahoma farmers in the 
1890s.  Between 1889 and 1897, prices for wheat, corn, and cotton – key 
Oklahoma crops – fell 15, 17 and 30 percent respectively, so that typical 
Oklahoma farmers operated “with annual net losses” by the mid-1890s.  Historian 
Theodore Saloutos attributed the low prices to federal land-grant, immigration and 
irrigation policies, and to new farm machinery that “accelerated agricultural 
production beyond all reasonable market demands.”  Low prices for territorial 
crops also reflected farmers’ growing exposure to distant national and international 
markets.
15
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Disgruntled territorial settlers added their voices to the chorus of Plains 
farmers who had been struggling for decades to reform railroad rates and to secure 
cheaper credit and market control through remedial legislation, cooperative stores 
and marketing associations.  Through the Alliance and Populist Party, Oklahoma 
farmers demanded currency inflation, increased federal regulation and ownership 
of railroads, and a ‘subtreasury’ credit and crop price protection plan for anyone 
who stored their crops in federal warehouses.  The protest movement peaked in 
1896 but was compromised by regional and occupational differences, and distance, 
and subsequently declined with the return of better crop prices in the late 1890s.  
The Populists’ concerns later resounded in farmers’ calls for the federal 
government to purchase surplus crops during the 1920s and New Deal programs to 
provide farm credit and crop price guarantees.
16
 
Following Populism’s decline, lingering poverty made many Oklahoma 
share-croppers receptive to socialist ideas.  In Oklahoma’s southern and eastern 
cotton-producing counties, support for Socialist candidates grew from 1907 to 
1914, but it faded under patriotic pressure and high crop prices during World War 
I.  The quick transformation prompted historian Garin Burbank to conclude that 
agrarian socialism in Oklahoma was merely an outlet for economic distress, not a 
commitment to collective ownership of resources.  Consequently, explains 
historian R. Douglas Hurt,Oklahoma Socialists supported “the distribution of 
privately held land” to landless tenantsinstead of land nationalization in the 1912 
federal election.  Still, the region’s poverty was the seedbed for a sense that federal 
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programs and public works were vital to its economy.Recalled southeast 
Oklahoma’s congressional representative Carl Albert decades later: “Because my 
state was poor and my district poorer, federal aid was no demon; it was a 
deliverer.
17
 
Across the Plains, the 1890s drought fueled agricultural adaptations, 
technical innovations and legislative reforms.  In USDA experimental station 
bulletins and promotional pamphlets, experts promoted new ‘dry-farming’ 
techniques to conserve moisture, including “deep plowing in the fall, packing the 
subsoil, frequently stirring up a dust mulch [and] leaving part of the ground 
unplanted each year to restore moisture.”  Farmers replaced their moldboard plows 
with one-way disk plows that “moved along faster,” and “left a finely pulverized 
surface layer.”  And they switched from corn to more drought-resistant crops, 
including kafir corn, sorghum grain, broomcorn and Turkey Red, a hard winter 
wheat.  Crusaders, including journalist-promoter William E. Smythe and USGS 
hydrologist Frederick H. Newell, urged settlers to irrigate portions of their land.  In 
1902, Congress passed the Reclamation Act to finance western irrigation projects 
through a revolving fund to be repaid by successful settlers.  And in 1909 and 
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1912, Congress amended the homestead law to allow for 320 rather than 160-acre 
homesteads and to reduce both the cultivated acreage and residency terms required 
for title.
18
 
In Oklahoma, the drought and depression crises strengthened expert 
authority, argued Bonnie Lynn-Sherow, because they “gave the scientists at 
Stillwater an entry that might not have existed otherwise.”  Oklahoma experiment 
station director John Field offered advice to the state’s farmers: “‘Grow many 
crops, do not depend upon one crop, but utilize stock to the greatest extent and 
thus secure greater returns and at the same time, keep up the fertility of the soil.’”  
In western Oklahoma, the USDA Woodward Research Station also emphasized 
diversified agricultural production.  In 1921 the station added 160 acres for dairy 
cattle research and by 1924 the station had displayed over 100 varieties of trees 
and shrubs, more than 50 varieties of peaches, 35 varieties of apples, as wells as 
plums, apricots, pears, and 120 varieties of grapes.  Oklahoma farmers who 
expanded to grow new crops, and those who became “part-time stock raisers [to] 
hedge against the failure from drought of their small grain crops[,]” increasingly 
relied on expert advice.  By 1901, farmers from almost every county in Oklahoma 
and Indian Territory had requested information and assistance to combat blackleg, 
a dangerous disease that quickly killed healthy young cattle.  Between 1900 and 
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1913, the Oklahoma experiment station distributed 1,243,000 doses of blackleg 
vaccine.  As a result of the blackleg scare, “farmers came to expect the station’s 
material assistance in a number of other ways” including water testing, insect 
identification, and commercial seed testing.  From 1899 to 1907, circulation of the 
Oklahoma Experimental Station’s bulletin jumped from 13,500 to 25,000 copies.19 
But farmers did not uniformly follow or benefit from scientific advice.  In 
western Oklahoma, “[s]ettlers planted everything at first: corn, broom corn, oats, 
alfalfa, millet, cowpeas and cotton[,]” but gradually “turned to wheat.”  And large-
scale grain farmers displaced many smaller-scale subsistence-oriented farmers in 
western Oklahoma.  Elsewhere, cotton predominated and by 1907 “was the new 
state’s economic mainstay[,]” especially among poor sharecroppers in southern 
and eastern Oklahoma.  Partly these patterns reflected rising crop prices during the 
early 1900s.  They also occurred because diversified farming and scientific 
stewardship was difficult for small farmers who could not spare the acreage for 
feed or soil-building crops.
20
 
During the four-year period 1910-14, farm commodity prices compared 
favorably to prices for industrial goods.  The trade balance, known as ‘parity’, 
became a subsequent benchmark for farmers’ purchasing power.  Through World 
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War I, favorable weather and rising crop prices increased farm prosperity.  Steam 
and gasoline engines boosted yields, and farmers eager to capitalize from high 
grain prices borrowed money to acquire and cultivate more land.  By 1918, write 
historians Anne and H. Wayne Morgan, “Oklahoma agriculture was clearly 
overextended. Cotton, a ruthless consumer of soil fertility, was planted in every 
county [and] [w]heat grew well beyond both its natural and economical 
boundaries.”  Additionally, by 1920 more than half of the state’s farmers were 
tenants with little incentive to practice crop rotations or soil conservation.  The 
situation prompted one observer to lament that the state’s farmers were limited 
intellectually and practiced the “‘most backward agricultural methods’[.]”21 
In the early 1920s as European farmers recovered from the war, prices for 
wheat, cotton and livestock dropped significantly.  Falling commodity prices and 
high production costs squeezed farmers with implement and mortgage debts.  
Between 1919 and 1924, complained an Oklahoma congressman, farmers’ 
purchasing power dropped by more than half.  Many farmers expanded their 
cultivated acreages to compensate for the low prices.  In one Oklahoma Panhandle 
county, for example, wheat acreages rose 300 percent between 1920 and 1929.  In 
1925, the state’s cotton acreage reached its high of 5,396,000 acres and accounted 
for seventy-five percent of farm commodity sales.  Mechanization fueled the trend, 
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especially in the wheat belt.  From 1920 to 1925, the number of tractors on 
Oklahoma farms jumped from 5,800 to 10,000.  Agricultural scientist William 
Lockeretz subsequently observed: “mechanization…reinforced the conversion to 
mechanized methods.  To be able to pay for the new machinery and the additional 
land [that would] make the new machinery economical, plains farmers had to 
become more commercialized than they had been under the older, more diversified 
and more self-sufficient systems.”22 
Through the decade, policy-makers struggled to solve farmers’ 
corresponding crop surplus and income problems.  In 1921, Oklahoma governor 
James Robertson warned of “grave danger thateven the normal production will 
cease unless the farmer and stock-raiser is enabled to obtain afair profit on his 
investment and for his labor.”  Like many of his contemporaries, Robertson 
rejected “paternalistic” assistance and “charity” to remedy the situation.  Instead, 
he urged the state legislature to help agricultural producers organize cooperative 
marketing associations, provide for more timely market reports, and establish 
better product grades and packaging standards.  State leaders soon called for more 
direct governmental assistance.  In 1923, Governor John Walton requested state 
credit to help cooperatives build grain and cotton storage facilities.  And in 1924, 
despite its overwhelming rejection in the House of Representatives, Oklahoma’s 
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representatives unanimously supported the controversial McNary-Haugen bill to 
raise key crop prices through federal purchases.  After commerce secretary Herbert 
Hoover advised President Calvin Coolidge to veto another McNary-Haugen bill in 
1927, Oklahoma Farmers’ Union president John Simpson called Hoover “an 
enemy of farmers[.]”23 
Coolidge repeatedly vetoed the McNary-Haugen plan, but in 1929, with 
Hoover as President, Congress established the Federal Farm Board to finance crop 
storage and marketing associations.  After this approach failed to reduce 
agricultural surpluses, raise farm prices, or restore farmer purchasing power, in 
May 1933, Congress established the Agricultural Adjustment Administration 
(AAA), which paid farmers (from funds raised by taxing processors) to reduce 
their production of basic commodities including wheat, corn, cotton, and hogs.  To 
stabilize farm incomes and reduce price fluctuations, Congress also established the 
Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) which offered non-recourse loans to 
farmers against their federally-stored crops.
24
 
As Congress struggled to raise crop prices and stabilize farm incomes, 
drought again afflicted Oklahoma and the Southern Plains.  Grass shortages 
quickly threatened cattle producers already burdened by over-production and low 
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prices.  Early in 1933, Congress authorized federal loans for drought-stricken 
farmers and ranchers to purchase feed, and railroads discounted shipping rates for 
feed to the drought area.  When these measures failed to raise prices and save 
herds, Congress also implemented a major cattle purchase program.  And in 1934, 
officials added cattle to the list of eligible AAA commodities to benefit desperate 
and independent-minded cattle producers who had initially scorned federal 
production controls.  The same year, Congress passed the Taylor Grazing Act, 
which removed from settlement nearly eighty million acres of the public domain to 
be managed by local grazing districts under the Interior Department’s 
supervision.
25
 
Decades of dry-farming had made soils especially vulnerable to wind 
erosion, and during the 1930s intense dust storms scoured the Southern Plains.  
The center of dust storm activity, known as the ‘Dust Bowl,’ included parts of the 
Oklahoma and Texas panhandles, eastern New Mexico, southeast Colorado and 
southwest Kansas.   In 1934, the region experienced twenty-two dust storms.  That 
figure rose to forty in 1935, to sixty-eight in 1936, and to a high of seventy-two 
dust storms during 1937.  Conservation measures and rain helped to lower the 
number of storms during the 1940s.  By 1941, only seventeen storms hit, and 
officials reported only one dust storm during 1945.
26
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The storms carried a range of social and spiritual implications.  Blowing 
soil aggravated health issues including measles, strep throat, bronchial diseases 
and dust pneumonia.  Dust Bowl residents struggled constantly to perform 
ordinary tasks.  In June 1935, Caroline Henderson wrote from Eva, Oklahoma: 
“[W]e have been trying to rescue our home from…wind-blown dust[.]  It is an 
almost hopeless task, for there is rarely a day when…the dust clouds do not roll 
over….and everything is covered again[.]”  Hard times moved some people to 
humor.  A newspaper editor jokingly complained from southern Kansas: “‘[I] 
haven’t heard a thing for hours, my ears are full, can’t smell, my nose is full, can’t 
walk, my shoes are full but not of feet.’”  Others turned to religion for comfort and 
hope.  Church membership grew throughout the Dust Bowl region during the 
1930s, and many residents viewed the dust storms as signs of the coming 
apocalypse and punishment from God.
27
 
The dust bowl’s social and environmental devastation sparked fundamental 
discussions about the region’s agricultural economy.  Observing the devastation in 
his 1935 book Deserts on the March, the ecologist Paul Sears called the dust 
storms “a symptom and a symbol,” of short-term land-use and management 
patterns, and  “the inevitable result of a system which has ever encouraged 
immediate efficiency without regard to ultimate consequences.”  Soil scientist 
H.H. Finnell believed that the problem was not whether land should be cultivated, 
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but how it should be cultivated.  The historian James Malin subsequently stressed 
that dust storms were a natural phenomenon common before western settlement.
28
 
Some contemporaries tried to downplay dust bowl conditions.  In 1938, for 
instance, an Oklahoma public health official downplayed “‘exaggerated statements 
[and] ‘mass hysteria’” surrounding the storms’ health effects.  But routine front-
page newspaper accounts of the devastation, Dorothea Lange’s vivid photographs 
of Dust Bowl survivors, and the widely-viewed film, The Plow That Broke the 
Plains, directed by Pare Lorentz, drew national attention to the disaster.  Before 
the decade’s end, Lange’s photos and John Steinbeck’s 1939 novel, The Grapes of 
Wrath, made iconic the image of blown-out farmers straggling away from wrecked 
farms.
29
 
To fight the dust storms, in June 1933 Interior Secretary Harold Ickes 
established the Soil Erosion Service (SES) as a temporary agency to demonstrate 
soil and water conservation practices including contour plowing, terracing, and 
strip-cropping.  After immense dust storms reached east coast cities during 1934 
and 1935, Congress made SES activities a permanent function of the Department 
of Agriculture, to be administered by a new agency called the Soil Conservation 
Service (SCS).   Since USDA had very little information on soil types and their 
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distribution in the early 1930s, SCS also surveyed and classified southern plains 
soils.
30
 
In 1936, the Supreme Court ruled that taxing processors to finance AAA 
crop reduction programs was unconstitutional, so Congress married crop reduction 
to soil conservation by paying farmers to shift “from soil-depleting to soil-
conserving crops,” including grasses, legumes, and feed crops.  Congress also 
established the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) which provided SCS 
technical assistance and paid farmers to implement soil conservation practices 
from lists determined annually by local and federal officials.  By 1938, the SCS 
mandate included flood control, sub-marginal land development, drainage and 
irrigation.  To further mitigate drought and price problems, the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act added crop insurance, parity payments, mandatory non-recourse 
loans for corn, wheat and cotton producers, and permanently added the allotment 
program to the USDA budget.
31
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After initial hesitation, Oklahomans responded favorably to soil 
conservation and crop control programs.  In 1932, for instance, voters rejected an 
initiative petition for a new law to regulate the amount of soil-exhausting crops 
farmers could plant.  And in 1936, they rejected a law that would fund and 
empower the Oklahoma Conservation Commission to help federal agencies 
designate suitable soil conservation projects under the Soil Conservation and 
Domestic Allotment Act.
32
   After SCS drafted a 1936 model law to create soil 
conservation districts by local petition and referendum, however, Oklahoma 
quickly passed similar legislation the following year.  The Oklahoma legislature’s 
quick action owed partly to a new federal law requiring states to have soil 
conservation laws in order to qualify for SCS benefits.  Farmers subsequently 
defeated some soil conservation districts at the polls, reported one Dust Bowl 
newspaper, because of  “‘the red tape and technicalities insisted upon by the 
government,’” and from the fear that land control “‘might pass…from the hands of 
the individual farmer to a distant committee or supervising body.’”  But soil 
conservation districts quickly occupied the landscape.  Within a year, Oklahoma 
contained twenty-eight soil conservation districts covering one-third of the state.  
Many farmers adopted new cultivation techniques, including ‘stubble-mulching’ 
through which they left crop stubble in the ground after the harvest to anchor the 
soil and capture moisture.  They also used duck-foot cultivators which minimized 
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the soil’s exposure to heat and wind by stirring it to cut weeds below the surface 
instead of turning it over.
33
 
To qualify for federal subsidies, many landowners cut from production the 
acres they normally rented to tenant farmers.  Since tenants operated more than 
sixty percent of Oklahoma farms in the early 1930s, this response carried 
significant social, economic and environmental implications.  Many eastern 
Oklahoma tenant farmers left the state for California; a move that appealed to 
contemporary and subsequent observers.  In 1937, for example, Oklahoma 
Governor Ernest W. Marland explained to the state legislature: “Farm tenancy is 
the major cause of rural Oklahoma’s social and economic problems.  It is 
inseparably tied to the problems of soil erosion and relief….because the transitory 
tenant farmers…make no effort to conserve the soil….[and] the relief load is 
always far greater in counties where there is the greatest percentage of tenant 
farming.”  Another contemporary observer concluded that Oklahoma’s “‘newly 
broken red plains are among the worst eroded, and its farm people are among the 
least rooted to the soil.’”34 
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Oklahoma’s tenant farmers were exceptionally mobile.  In 1930, for 
instance, forty-four percent of Oklahoma farmers had inhabited their farms for 
fewer than two years.  And a 1937 study of over 1,000 Oklahoma farm families 
from four counties showed that “the average Oklahoma farmer moved four times, 
five if he was a tenant.”  Aside from stewardship issues, this mobility affected the 
ways that farmers understood work.  Over one-third of Oklahoma tenant farmers 
had nonagricultural work experience during the 1930s, “having left farming for a 
time then returned.”  This condition reflected broader circumstances.  For much of 
the cotton-belt, explained historian James Gregory “[n]either occupational 
categories nor communities of residence enjoyed much constancy.  Today’s oil 
worker was yesterday’s farmer and tomorrow’s farm laborer.”35 
To help stabilize the farm population and eroded soil, the federal 
government purchased sub-marginal land, relocated residents and re-grassed 
drifting areas.  The Resettlement Administration coordinated and directed land 
purchase and relocation programs from 1935 to 1937, when the Farm Security 
Administration (FSA) assumed the task.
36
  FSA also granted loans to farmers 
“whose operations promised to be self-sustaining, provided they had adequate 
access to equipment, seed and livestock.”  Opposition from landowners unwilling 
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to move or sell their land for its current appraised value, businessmen afraid to lose 
customers, and local governments afraid to lose tax revenues helped to end the 
land purchase program in the early 1940s.  But by the 1950s, FSA’s successor, the 
Farm Home Administration (FHA) was an important alternative for farmers unable 
to secure loans at commercial banks.
37
 
Despite resistance to New Deal resettlement programs, the 1930s 
depression and drought changed farmers’ expectations about government’s 
economic and social roles.  In 1930, for instance, Oklahoma Farmers’ Union 
president John A. Simpson became president of the national organization because 
he vehemently opposed production limits.  Also that year, Oklahomans elected as 
governor, William Murray, a fiscal conservative who resisted debt or inflation to 
solve the economic crisis, and who believed that charity was a private concern.  In 
early 1931, newspapers boasted that Oklahoma’s Panhandle counties refused 
drought relief assistance.  Historians have noted too, that during the early 1930s 
“Oklahomans consistently defeated initiative petitions to increase state funds for 
relief.”38 
By 1932 however, most farmers began to support the domestic allotment 
plan that included acreage restrictions and taxes on processors of basic farm 
                                                          
37
 Hurt called them ‘standard’ loans.  “These loans,” he explained, “were granted to farmers whose 
operations promised to be self-sustaining provided they had adequate access to equipment, seed, 
and livestock [and] to enable farmers to shift emphasis from cash grain farming to mixed farming 
with greater emphasis on raising livestock.” To give farmers the needed time to effect the shift, 
these loans were repayable over ten years.  In Hurt, The Dust Bowl, pp. 95, 118.  Congress also 
authorized land-purchase loans to farm tenants and ‘rehabilitative’ loans so farmers without 
alternative credit could purchase “livestock, equipment, and other farm-operating needs, and for 
family subsistence.”  In Ottoson et al., Land and People, pp. 84-5; R. Douglas Hurt, “The National 
Grasslands: Origin and Development in the Dust Bowl,” Agricultural History, vol. 59, no. 1 
(January 1985): 149. 
38
 Instead of production cuts to raise farmers’ incomes, Simpson wanted a public works program, 
currency inflation and farm mortgage refinancing.  In Milligan and Norris, “John A. Simpson,” pp. 
373-4, 378-80; Bonnifield, The Dust Bowl, p. 38; Morgan and Morgan, Oklahoma, p. 126. 
 33 
 
commodities.  And as the depression deepened, “Murray joined other governors in 
seeking federal funds.”  In 1937 Oklahomans elected E.W. Marland as governor 
for his pledge to “bring the New Deal to Oklahoma.”  To cooperate with federal 
public works programs, Marland’s administration established the Oklahoma State 
Planning Board (OSPB) to inventory “natural, agricultural, industrial and human 
resources…and [to] develop plans and programs for the conservation and better 
utilization of these resources.”  When he came to office in January 1939, 
Oklahoma Governor Leon Phillips explained: “Our people have come to the place 
where they demand more of the government than was expected when our State 
was first admitted.”39 
During the 1930s, reformers learned to mitigate drought through 
agricultural adjustments.  That lesson appeared most clearly in the 1936 report The 
Future of the Great Plains, prepared by the Great Plains Committee (GPC), a 
group appointed by President Franklin D. Roosevelt to assess conditions on the 
Great Plains.  To reduce the region’s environmental and economic vulnerabilities, 
GPC emphasized agricultural adjustments including land surveys, resettlement, 
bigger farms, erosion control districts and crop production shifts.  As he presented 
the report to Congress, Roosevelt explained: “The problem is one of arresting the 
decline of an agricultural economy not adapted to [its] climatic conditions….A 
new economy must be developed which is based on the conservation and effective 
utilization of all the water available [and] which represents generally a more 
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rational adjustment of the organization of agriculture and cropping plans and 
methods to natural conditions.”  New Deal agricultural reform also contained 
fundamental tensions, explained historian Donald Worster, since “a large number 
of USDA bureaucrats [wanted] to enable the commercial farm sector to compete 
more successfully with manufacturing [while] other officials concentrated on the 
rural poor [and tried] to keep as many farm families on the land as possible.”40 
In several respects, Congress responded to FDR’s call to conserve and 
effectively use great plains water, but the federal government did little to promote 
irrigation during the 1930s.  The 1937 Water Facilities Act authorized $5 million 
to great plains water development projects and maintenance, but limited assistance 
for any single project to a maximum of $50,000.  For several years, the 1939 Case-
Wheeler Act authorized WPA and CCC relief labor to great plains irrigation 
projects.
41
  Additionally, the 1939 Reclamation Project Act eased federal water 
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project repayment obligations for local organizations including irrigation districts 
and water users’ associations, and it authorized the Bureau of Reclamation to 
supply municipal water as long as the agreement did not “impair the efficiency of 
the contract for irrigation purposes.”42 
More than a move to irrigate the Plains during the 1930s, these laws 
reflected organized western pressure for federal reclamation assistance.
43
  
Delegates to the 1932 Western Governors’ Conference in Salt Lake City had 
organized the National Reclamation Association to cooperate with the Bureau of 
Reclamation “in urging desirable legislation and the speedy completion of 
projects[.]”   These laws also pointed to growing federal spending for water 
development during and after World War II.  By one account, “[f]ederal money for 
western water development rose from $33 million in 1939 to $230 million in 1949 
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and stayed on that higher plateau thereafter.”  And they reflected reclamation’s 
expansion eastward during the 1930s, as Oklahoma and Kansas joined the 
organization in 1939.   After the 1930s, the Bureau of Reclamation’s focus moved 
“from the rural to the urban West.”44 
 As federal agencies expanded their conservation, water development and 
flood control activities during and after the 1930s, their spheres collided.
45
  Federal 
flood control activity increased following the 1936 Flood Control Act, which made 
the federal government responsible for flood control throughout the country.  The 
law assigned major flood control responsibility to the Corps of Engineers but it 
also tasked USDA to study upstream flood prevention.
46
  For federal agencies, the 
WashitaBasin, in southwest Oklahoma became contested terrain.  In 1937, 
Congress appropriated nearly $1.5 million for USDA land and water conservation 
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on the WashitaRiver.  By the end of 1938, the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of 
Reclamation and the USDA were all surveying the Washita basin.
47
 
The Army Corps of Engineers lobbied aggressively for congressional 
approval to construct large, multi-purpose dams on the Red River, especially the 
Denison Dam at the mouth of the WashitaRiver.  Congressmen from Texas, 
Arkansas, Louisiana and Oklahoma supported the Denison Dam because it 
promised to control downstream floods.  Opponents included upstream farmers 
and Oklahoma governor Leon J. Phillips, who adopted USDA arguments, saying: 
“To be economic and effective, a program of water conservation and flood 
prevention must have its beginning at the ‘headwaters’….We want to hold every 
drop of water as near the place it falls as we can[.]”  Despite this opposition, 
Congress authorized the Denison project in 1938 and the dam was completed in 
1944.
48
 
Congress also recognized the benefits to upstream flood control, and the 
1944 Flood Control Act boosted USDA flood control work by tasking the Soil 
Conservation Service (SCS) to develop upstream erosion and flood prevention 
projects on eleven specific watersheds nationwide, including the Washita and its 
tributaries.  By the 1950s, Sandstone Creek, in southwestern Oklahoma, was the 
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nation’s first completed upstream flood prevention project.  The project was so 
successful that Congress made upstream flood control a permanent federal activity 
with the 1954 Watershed Protection and Flood Protection Act.
49
 
Tension between farmers and townsfolk during the Denison Dam 
controversy reflected broader technological and demographic changes.  From 1940 
to 1969, America’s farm population dropped from over 30 million to less than 10 
million, the number of farms dropped from over 6 million to about 3 million and 
average farm sizes rose from approximately 150 acres to over 350 acres.
50
  
Similarly, the percentage of Oklahomans involved in agriculture dropped from 
nearly 41 percent to only about 8 percent during the period 1907 to 1957.  Partly 
these changes owed to technologies like tractors that made it easier to farm bigger 
acreages with less manpower.  Tractor ownership that had grown substantially 
after World War I virtually exploded after World War II.  In 1920, three percent of 
Oklahoma farms had tractors, a figure that rose to 11.4 percent in 1930 and 22.9 
percent in 1940.  From 1940 to 1950 that figure sky-rocketed to 50.4 percent.  As 
tractors replaced manpower, farm sizes grew and farmers moved to towns and 
cities.  Oklahoma’s urban population grew by over twenty-five percent during the 
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1940s.
51
   Urban growth owed also to opportunities in “factories and military 
airfields [that] dotted the prairies” during and after World War II.  The change 
stressed water supplies because cities consumed more water per capita than their 
rural counterparts.
52
 
Even as cities grew in stature and size, the return of adequate rainfall in the 
late 1930s and growing overseas markets during World War II benefitted farmers.  
To encourage agricultural production during WWII, the federal government 
guaranteed ninety percent of parity for key commodities, including corn, cotton, 
peanuts, and wheat.  During 1944-45, the CCC guaranteed cotton farmers 100 
percent of parity for their crops and USDA gradually relaxed acreage restrictions 
where farmers planted war crops.  Their new tractors enabled many farmers to 
grow commercial crops on land formerly used to grow horse and mule feed.  
Consequently, many New Deal reforms lost momentum.  Through World War II, 
by one account, “as much as 4,000,000 acres were replowed on the central and 
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2009.  By 1950, nearly fifty percent (49.6%) of Oklahomans lived in cities or towns.  In Oklahoma 
Long Range Water Program: Report to the Governor and Legislature, prepared by the State-wide 
Engineering Committee, December 1954, pp. 11, 13.   
52
 Morgan and Morgan, Oklahoma, p. 133.  From U.S. Geological Survey Circular 115 (1951), 
geographer PeverilMeigs observed that “per capita use of water increases as the economic structure 
becomes more complex and the standard of living rises.”  Per capita consumption in cities 
(including water for domestic, city and some industrial uses) averaged 145 gallons per day during 
the 1950s, compared to rural consumption of from 80 gallons (in houses with running water) to 10 
gallons (those without running water) per day.In PeverilMeigs, “Water Problems in the United 
States,” Geographical Review, vol. 42, no. 3 (July 1952), p. 347.   
 40 
 
southern High Plains, 3,000,000 of which had previously been labeled unfit for 
cultivation.”  In 1949, Oklahomans planted a record seven million acres of 
wheat.
53
 
The Marshall Plan to secure post-war Europe and the Korean War 
compelled Agriculture Secretary Charles Brannan to maintain high price supports 
into the early 1950s.  When the Korean War ended in 1953, however, growing 
surpluses and falling farm prices led to renewed acreage allotments.  Farmers 
wishing to qualify for CCC loans in 1954 had to restrict their acreages of key 
commodities.  To maintain their production, many farmers applied new 
technologies to their small acreages.  For instance, nitrogen fertilizer use grew by 
nearly 650 percent per year from 1949 to 1968.   Consequently, nationwide crop 
production rose nearly forty-five percent from 1949 to 1968 despite a sixteen 
percent decline in harvested acreage.
54
 
As farmers invested in new technologies to increase their yields, farm 
capital requirements, operational costs and living expenses rose.  In 1955, 
Oklahoma Governor Raymond Gary explained to the state legislature: “During the 
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past 25 years the farmer’s expenses have gone from 25% of his gross income to 
75% or 80%.”  And more production inputs, like fuel and fertilizer, involved cash 
expenditures.  Smaller profit margins, along with higher debt and cash costs made 
small and new farms especially vulnerable to environmental and market swings.  
In 1960, agricultural economist Harold Ottoson explained that “[a] few successive 
years of drought, coupled with high cash costs of operation, [can] severely cripple 
the capital and credit position of farmers who might be struggling to get 
established and who [have] comparatively small initial equities.”55 
By the 1950s, Oklahoma agriculture reflected other changes.  Since the 
1920s, wheat and cattle had replaced cotton as Oklahoma’s major crops.  From 
1925 to 1952, Oklahoma’s cotton acreage declined from 5.4 million acres to just 
over one million acres and its proportion of state crop revenues dropped from 75 
percent to just 15 percent.  In 1952, cattle brought $234 million compared to $52 
million for cotton.  In fact, except for one year during the period 1935 to 1952, 
livestock – and especially cattle – generated most of Oklahoma’s agricultural 
revenues.  The late 1940s were especially profitable for cattlemen, as beef prices 
and consumption reached record highs.  Reflecting the change, from the mid-
1940s to the 1970s, researchers at the USDA station in Woodward, Oklahoma, 
shifted from mixed farming and dairy studies to focus almost exclusively on range 
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management and beef cattle.  In 1953, the station closed its dairy and in 1964 
ended its research on fruits, vegetables, trees and shrubs.
56
 
Less dominant than cattle, but still significant, wheat generated $178 
million in 1952.  By mid-century, Oklahoma customarily ranked third in wheat 
production behind Kansas and North Dakota, and geographers included western 
Oklahoma in the ‘American Granary’ which stretched from Texas to the Canadian 
border.  Since profitable grain production required big acreages and highly-
mechanized operations, western Oklahoma wheat farms were bigger and more 
expensive than the state average.  In 1949, western Oklahoma farms averaged 653 
acres in size, compared to the state average of 253 acres, and the land and 
buildings on western Oklahoma farms were worth more than double the state 
average.  Of western Oklahoma during the 1950s, geographers Haystead and Fite 
observed “farms are large and they are rapidly growing larger.”  The rapid change 
clashed with traditional values:  “The tradition of the 160-acre homestead still 
holds its destructive grip on much farm thinking,” they explained, “but on the 
whole, farmers must rely on extensive operations.”  Shortly afterward, land 
utilization professor Edward Higbee explained: “Farming has become a high-speed 
business rather than a philosophy or a way of life [and while] most of the land will 
continue to be devoted to husbandry, the newer ways of rural life will bear little 
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resemblance to those of the past.  The culture, even more than the agriculture, of 
185 million Americans is in flux.”57 
As many farms grew in size, smaller farmers who resisted the squeeze 
increasingly needed off-farm work.  From 1930 to 1954, the number of part-time 
farmers in Oklahoma more than doubled, from approximately 18,000 to over 
40,000.  Where they had constituted less than twenty percent of the state’s farmers 
in 1930, part-time farmers constituted nearly seventy percent of their number in 
1954.  These changes were nationwide.  By 1958, USDA Yearbook editor Alfred 
Stefferud urged readers to consider recent changes, including “[t]he growth of 
population and cities, the growth of the size of farms [and] the expanding numbers 
of part-time and residential ‘farms’[.]”58 
New priorities and sensibilities accompanied the Oklahoma’s changing 
demographic and economic structures.  Previously, Oklahoma governors 
proclaimed agriculture’s fundamental importance, calling it “our most important 
industry,” “the substructure of civilization,” and the state’s “outstanding, 
predominating industry.”  During congressional hearings in 1926, Oklahoma 
Representative William W. Hastings had called agriculture the nation’s “greatest 
basic industry,” and warned that “‘to further impoverish and destroy’ the farm 
economy guaranteed that every type of business would be harmed.”  After World 
War II, however, state legislators and ambitious leaders increasingly emphasized 
the state’s urban, commercial and industrial future.  In 1947, for instance, 
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Governor Roy J. Turner reversed earlier rhetoric and called industrial development 
“a boon to the economic stability and welfare of farmers and stockmen” because it 
created new markets.  The same year, Oklahoma business leaders financed an 
exhibition of state products to attract investment from eastern cities, a move that 
helped boost industrial development by thirty-six percent in 1948, compared to a 
national increase of only ten percent.
59
   In 1951, incoming governor Johnston 
Murray promised that one of his “first official acts [would] be to call a series of 
conferences with…experts in the manufacturing world, to try and determine what 
is the most feasible plan of offering inducement to outside capital to bring them 
into the State of Oklahoma.”  In January 1957, Oklahoma governor Raymond 
Gary proclaimed “a bright new era in Oklahoma” with the recent addition of 
nearly 45,000 non-agricultural jobs.  Gary respected the state’s agricultural 
heritage, but he envisioned a different future:  “Our forefathers gripped firmly the 
handles of a moleboard plow, as they guided it behind a strong team of 
horses….We, too, have plow handles which we must grasp firmly.  Ours is not a 
plow to turn new sod, but one to turn new ideas into new job opportunities.”  
Reflecting the new orientation, during the summer of 1957 Oklahoma Agricultural 
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and Mechanical College (A&M) officially changed its name to Oklahoma State 
University (OSU).
60
 
Central to Oklahoma’s post-war industrial development was Robert S. 
Kerr, governor from 1943 to 1947 and senator through the 1950s.  Like others of 
his generation, Kerr learned during the 1930s that economic “[s]tability and 
growth must clearly come through diversification, planning, and conservation.”  
His rural Oklahoma roots and his experiences during the 1930s made him 
sympathetic to soil and water conservation.  “Born into Oklahoma’s rural poverty 
and raised with a passionate and intense identification with the land,” wrote his 
biographer Anne H. Morgan, “Robert Kerr understood and cared about the 
problems of the little farmer.”  He held his Senate seat because of a willingness to 
stand “for hours in the blistering Oklahoma sun listening intently to weatherbeaten 
farmers’ hard luck stories about the ravages of wind and drought.”61 
A devastating 1943 flood that ravaged northeast Oklahoma convinced Kerr 
that the state’s security and economic vitality required water management.  
Following that disaster he wrote, “I began to set my sights on a remedial program 
[that] would control the water to prevent the terrible destruction of flood, and to 
conserve and use it, to lessen and mitigate the damage from drought.”  He 
explained water’s industrial importance to National Reclamation Association 
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members in 1947: “Time and again…our state has lost out on the establishment of 
new industries where thousands of men could find employment [because] we 
would not furnish ample and cheap industrial water.”  In the Senate, Kerr sat on 
influential committees including Finance and Public Works where he helped 
sympathetic colleagues develop their public works projects while building support 
for his own, especially the Arkansas navigation system, a 448-mile system of 
channels, dams and reservoirs that linked Oklahoma to the Mississippi River.  His 
success with that project prompted Corps of Engineers Tulsa District historian 
William A. Settle Jr. to call him “one of the most powerful members the Senate 
has ever had.”62 
Kerr’s success was especially remarkable given the political climate in 
Washingtonduring the 1950s.  As President from 1953 to 1961, Dwight 
Eisenhower wanted to reduce federal spending through a “partnership” approach 
to natural resource development.   He explained the principle in his first State of 
the Union address, saying “[t]he best natural resources program for America will 
not result from exclusive dependence on the federal bureaucracy.  It will involve a 
partnership of the states and local communities, private citizens and the Federal 
government, all working together.”  This approach essentially reversed New Deal 
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Interior Secretary Harold Ickes’ efforts to place “national control before state or 
local initiative.”  And it contradicted Kerr’s belief “that prosperity following 
[World War II] would require the extension, not the contraction, of federal activity 
to develop natural resources and power to fuel industrial expansion” and “that 
Oklahoma’s industrial development, as well as the expansion of her agricultural 
base, depended on federal development of national water resources.”  The 
“partnership” plan was significant to Oklahoma water development, explained 
Anne H. Morgan, because it “meant that [many] projects…would have to attract 
massive local funding to survive.”63 
Eisenhower also wanted to eliminate price supports and crop surpluses 
through a freer market for farm products.  “[H]is ultimate goal[,]” explained 
biographer Stephen Ambrose, “was to end both parity and the government controls 
that went with it.”  To this end, he hired as Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft 
Benson, who believed that “freedom, both personal and economic, was an 
inalienable and God-given right[,]” and that “[p]ersonal accountability for the 
moral or material consequences of freely arrived at decisions were a corollary to 
liberty.”  Benson was a Mormon.  Along with a Master’s degree in Agricultural 
Economics, he had practical and administrative experience that included time in 
the extension service, over four years as Executive Secretary of the National 
Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and service on the National Agricultural 
Advisory Committee during World War II.  He believed firmly that federal 
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interference in the nation’s economy could degenerate society.  In 1950, he  had 
warned an audience that “a planned and subsidized economy weakens initiative, 
discourages industry, destroys character, and demoralizes the people.”  In policy 
terms, these tenets meant smaller government regulation and support.  According 
to his biographers, Edward L. and Frederick H. Schapsmeier, Benson believed that 
American farm policy after World War II “encouraged small and inefficient (or 
even marginal) farmers to cling to their land as a source of income,” and he 
wanted to “reorient the USDA away from the acreage allotment-production control 
policy and prepare the way for more emphasis upon marketing, expansion of 
overseas outlets, and increased utilization and research.”64 
Benson’s economic philosophy, Eisenhower’s political vision, and 
Oklahoma’s agricultural and industrial ambitions were all important ingredients to 
the state’s drought experiences during the 1950s.  As the disaster crept across the 
Southwest and into Oklahoma, struggling farmers, ranchers, and towns sought 
federal assistance to overcome economic hardships and water shortages.  The 
tensions and solutions that emerged from the crisis reflected historic patterns and 
new priorities.  As it had during the 1930s, the drought oriented agricultural 
producers with technical experts, and it heightened debate and discussion on 
appropriate soil and water conservation techniques.  It also grew the state 
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bureaucracy.  During the 1950s, however, that debate produced a new approach to 
Great Plains conservation and a broader sense for the drought’s economic 
consequences. 
 50 
 
Chapter 2 – Agricultural Conservation during the 1950s Drought 
 
As they had during the 1930s, dust storms scoured the Southern Plains 
during the late 1940s and 1950s.  In contrast to the 1930s, however, most of the 
storms originated outside of the former Dust Bowl region, in parts of eastern 
Colorado and western Texas where farmers had broken land to capitalize on high 
crop prices during World War II.  By the mid-1950s, blowing soil had damaged 
nearly as many acres as during the 1930s.  Emergency tillage assistance and 
existing conservation programs to prevent soil erosion proved inadequate to 
protect farmers’ long-term economic interests.  To address the problem, federal 
and regional officials met during 1955 to reconsider conservation on the Great 
Plains.  They developed the Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP), 
authorized by Congress the following year.  GPCP addressed a widely perceived 
need for flexible solutions to individual farm and ranch conservation needs.  It 
protected farmers’ allotments during drought and it gave farmers more time to 
implement comprehensive conservation programs on their farms.  But the program 
only partially reflected soil and water conservation in Oklahoma during the 1950s 
drought.  It only applied to the state’s western region.  During the 1950s, 
production techniques to mitigate dry conditions – like grass farming and irrigation 
– followed the drought into normally humid areas east of GPCP boundaries.  And 
the control farmers acquired through the program ran counter to their heightened 
and growing reliance on technical systems and expert advice to conserve soil and 
water. 
 51 
 
 
As drought conditions intensified during the late 1940s, dust storms 
increasingly afflicted the Southern Plains.  In August 1948, soil scientist H.H. 
Finnell observed: “Three years ago…in the whole plains country…there was only 
one major dust storm.  Last year three big dust storms sprang up in the cotton, 
sorghum and bean area of Texas and New Mexico.  This year in the blow season 
from January to May, there were [seventeen].”  During the spring of 1950, dust 
storms “swirled from Texas to North Dakota” and University of Kansas 
Geography department chairman Walter M. Kollmorgen warned of “worse dust 
storms than those experienced in the ‘Thirties’.”  In December 1951, dust storms 
ravaged the Texas Panhandle and threatened nearly 500,000 acres of wheat in 
Oklahoma.  During the winter and spring of 1953, dust storms from Colorado and 
Kansas “engulfed” Oklahoma, reducing visibility in some areas to less than a mile.  
As they had during the 1930s, May 1953 dust storms reached the Atlantic coast 
and left “reddish, sandy dirt” on cars in New York City.  From January to August 
1953, officials estimated that wind erosion had damaged 5.5 million acres of 
southern plains land.  In February 1954, the worst dust storm in nearly twenty 
years blew from Nebraska to Mexico, leaving three inches of silt on sidewalks in 
southwest Kansas and more than 116 pounds of dust per acre on farms in 
southwest Oklahoma.  That year, observers joked that Kansas was the best place to 
get a Colorado farm.
1
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More seriously, in March 1954 the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) 
reported that the acreage under active erosion on the Southern Plains was over 9.2 
million acres, a figure “only slightly less than the total acreage damaged by wind 
storms and drought in the Dust Bowl days of the [1930s].”  By June, the agency 
reported that wind erosion had damaged 16,760,000 acres on the Southern Plains, 
with another 14,830,000 acres still vulnerable.  Most of the blowing soil came 
from an area spanning eastern Colorado and western Kansas, and from the West 
Texas cotton farms south of Lubbock.  Eastern Colorado had for several years 
been especially problematic, having produced 6 of the 11 southern plains dust 
storms in 1952, 17 of 41 storms in 1953, and 21 of 29 storms during the spring of 
1954.
2
 
Contemporaries attributed the storms to sub-marginal land cultivation 
during and after World War II.  Following spring 1950 dust storms, for instance, 
the New York Times explained: “A rush to cash in on the wartime and post-war 
boom in agricultural prices brought about the intensive plowing and sowing to 
wheat of land unsuited for crops.”  Despite lessons learned during the 1930s, Great 
Plains Council members, including PMA, SCS, and extension service personnel 
were “ready to abandon long-delayed conservation work and turn to all-out food 
and fiber production” during the Korean War.  For 1951, officials raised the 
nation’s wheat allocations from 71.5 million acres to 72.8 million acres.  USDA 
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statistician Sherman Johnson explained that the increase “‘was a safeguard in view 
of the changing world situation, and the need for a contingency reserve.’”  Another 
USDA official explained to reporters that in order to meet anticipated demand: 
“‘We’ll have to gamble with a greater breaking out of sod, especially in marginal 
areas where rainfall is the governing factor.’”3 
Some officials foresaw the erosion threat.  During the mid-1940s, for 
instance, an SCS drought specialist told conservationist Bernard DeVoto that the 
next dust bowl would come in Colorado.  And after southeast Colorado produced 
ominous dust storms during 1948, H.H. Finnell identified a “marginal zone of 
major risk….along the western fringe of dry farming….beyond the former Dust 
Bowl areas….where semi-arid climate breaks off into arid climate…[and] where 
the sandy loams merge into shifty, loose sands[.]”  In 1951, renowned soil 
conservationist H.H. Bennett warned that while “‘people in the heart of the old 
dust bowl country aren’t breaking out much new land….[t]rouble may come, 
however, on the fringes of this country, where some people are planting cotton, 
peanuts and wheat on land that isn’t suitable for crops in drouth.”  Within that 
fringe area, in southeast Colorado’s KiowaCounty, for instance, wheat acreage 
ballooned from 4,939 acres in 1942 to 225,000 acres in 1953.  By 1954, over half 
of the county was blowing.  That year, SCS reported that from seventy-five to 
ninety percent of the nearly 3.5 million acres broken on the Southern Plains since 
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1942 should not have been cultivated.  By contrast, the 1930s Dust Bowl region, 
including large portions of the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles, comprised “a 
fairly well-stabilized area[.]”4 
Observers credited farmers in the old Dust Bowl region for having learned 
valuable lessons during the 1930s.  SCS chief Donald Williams explained, for 
instance, that farmers in the old Dust Bowl knew more than they did in the 1930s 
and had better tillage equipment.  During the 1930s, many Panhandle farmers had 
learned to hold dry soil against the wind by cultivating crops in alternate rows 
(strip-farming) and by keeping stubble in the ground after the harvest.  
Additionally, ranchers had learned not to over-graze their ranges.  In the spring of 
1954, the New York Times reported: “unlike the tragic days of the first Dust Bowl, 
the [Oklahoma] Panhandle is now covered with better stands of crops and the 
grassland is more fully protected.  Some winter wheat is up high enough to hold 
down the soil, and the stubble from some of last year’s sorghum is also serving as 
an effective anchor.”  CimarronCounty agent Pete Williams explained to the Tulsa 
Tribune that where most farmers had cut their wheat too low during the 1930s and 
had not adequately furrowed to catch blowing soil, by the 1950s, they “‘left their 
stunted wheat in the ground and pastured it lightly.’”  Historian R. Douglas Hurt 
subsequently concluded, “the Dust Bowl did not return to the distressing and tragic 
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conditions of twenty years earlier [because] farmers now understood the 
relationship between soil conservation and successful farming.”5 
The Oklahoma Panhandle was not entirely stable, however.  In January 
1953, observers described “more bare lands subject to wind erosion in Oklahoma 
and west Texas than at any time since the dust storms of the 1930s.”  During the 
spring of 1954, the Tulsa Tribune called the Oklahoma Panhandle, “an area of 
distress in between two regions of disaster” and warned that “the topsoil in much 
of western Oklahoma is getting to the dangerous powder stage where it can blow 
from between the crop rows.”  Aware that their farms were increasingly vulnerable 
to erosion, especially as the drought continued, Oklahoma farmers joined a 
delegation in Washington to request federal assistance to stop the dust storms.
6
 
In March 1954, before the Senate Forestry and Agriculture Committee, 
witnesses from southern plains states emphasized conditions within and near the 
blowing areas.  Lamar, Colorado farmer Lail Schmidt explained that for sixty 
hours the previous week “we could not see the sun.”  Boise City, Oklahoma, 
farmer Roy Nall explained: “It is so bad that a man cannot….even see the radiator 
cap on his tractor[.]”  Farmers wanted money to pay for emergency tillage.  “Our 
                                                          
5
Oklahoman, 22 May 1955, p. 145.  The historian R. Douglas Hurt later explained that federal land-
use and demonstration projects established during the 1930s “helped to ensure the best 
conservation and land-use…following the return of normal precipitation to the dust bowl.”  In R. 
Douglas Hurt, “The National Grasslands: Origin and Development in the Dust Bowl,” Agricultural 
History, vol. 59, no. 1 (January 1985), p. 156; Richard Lowitt, American Outback: the Oklahoma 
Panhandle in the Twentieth Century (Lubbock: TexasTechUniversity, 2006), pp. 44, 51-2.  Texas 
Panhandle farmers were similarly well-prepared for drought, reported The New York Times, since 
“‘[t]hey know more about combating erosion than they did in the first Dust Bowl.’” In New York 
Times, 11 April 1954, p. 82; Tulsa Tribune, 3 April 1954, p. 11;R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust Bowl: 
An Agricultural and Social History (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981), p. 154.  Where soil was blowing, 
historian Donald Worster saw a cultural failure, not a lack of understanding.  “[I]t should have been 
clear to everyone that the persistent problem of the plains was not…incompetence or ignorance,” 
he explained, “but motivation.” In Worster, Dust Bowl, p. 228. 
6
Oklahoman, 1 January 1953, p. 1; Tulsa Tribune, 3 April 1954, p. 11. 
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difficulty now is keeping the other man off of us[,]” explained Schmidt.  “Why 
does he not stay off of us?  Because he does not have the money to do it.  We have 
people who have [two] or [three] tractors.  They are running [one] themselves but 
cannot afford to hire somebody to run the other [two].”  Southwest Kansas farmer 
Merlin Carter explained that some farmers did not work their land because “they 
did not have any money and they were too proud to admit it.”7 
Following the hearings, Congress authorized USDA to provide $2.5 
million in emergency funds for state and local governments to control wind 
erosion.  Farmers could also apply for existing USDA assistance including 
Farmers’ Home Administration (FHA) production and subsistence loans, water 
facilities loans and Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) payments.
8
  In May, 
after southern plains governors from New Mexico, Texas, Oklahoma, Colorado 
and Kansas appealed for more assistance, Congress authorized an additional $15 
million to fund emergency conservation activities including $1.25 per acre for 
deep-plowing, a tillage technique that broke and stirred hard-packed soil on the 
cultivation floor to help anchor light and easily-blown sand.
9
 
To the county level, the emergency assistance respected local conditions.  
In Oklahoma Panhandle counties, for instance, state Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation (ASC) committees determined which farmers and practices qualified 
                                                          
7
U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, Emergency Assistance for 
Drought Areas, Hearing, 23 March 1954, pp. 2, 17, 3-4, 13. 
8
 The $2.5 million came from the President’s $10 million emergency allocation to transport hay to 
farmers and ranchers in drought areas the previous summer. During 1954, the ACP program 
included temporary federal cost-sharing for tillage operations to control the immediate soil-blowing 
problem and to establish protective vegetative cover.  In K.L. Scott 6 April 1954 letter to C.M. 
Mouser, in Emergency Assistance for Drought Areas, Hearing, 23 March 1954, pp. 21, 23. 
9
 They also requested more and longer credit and lending programs for Plains farmers.  In The New 
York Times, 27 April 1954, p. 22; National Union Farmer, June 1954, p. 8. 
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for assistance.  Below the county level, however, the program was less flexible.  
Across TexasCounty, for instance, two practices qualified for assistance.  Eligible 
farmers could receive payments of $1.25 per acre for field strip cropping and $1 
per acre for planting broomcorn, sorghums or Sudan grass.  Cover crops had to be 
planted before 15 July 1954 and farmers were required to keep at least four inches 
of stubble through the following spring.  Strip-crops had to be alternated with 
listing or chiseling and planted at right angles to the wind.  Furthermore, assistance 
to plant cover crops was limited to a maximum of half the cropland area planted, 
and only on land not eligible for wheat allotments.
10
 
Farmers wanted more flexible assistance.  In the March 1954 hearings, for 
instance, Colorado farmer Lail Schmidt had recommended that deep-plowing 
assistance “be set up, not only by counties or by States or anything like that, but to 
the area that is affected by this disaster[.]”  Witnesses had also described to 
Congress constantly changing winds, a circumstance that challenged rigid planting 
requirements.  Boise City, Oklahoma, farmer Roy Nall explained that “one day the 
wind [comes] from the north; the next day from the south; the next day from the 
west[.]”  To remedy effectively the situation also required time, explained H.H. 
Finnell: “at least a year to grow an effective cover crop on the acreage of bare soil 
now exposed [and] time required to sell the idea of planting cover crops to the 
owners and operators of marginal farms.”11 
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Guymon Daily Herald, 12 May 1954, p. 1. 
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Emergency Assistance for Drought Areas, Hearing, 23 March 1954, pp. 5, 17; H.H. Finnell, “The 
Dust Storms of 1954,” p. 26. He also explained: “Today’s conditions took several years to develop 
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How to preserve their allotments during the drought also concerned 
farmers.
12
  Because the commodity surplus program assigned allotments according 
to individuals’ cropped-acreage histories, drought-area producers wanted their 
allotments to account for acreages unplanted and lost because of the drought.  For 
this reason, Oklahoma Cotton Ginner’s Association Secretary J.D. Fleming 
emphasized to Oklahoma congressman Carl Albert that the state had lost nearly 
250,000 acres to drought during 1953.  In 1954, CimarronCounty farmers 
complained to Agriculture Secretary Benson that their wheat acreage allotments 
had dropped nearly twelve percent more than the national average because they 
had been practicing drought-related cropping strategies.  And southern plains SCD 
supervisors meeting in Amarillo to discuss the wind erosion problem agreed that 
“[t]he present system of granting acreage allotments on the basis of past history 
rather than proper land use has seriously aggravated the erosion problem and 
penalizes the conservation farmer or rancher.”13  USDA officials kept a rigid 
approach to the issue.  When Oklahoma congressman Victor Wickersham pushed 
for changes to the allotment program, USDA Agricultural Credit Services director 
K.L. Scott bluntly informed him that the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act 
                                                          
12
 To stabilize agriculture during the 1930s drought and depression, the 1938 Agricultural 
Adjustment Act had instituted a two-fold program of production controls and price supports.  By 
agreeing to limit their production to an ‘allotted’ amount, participating farmers received a 
guaranteed price for their crops.  To qualify for the program, farmers had to remain active.  For 
instance, a key provision of the law state that cotton farmers must have produced a crop during one 
year in the previous three.  In Land, USDA Yearbook for 1958, pp. 310-11, 132.  
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 J.D. Fleming 14 July 1953 letter to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, 
box 14, folder 40.  Fleming did not give the source of his estimate, but USDA reports suggest he 
may have inflated the figures to benefit his organization.  USDA reported that Oklahoma’s average 
harvested cotton acreage for 1943 to 1952 was 1,203,000 acres.  In 1953 the state harvested 
1,020,000 acres.  See, 1 December 1954 USDA Cotton Report, USDA Agricultural Marketing 
Service, Crop Reporting Board, 8 December 1954, p. 2, in Carl Albert papers, Departmental Series, 
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provided “no authority whereby cotton acreage allotments may be suspended for a 
particular area because of adverse weather conditions.”14 
Despite the emergency provisions to control wind erosion, the damage 
continued the following winter and spring.  From November 1954 to March 1955, 
wind damaged 3,023,000 acres in Colorado; 706,000 acres in Texas; 525,000 acres 
in Kansas; 238,000 acres in Oklahoma; and 152,000 acres in New Mexico.  During 
the single month of March 1955, widespread dust storms damaged nearly two 
million acres across the Southern Plains.  And the problem was spreading.  In early 
April 1955, Oklahoma Association of Soil Conservation Districts president F.C. 
Dunaway warned Oklahoma senator Robert Kerr: “I live 250 miles from the dust 
bowl and even here the visibility is so low that the sun is sometimes obscured at 
4:30 p.m. by the dust.”  Later that month, blowing soil blanketed Oklahoma with a 
reddish-brown dust cloud that stretched from Albuquerque, New Mexico, to 
Arkansas.  In Colorado, Denver-based journalists who had driven 100 miles east to 
reach dust storms during 1954 remarked that by April 1955, “highways just East 
[sic] of the city were repeatedly closed to avoid traffic crashes in the choking, 
blinding dust.”  In May 1955, the National Union Farmer reported that altogether 
nearly thirteen million acres, “an area equivalent in size to the states of 
Massachusetts, Connecticut and New Jersey, lumped together” had been 
completely blown out across the Southern Plains.  And the Oklahoman reported: 
“the danger is growing….Last year there were two bowls of serious 
                                                          
14
 K.L. Scott 21 April 1955 letter to Victor Wickersham, p. 3, in Victor Wickersham papers, box 1, 
folder 15. Wickersham’s western Oklahoma congressional district raised nearly seventy-five 
percent of the state’s cotton acreage.  He had previously requested that the national allotment be 
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damage….Now there are four.  For the first time the destruction has pushed 
northward into southeast Wyoming and into the western section of Nebraska.”  To 
assess the situation, Agriculture Secretary Benson traveled to the Southern Plains.  
During his trip, by one account, he realized the need for long-term strategies to 
stop soil blowing, because “[p]ast emergency measures ha[d] not done so[.]”15 
In May and July, following Benson’s inspection, federal and state officials 
from the Great Plains met to draft a new program for Great Plains land use and 
conservation.  Carl Albert, who had for years served on the House Agriculture 
Committee, supported the idea.  To prepare Oklahoma governor Raymond Gary 
for the meetings, Albert explained: “Our difficulty in the past has been that we 
have always waited for trouble to arise and then we have simply hit at it piece 
meal where it was hurting most….we have never seen a really comprehensive 
statement on the causes and effects of drought.  Nor have we ever considered long-
range plans and steps that should be taken to alleviate its effects.”  To remedy the 
situation Albert proposed a catch-all list of measures, including increased drought 
research funding to experimental stations and agricultural colleges in drought-
stricken states; more accessible and longer-term loans; accelerated irrigation 
projects; increased sub-marginal land purchase or long-term lease by the federal 
government; and revised acreage allotment and quota programs.
16
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Albert’s concern for the allotment program built on earlier points.  “Under 
the present law,” he stressed to Gary, “farmers feel compelled to plant their 
allotments annually under penalty of losing them or having them diminished in 
size.”  This meant cultivating land made vulnerable to wind erosion by the 
drought.  As a flexible alternative to this situation, Albert suggested that “if the 
basic crops which are grown in the dust bowl were planted only once in every 
three years, there would be much less danger of erosion.”  Because this plan would 
also help to reduce national surpluses, Albert stressed, it would also benefit 
farmers in more humid areas.
17
 
Albert’s proposal for the federal government to purchase or lease sub-
marginal lands also echoed recent ideas, as well as grazing legislation and land-use 
programs implemented during the 1930s.  In May 1954, SCS officials had 
recommended to Benson several remedies to the blowing soil, including 
restrictions on federal and private loans and crop subsidies to farmers on 
threatened southern plains lands, and the federal purchase of cultivated marginal 
lands for re-grassing and grazing leases.  And in an August 1954 meeting, the 
Great Plains Agricultural Council had suggested that “[p]roper land use may in 
some cases be facilitated through the exercise of some public control…or limited 
public ownership.”18 
                                                                                                                                                                
a comprehensive drought survey to delineate federal, state and local responsibilities, price supports 
for livestock, flood control and upstream watershed conservation and water storage projects. 
17‘Drought Conference’ – 9 May 1955 memorandum from Carl Albert to Raymond Gary, p. 3. 
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New York Times, 4 May 1954, p. 25;Great Plains Agricultural Conference, 31 May – 2 June 
1955, ‘Background,’ p. 3, in Records of the Great Plains Agricultural Council, Series 4, box 5, 
folder 35. 
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At the May 1955 Great Plains conference, participants produced a series of 
land-use and conservation “guides” to be reviewed by interested local, state and 
federal officials who could then direct their comments either to Great Plains 
Agricultural Council Secretary W.H. Brokaw or to Undersecretary of Agriculture 
True D. Morse.  Instead of federal control or ownership of marginal areas, 
however, the ‘Guide to a Successful Long-Range Program in the Great Plains,’ 
emphasized local, flexible solutions to production and conservation problems, 
including accelerated soil surveys and land classification under local leadership, 
accelerated on-site technical guidance for conservation, and more flexible 
repayment terms for farmers in conservation cost-sharing agreements.
19
 
The emphasis on flexible and locally-determined solutions reflected a sense 
for the diverse economic and agricultural circumstances on the Great Plains, even 
within dry areas, and the importance of local and flexible conservation plans.  In 
April 1954, for example, H.H. Finnell had explained: “There is good land in the 
Great Plains.  Under proper management, it can withstand the natural hazards of 
the long dry spells common in this country.”  During the late 1940s, Finnell had 
emphasized to the Great Plains Agricultural Council that even within the Southern 
Plains’ marginal western edge “‘Second class, fourth class, and sixth class lands 
lie every-which-way in relation to each other.’”  Instead of “‘generalized zones’ 
[which were] of little use to plan soil and water conservation programs,” Finnell 
advised the Council that “‘[t]he land use planner, the conservation planner, the 
land owner, and the operator [….] have all got to go deeper [to recognize] the 
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Great Plains Agricultural Conference, 31 May – 2 June 1955, ‘Guides to a Successful Long-
Range Program in the Great Plains, pp. 1-7. The guide also recommended accelerated and 
enlarged surface and underground water supply surveys to improve irrigation. 
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various uses and farming methods for different tracts in close proximity to each 
other.’”  Similarly, in 1952, the National Reclamation Association had reported to 
Congress that a conservation program for western states should respect specific 
circumstances on individual farms.  “The farmer….has a whole army of specialists 
to serve him,” reported the organization, “but he is left mainly to his own devices 
for working out the specialized job of fitting together their varied 
recommendations into a workable system for his own farm….many of the pieces 
handed to him cannot possibly be fitted together without some alteration.”  And in 
a July 1954 meeting to discuss the wind erosion problem, more than 200 southern 
plains SCD supervisors had agreed that “[t]he final solution to the wind erosion 
problem must come from local people who live on and farm the land[.]”20 
The sense that soil and water conservation should be flexible and locally-
determined also reflected practical experiences and experiments which 
demonstrated that even popular techniques like deep-plowing and the planting of 
legumes and grass did not suit every situation.  In tests during 1953, for instance, 
deep-plowing successfully halted erosion and supported grain sorghum and cotton 
crops at the Sandyland Research Station in southwest Oklahoma.  Oklahoma 
A&M soil scientist Dr. Horace J. Harper quickly encouraged its wide use and 
HarmonCountyFHA administrator Carl Harris withheld loans from farmers whose 
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land needed the treatment.  By 1955, southwest Oklahoma farmers had deep-
plowed nearly 75,000 acres.
21
  But agricultural researchers elsewhere in Oklahoma 
and Kansas reached different conclusions about the practice.  For instance, tests at 
the Southern Great Plains Field Station in Woodward, Oklahoma indicated that 
tillage timing affected yields more than tillage depth or implement type.  And tests 
at Kansas State College showed that “[d]eep tillage [had] little value, either to 
improve yields or for improving conservation of moisture.”  In at least one of the 
KansasState tests, sub-soiling actually cut down the water intake rate.
22
 
Farmers and ranchers increasingly used legumes to build the fertility and 
moisture-holding capacity of their soils during the drought, but as with deep-
plowing, experts disagreed about their value.  In 1953, SCS administrator Dr. 
Robert Salter observed that in Nebraska, Texas and Oklahoma, “acreages planted 
to vetch have greatly increased in the last few years.”  In Oklahoma the trend was 
especially pronounced.  In its production of Hairy Vetch seed, for instance, the 
state ranked third nationwide during 1953, first during 1954 and 1955, and second 
during 1956.  And in its production of alfalfa seed, Oklahoma ranked 
eleventhnationwide during 1953, sixth during 1954 and 1955, and fifth during 
1956.  During 1954, Oklahomans seeded 604,000 acres to alfalfa, compared to a 
                                                          
21
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ten-year average of 398,200 acres.  The most popular variety sewn was hardy and 
drought-resistant Common.
23
 
Despite their growing use, however, agricultural advisors did not agree that 
legumes benefitted production and conservation programs.  Texas A&M extension 
specialist Jack Barton explained: “[T]he important thing, is to get large quantities 
of organic matter into the soil….[s]ome farmers use legumes, green manure crops, 
or crop-pasture rotations, while others use cotton burs or barnyard manure to do 
the job.”  By contrast, southwestern Oklahoma farmer and former SCS soil 
scientist John Underwood used a cotton-fallow-wheat cropping sequence without 
legumes, and counseled: ‘“the loss of moisture from growing a winter legume like 
sweet clover does more harm than good.’”24 
Many farmers and ranchers also used more grass during the 1950s, but like 
deep-plowing and legumes, officials and experts qualified their support for the 
technique.  Grass reduces erosion, increases infiltration and conserves fertility.  
Oklahoma farmers and ranchers testified to its benefits during drought.  From the 
Panhandle, for example, Texas County livestock operator A.P. Atkins explained: 
“‘The best protection against drouth on my tightland range is a natural cover of 
grass which lets the soils absorb moisture whenever it falls, protects new growth, 
stimulates natural reseeding and provides a reserve of feed during a long dry 
spell.’”  And central Oklahoma farmer Johnny Reininger favorably said of his 
grass: “‘It doesn’t wash, it doesn’t blow and I don’t have to farm it every year.’”  
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By the drought’s end in early 1957, Oklahoma A&M extension range specialist 
Clarence Bunch said interest in planting native grass was the highest he had ever 
seen.
25
 
 Despite its virtues, however, officials qualified grass’ place in production 
and conservation systems.  Texas Commissioner of Agriculture John C. White 
explained that “‘[p]rolongeddrouth and serious soil blowing have made [it] 
necessary to retire the less productive and erosive soils to permanent pasture,’” but 
he stressed that “‘it is possible to overemphasize the return of grass to the 
detriment of our present economic system.’”  Oklahoma soil scientist Dr. Horace J. 
Harper explained, “‘when you take land out of cultivated crops and put it to 
grassland, you reduce its income to one-third of what it was in cultivated crops’”  
Farmer Stockman editors noted that “during World War II and post-war years…it 
required a yield of only [eight bushels] of wheat to beat income from grazing the 
land in native pasture.”26 And Clarence Bunch warned farmers that native grasses 
were not suited to all types of operations.  “‘A man with a small farm hasn’t any 
business with native grass,’” he explained, “‘because native grasses just won’t 
stand overgrazing.  You’ve got to spread cattle thin on native grass acres.’”  Bunch 
also counseled patience since good native grass stands could take several years to 
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establish.  “‘[F]orget your native grass the first year[,]’” he advised, “‘[d]on’t even 
look to see if you got a stand.’”27 
Different perspectives on the value of deep-plowing, legumes, and grass 
reflected the sense that soil and water conservation plans should respect specific 
circumstances.  In 1951, for instance, Red Plains Conservation Station researchers 
concluded from Guthrie, Oklahoma: “The exact combination of [erosion control] 
practices…must be determined by the various soil capabilities and climatic 
conditions where they are applied.”  Officials reached this conclusion throughout 
the Plains.  In her study of the Northern Plains during the twentieth century, for 
instance, the historian Mary Hargreaves observed that after World War II, regional 
recommendations for conservation repeatedly stressed the need for “flexibility” in 
farm operations and available credit, and that disagreements and conflicting advice 
from agricultural experts “made it evident…that individualized technical guidance 
rather than formalized regional recommendations was required.”  National 
Farmers’ Union (NFU) president James G. Patton put the idea directly to 
Agriculture Undersecretary Morse following the May 1955 Great Plains 
conference.  Instead of uniform farming adjustments, Patton urged USDA to 
provide more flexible credit and to “place the necessary technical staff with the 
lending group to work out farm by farm or unit by unit the needed changes.”28 
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Early in 1956, USDA recommended a new Great Plains conservation 
program that reflected the region’s practical and experimental experiences.  
Among its key features, the program would expand ACP cost-sharing for long-
term conservation practices, research the allotment system’s implications for 
appropriate land use, accelerate USDA land classification activities and technical 
assistance to farmers, and promote “an orderly and economically sound transition 
into grazing and livestock” in areas unsuited to arable farming.  As he presented 
the plan to President Eisenhower, Benson explained: “The objective of the 
Program for the Great Plains is to assist farmers and ranchers to develop for 
themselves a land-use program which will help them avert many of the hazards 
that come with the recurring droughts common to the region.”29 
That summer, Congress authorized the Great Plains Conservation Program 
(GPCP).  The enabling law amended the 1936 Soil Conservation and Domestic 
Allotment Act and the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act to authorize USDA to 
enter long-term (ten-year) conservation contracts with Great Plains farmers and 
ranchers, and to protect farmers’ acreage allotments during contract periods.  
Congress authorized $150 million for the entire program, with a maximum of $25 
million for any one year.  The federal government would pay eighty percent of the 
cost for practices including chiseling, establishing permanent plant cover on 
cultivated land, contour cultivating, and improving irrigation dams and stock 
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ponds.  Participating farmers who violated the contract’s terms would not receive 
subsequent payments and would refund payments already received.  The program 
was scheduled to run for fifteen years, from 1957 to 1972.
30
 
The program was flexible and it respected local circumstances.  As 
Assistant Agriculture Secretary E.L. Peterson explained in the program’s 
congressional hearings, “we cannot have conservation or care of land unless there 
is an understanding and conviction in the minds of the landowner that doing these 
things is good for him and in his interest[.]”  The program also gave farmers 
control over the nature and pace of their conservation programs because they could 
adopt practices in piecemeal fashion.  “A long-time program of conservation and 
land use adjustment [will] be worked out with the producer,” Peterson explained, 
“in accordance with the capabilities of each farm or ranch.”  Long-term contracts, 
he continued, gave participating farmers and ranchers time “to make, in orderly 
progression over a period of years, changes in their cropping systems and land 
uses…and to install the [needed] soil and water conservation measures[.]”  
Indicating an important measure of regional support for the plan, Guymon stock-
grower and National Association of Soil Conservation Districts (NASCD) official 
A.P. Atkins declared, “It’s the kind of program a man can live with.”31  University 
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 “Projects will be carried out on farms and ranches moving as fast and as far as the operators are 
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Williams said “one of things that the proposed legislation would do that is not now readily 
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of Nebraska agricultural economists said the program’s “time schedule for land-
use changes [was] a major innovation.”32  And agricultural historian Douglas 
Helms observed that the GPCP’s long-term contracts “became the standard 
procedure in other conservation programs.”33 
The program added another new ingredient to soil and water conservation 
by applying contracts to entire farms or ranches.  To the House Agriculture 
Committee, Peterson explained that instead of the “‘practice’ by ‘practice’” and 
“‘commodity’ by ‘commodity’” approaches inherent to the ACP and surplus 
reduction programs, both of which effected partial production shifts, the GPCP 
approached conservation “for a farm or ranch in its entirety.”  Like the program’s 
other features, this approach reflected contemporary developments on the Plains.  
In 1953, for instance, the Great Plains Conservation Station, in Guthrie, 
Oklahoma, reported that it had entered a new phase of research.  From mechanical 
and vegetative erosion control research during the 1930s and 1940s, the station 
planned to emphasize the “integration of erosion control and fertility restoration 
into a complete farm program.”34 
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 Howard Ottoson et al., Land and People in the Northern Plains Transition Area (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1966), p. 108.  In his discussion of the Great Plains Program, Robert 
J. Morgan observed: “[t]he idea using contracts to achieve proper land use is not new, of course, 
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Conservation: Thirty Years of the New Decentralization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 
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Agricultural History, vol. 64, no.2 (spring 1990), pp. 67, 69.  The Food and Agriculture Act of 
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 Peterson explained: “the first thing that would be done is that a survey would be made of the 
farm to determine the capability of the land in the farm.  A comprehensive review…to the problems 
of erosion and the capability of the land would be made.  In consultation with the farmer, a 
conservation farming program for the entire farm, all of the acreage on it, would be developed.”  In 
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For the program’s first year, Congress appropriated $10 million, to be 
made available beginning 1 July 1957.  Farmers in Oklahoma’s thirty westernmost 
counties were originally eligible to participate.  Great Plains farmers soon pushed 
for more aid.  During the spring of 1958, Atkins urged Oklahoma senator Robert 
Kerr to help increase program appropriations for the upcoming fiscal year.  
“Thirty-six additional counties in the ten Great Plains states are asking to be 
included in the program,” Atkins told Kerr.  And he explained that the federal 
government’s initial $10 million appropriation would not be able to absorb the 
incoming counties.  By May 1961, farmers across 347 Southern Plains counties 
had signed 6,400 conservation contracts under the program, with 2,791 
applications outstanding.
35
 
Oklahomans responded positively to the program.  Panhandle farmer W.H. 
Williams was among them.  By the spring of 1961, he had developed a livestock 
water source that enabled him to return nearly 400 acres to pasture.  He had also 
built nearly fifty-five miles of waterways, nearly 100 miles of channel-type 
terraces, ten miles of diversion terraces, and an irrigation water reservoir to irrigate 
twenty-five acres of feed crops.  By the fall of 1960, fourteen western-Oklahoma 
counties had 783,143 acres in the program.  By 1962, over 500 Oklahoma farmers 
had 1,225,000 acres in the program and Congress had extended it for an additional 
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five years, to end in 1976.
36
  By 1976, Oklahoma had more active GPCP contracts 
than any other state.  Oklahoma Conservation Commission historians subsequently 
called it one of the state’s “most successful conservation programs.”37 
 
The Great Plains Conservation Program was significant because it reflected 
the contemporary sense that soil and water conservation activities should suit 
specific geographic and economic circumstances and be flexible.  It represented 
practical experiences and it gave farmers and ranchers control over the nature and 
pace of their conservation programs.  But the program only partially reflected 
conservation and production developments in Oklahoma during the drought.  It did 
not include eastern Oklahoma.  During the 1950s, production techniques to 
mitigate dry conditions – like grass farming and irrigation – followed the drought 
into normally-humid areas east of the GPCP boundaries.  And the control farmers 
acquired from the GPCP contrasted with their growing reliance on new 
technologies and research. 
Grass farming expanded during the 1950s drought, not just in dry western 
regions, but also in normally humid areas.  In western Oklahoma, more adaptable 
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Farmer Stockman, March 1961, pp. 52-3; Farmer Stockman, September 1960, p. 30; Farmer 
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grass varieties played an important role.  In November 1956, for instance, Bob 
Kneebone, a grass-breeding specialist at Woodward optimistically predicted: 
“[W]e can look for better and better grasses for the Plains area,” especially from 
Side Oats Grama and Sand Bluestem varieties.  At the Woodward Station, plant 
researcher J.A. Harlan developed Tucson side-oats grama, notable for its early and 
late growth and heat tolerance.  Southern Plains experimental station researchers 
demonstrated how reseeded pastures produced heavier cattle than native pastures.  
Researchers also released Coronadosideoatsgrama, a new pasture grass that was 
“adaptable throughout most of the western part of the state.”  New harvesting 
technology also made grass more accessible.  Unlike the 1930s, when “[t]he 
technology of harvesting seed of the native grasses, processing the seed for 
planting, and methods of planting had not been developed[,]” explained SCS 
administrator Dr. Robert Salter, farmers wanting to seed native grass during the 
1950s had a range of technical options, including “lime spreaders, fertilizer 
spreaders, cotton planters, special [grass] seeders and by airplane.”  Furthermore, 
special grass seeders could be rented from almost any Oklahoma soil conservation 
district.
38
 
The drought also helped to foster new attitudes and to spread grass farming 
to normally humid areas.  Salter explained that in the normally humid South, 
“many grasses and legumes are in wide use that were unknown to farmers just a 
few short years ago.  In this region of usually abundant and evenly distributed 
rainfall during the long growing season, cotton, corn, tobacco, peanuts, and other 
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row crops were until recently the principal farm crops produced.  Grass was more 
likely considered a weed, or pest, rather than as a useful and valuable farm 
resource.”39Eastern Oklahoma farmers reflected the new attitude.  In a 1954 survey 
of outstanding soil and water conservation problems, north-central and southeast 
Oklahoma farmers requested research and information on “[c]rops or grasses that 
would improve the rate of infiltration” and “what crops can be profitably grown 
with what types of grassland[.]”  In 1956, Farmer Stockman editor Ernest Shiner 
observed “a big difference” in the way southeast Oklahoma farmers used their 
land.  Instead of row cropping the land every year as they had in the past, many 
farmers began to rotate grasses with legumes and feed crops, like oats.  That year, 
for instance, nearly sixty drought-afflicted PontotocCounty farmers sowed 2,460 
acres of Bermuda grass for summer grazing.  In one operation a farmer harvested 
an oat crop and two cattle ‘crops’ from land seeded to Bermuda grass and oats.  In 
another operation, a dairy farmer planned “a long time rotation with a feed crop, 
then oats and vetch, and back to Bermuda.”  In yet another instance, northeastern 
Oklahoma farmer E.W. Pogue shifted from corn to cattle and irrigated grass.  
Pogue owned a bottomland corn farm near the confluence of the Cimarron and 
Arkansas rivers north of Tulsa.  In 1949, after regularly losing crops to floods and 
dry weather, he planted Bermuda grass on fifty acres to raise cattle.  After drought 
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 The grass and legume varieties being seeded in the South, he wrote, “include bahia, pangolia, 
Coastal Bermuda, Tift Sudan, the Tall Fescues, kudzu, Hard-Seeded Crimson, lupines, Button 
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withered his grass and forced him to purchase supplemental feed during the winter 
of 1954, he began to irrigate.
40
 
Pogue’s decision to irrigate his grass reflected a major development.  
Irrigation exploded in Oklahoma during the 1950s.  From 1941 to 1947, before the 
Altus-Lugert irrigation project was completed in Southwest Oklahoma, the state’s 
irrigated acreage only once exceeded 651 acres.
41
  By 1957, Oklahomans irrigated 
nearly 300,000 acres.  Most of this growth occurred in the state’s dry, western 
region.  But the phenomenon was statewide.  Farmers irrigated in all but four of 
the state’s seventy-seven counties during 1957, prompting observers to declare: 
“Irrigation was once regarded as an operation for the arid and semi-arid regions 
only, but no longer.”42 
Groundwater irrigation grew quickly in western Oklahoma during the 
1950s.  From its first irrigation well in 1950, for instance, HarmonCounty, in 
southwest Oklahoma, had over 200 wells by 1954.  And nearly 120 irrigation 
systems operated in GreerCounty by 1956, where there had been almost none a 
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Farmer Stockman, February 1958, p. 20; Farmer Stockman, March 1958, p. 14;Farmer Stockman, 
May 1957, p. 12. 
 76 
 
few years earlier.  By the spring of 1957, county agents estimated that over 400 
farms used irrigation wells in northwest Oklahoma and the Panhandle.  That year, 
Oklahomans west of the line separating Alfalfa and Grant counties irrigated 
257,800 acres, a substantial amount of the state’s 297,684 total.43 
Western Oklahoma’s irrigation growth reflected regional trends.  On the 
Texas High Plains, for instance, the number of irrigation wells jumped from 
approximately 8,400 in 1948 to more than 42,200 by 1957.  From 1945 to 1954, 
irrigation on the Southern Plains grew by nearly 3.5 million acres, mostly in 
Texas, which accounted for forty-five percent of irrigation growth among the 
seventeen reclamation states over the period.  New technology – including plastics, 
rubber, concrete and aluminum developed during World War II – fueled the trend.  
In particular, more efficient pumps helped to push irrigation outward from shallow 
water areas into areas of deep groundwater.  So did federal support for 
groundwater development and irrigation on the Plains.
44
  During the 1950s, USDA 
subsidized irrigation installation procedures.  In 1954, for instance, the ACP 
program paid CimarronCounty farmers to drill wells, and during 1956 it paid them 
nearly half the cost to install underground irrigation pipe.  SCS technicians and 
ACP funds also helped farmers to level their land.  Over the winter of 1955-56, for 
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instance, Cimarron county farmer Carlisle Brown leveled his land at a cost of $40 
per acre.  He received $20 per acre from ACP funds for the job.  During 1956, the 
FHA loaned nearly $12 million to 2,200 farmers and eighty-one (81) farmer 
associations to develop irrigation and farmstead water systems, and for 
conservation.
45
 
The new technology and government support contrasted circumstances 
earlier in the century.  From WWI through the 1920s, irrigation on the Southern 
Plains was delayed by wartime demand for dry-land products like wheat and 
livestock, adequate rainfall, high war-time metal costs, inexperience, a lack of 
adequate credit, and low post-WWI crop prices, among other factors.  Local 
entrepreneurship grew irrigation in Texas during the 1930s, but federal policies 
during the 1930s focused mostly on “better dryland farming through soil 
conservation rather than industrialization through irrigation[,]” and farmers spent 
AAA subsidy checks “mostly [o]n trucks and tractors rather than wells, pumps, 
motors and pipes.”  By the 1950s, New Deal subsidies and credit were entrenched 
so many farmers felt “secure enough to invest in risky technological innovations, 
ranging from tractors to irrigation wells to synthetic fertilizer.”  And cheap fuel on 
the Texas and Oklahoma Panhandles encouraged farmers to purchase irrigation 
systems.
46
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 As a result, explained John Opie, “[b]y 1958, 50 percent of the irrigated farms on the Texas High 
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 Green, Land of the Underground Rain, pp. 102-120, 125-144, 150-53.  In contrast to Green, John 
Opie explained that “the Great Plains Drought Area Committee concluded in 1936 that ‘irrigation 
at best can cause only minor changes in the economic life of the Great Plains.’  It identified only a 
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As in western Oklahoma, irrigation’s stretch into humid eastern Oklahoma 
reflected broad regional developments, new technology, new attitudes, new 
policies and the drought.  In 1952, the geographer PeverilMeigs explained that the 
idea of irrigating in humid areas “has begun to ‘catch on’ extensively, as the result 
of effective experimentation and increased publicity by state, federal, and private 
agricultural agencies” with “[t]he basic natural justification for the current trend 
[being] the occurrence of droughts during the growing season in all parts of the 
East.”  From 1945 to 1954, Oklahoma and Texas excluding the High Plains, 
comprised twelve percent of all irrigation growth in the West.  And from 1949 to 
1954, irrigation in USDA’s East South Central region – including deep-South 
states from Louisiana to the Atlantic coast – grew by 2563 percent.47 
In Oklahoma, the trend reflected new attitudes and new types of operators.  
In March 1953, for instance, The Farmer Stockman reported from 
KingfisherCounty, in central Oklahoma: “If there are [two] places where you 
wouldn’t expect to find irrigation farming, a dairy farm in a central Oklahoma 
county is probably both of them.  First, because most farmers in a 30-inch rain belt 
usually aren’t so hard up for water they’ll dig for it.  Second, a dairy farmer can 
always find plenty to do without taking on another more than full time job like 
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Geographical Review, vol. 42, no. 3 (July 1952), p. 348. During the period 1945-1954, the 
Southern High Plains, including the Texas and Oklahoma Panhandles, comprised thirty-three 
percent, and California comprised twenty-nine percent of western irrigation growth.  In Frederick, 
Water for Western Agriculture, p. 18; Farmer Stockman, May 1957, pp. 12-13. 
 79 
 
irrigating.”  KingfisherCounty dairy farmer George Yoeman irrigated anyway, 
telling the magazine: “‘You’ve got to have some feed insurance to keep production 
up and stay in the dairy business.’”  And in a 1954 NASCD soil and water 
conservation survey, Oklahoma farmers requested information on “[i]rrigation…in 
areas of [the] 24 [inch] to 35 [inch] rainbelt[,]” and “irrigation in Central and 
Eastern Oklahoma.”  In December 1954, the Farmer Stockman magazine reported 
from northeastern Oklahoma: “[three] years of extreme drouth…[made] 
farmers…consider the possible benefits of irrigation….Where only [three] 
irrigation systems were in use in Tulsa county [eighteen] months ago, some [thirty] 
farmers are now watering truck, field and pasture crops.”48 
Agricultural researchers and federal lawmakers responded to the interest.  
From 1954 to 1956, for instance, the Oklahoma experiment station tested 
underground water sources in central Oklahoma.
49
  And in 1954 Congress 
amended the 1937 Water Facilities Act to raise the law’s loan limits and to make 
irrigation loans available nationwide, not just within the seventeen semi-arid 
western states.  In hearings before the law’s passage, Agriculture Under-Secretary 
True D. Morse explained: “[i]n areas of the country normally considered humid, 
there has been an increasing interest by farmers in water facilities to supplement 
rainfall in the production of some crops, in the maintenance of year-round 
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1954, 1955, and 1956,” Pamphlet 331, Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station (Stillwater: 
OklahomaA&MCollege), September 1959. 
 80 
 
pastures, and in the introduction of other practices for increasing production.”  
Arkansas senator J.W. Fulbright added that “[w]ith the impetus of the disastrous 
droughts of recent years, farmers, dairymen, and stockmen are interested in 
irrigation as never before.  New techniques and new equipment have been 
developed, making irrigation possible where it never was before.”50 
New sprinkler technology and portable aluminum pipe helped to spread 
irrigation because they adapted well to a range of circumstances.  Texas A&M 
agricultural engineer R.V. Thurmond explained that the technology could be 
applied to “uneven, hummocky ground or steep slopes upon which leveling would 
not be economically feasible….Sandy soils…subject to erosion and [with] high 
water intake rates….Water supply inadequate to cover the land by surface 
methods….Shallow soils underlain by gravel, caliche and high water table…[and] 
[a] [w]ater supply so located that it must be pumped.”  Much of these geographic 
features characterized central and eastern Oklahoma.  By the mid-1950s, sprinkler 
systems watered nearly one-fifth of Oklahoma’s irrigated acreage, and almost all 
of central and eastern Oklahoma’s irrigated acreage.  At the end of 1954, observers 
noted that in a recent surge of irrigation in northeastern Oklahoma, “[t]he sprinkler 
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system is the predominant method of applying water and in Tulsa county [ninety 
percent] of the applied moisture comes from sandpoints in the Arkansas Valley.”51 
The new technology gave farmers more control to water crops “when 
needed and where needed[,]” without losses to seepage, weed growth or 
evaporation in exposed ditches.  TillmanCounty irrigator William Conrad, who 
replaced his southwest Oklahoma ditch system with 3,500 feet of 6-inch aluminum 
pipe estimated that it would save more than one-half of his irrigation water.  “‘One 
thing I like about the pipe,’” explained his neighbor Joe White, “‘is that I can put 
water in places I can’t with ditches.’”  And since they drew from groundwater, not 
large systems of tunnels and aqueducts, explained John Opie, Plains irrigators 
were relatively “free from distant technological breakdowns[.]”52 
Irrigation meant new and more crops.  From 1954 to 1959, alfalfa acreages 
rose slightly in Oklahoma from 37,652 to 42,717 acres.  Pasture acreages more 
than doubled, from 7,123 to 15,240 acres, and peanut acreages jumped from 6,562 
to 22,691 acres.  But the biggest increases came in cotton and sorghum acreages.  
Cotton acreages rose from 60,507 to 87,838 acres, while sorghum soared from 
31,783 to 81,355 acres.  Regionally, sorghum was the most irrigated crop on the 
Southern Plains by the end of the 1950s.  Increased sorghum production owed to 
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its drought-resistance, federal restrictions on wheat and cotton, and new sorghum 
strains suited to combine harvesting.  Irrigated sorghum and alfalfa became key 
feedstuffs for new cattle feedlot operations.  On a smaller scale, northeast 
Oklahoma farmers irrigated strawberries and other small fruits and vegetables.  
And southwest Oklahoma farmers irrigated sweet potatoes, lettuce, melons and 
onions.  To irrigate some of the new crops required local initiative and self-
direction.  In HarmonCounty, for instance, farmers struggled to grow cantaloupes 
until a local grower traveled to the Rio GrandeValley to see how irrigators there 
produced the crop.
53
 
As it increased their technical control and production capacity, irrigation 
committed farmers to additional inputs including fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides 
and new machinery.  By 1958, nearly 67 percent of Texas High Plains’ irrigators 
used fertilizer.  Irrigated cotton had a longer growing and fruiting period that 
favored boll weevil buildups, for instance.  In 1954, the Farmer-Stockman 
reported: “It’s…common now for a cotton farmer with irrigation to spend $20-$30 
per acre for insect control.  The hot sun used to do the job for nothing just a few 
years ago.”  Later, the magazine’s editors observed that in addition to wells and 
rigs, irrigators needed money for “fuel, fertilization, insecticides and other 
essentials of a successful operation.  Something must be set aside for extra labor 
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too.  Leaving out one of these essential operations may offset the gain of 
irrigation.”  For this reason, Oklahoma Soil Conservation Board executive director 
Word Cromwell urged Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson to increase federal 
assistance to irrigation farmers.  “Even after…arrangements ha[ve] been made for 
irrigation water,” wrote Cromwell in 1955, “it still costs a lot of money to 
complete the job….We do not want the farmer to be placed in the position [of] the 
new tractor owner [whose] financial limitations had been reached [though he] had 
not yet acquired any gang-plows, discs, drills, combines or other machinery to 
which the tractor could be applied.”54 
The need to complement irrigation equipment with other technologies 
represented a broad process, according to the historian Judith Fabry.  Nineteenth-
century farmers had “adopted technology in a piecemeal fashion,” she explained, 
but “in the early decades of the twentieth century, and more predominantly after 
1945, agricultural producers adopted systems of technology, not pieces of 
equipment.”  Machines, plants and chemicals became “so interrelated that one 
input could not function effectively in the absence of some or all of the other 
inputs.”  The historian David Danbom similarly observed that “innovations 
emerging during World War II reinforced and built on one another[.]”55 
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This process worked across the full spectrum of soil and water 
conservation and production activities.  For instance, stubble-mulch practitioners 
faced several inputs, including “specialized equipment for planting and fertilizing 
in an undisturbed trashy surface, and chemical herbicides” to control weeds.  
Irrigation in sandy areas benefitted from deep-plowing, which “‘tightened’ sandy 
soil by bringing clay to the surface.”  Likewise, experts urged farmers to 
complement deep-plowing with other techniques.  In August 1956, for instance, 
SCS agent Fred Dries praised a northeastern Oklahoma farmer who understood 
that “breaking the plow-pan by deep tillage operations is good in itself, [but] [to] 
make the treatment…effective over a long period of time [requires] liberal 
quantities of fertilizers and…deep-rooted legumes in the conservation crop 
rotation.”  Legumes also complemented fertilizers.  On eastern Oklahoma’s clays 
and heavy black soils, reported the Farmer Stockman, “[c]ommercial fertilizers 
became effective after we learned to plant sweet clovers to open up the subsoil and 
enhance the moisture-holding capacity of the upper soil[.]”  And fertilizer 
performance improved with irrigation.  In 1951, Bureau of Reclamation Regional 
Director H.E. Robbins reported that “[e]ven in the heavier rainfall sections of 
[Oklahoma] it has been found that the best results from fertilizers are obtained in 
conjunction with irrigation.”  Researchers fueled the process. During 1956, for 
instance, Oklahoma A&M officials sought Panhandle irrigation farmers to grow 
registered seed of new native grass strains Caddo Switchgrass and Coronado Side 
Oats grama.   And in 1957, Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station 
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agronomists combined the state’s three top forage-producing crops to get “the 
highest possible production under high fertilization and irrigation.”56 
Drought-stricken farmers who adopted the new technology altered 
agricultural production patterns across the state.  Just as turn of the century 
Oklahoma farmers who adopted cattle to mitigate dry conditions needed additional 
advice and medical technology to fight livestock diseases, farmers who irrigated to 
beat the 1950s drought needed mechanical advice and additional technologies 
including fertilizers and pesticides to successfully water their crops.  Not all 
farmers made the change, but for some who did, the process completely changed 
their lifestyles. 
Post-WWII farmers were not completely beholden to technical systems and 
expert advice.  In a study of Corn Belt farmers after World War II, for instance, the 
historian Joe Anderson observed that farmers selectively adopted new farming 
technologies and that “[f]ew of them either took up or rejected every technological 
innovation.”  Many farmers “use[d] the [insecticide] chemicals they believed 
would do the job,” he explained, “ignoring both government restrictions and 
advice from entomologists, manufacturers, and journalists.”  Respecting 
herbicides, he observed: “Rather than passively accepting manufacturers’ 
specifications and extension service guidelines, farmers determined how much to 
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apply and how often to apply it.”  They also used less fertilizer during the 1950s 
drought despite expert calls to increase applications.
57
 
Anderson’s argument stands in opposition to a key theme from this chapter 
– that drought accelerated farmers’ connections to technical systems and expert 
advice during the 1950s.  But his point has merits, especially because Oklahomans 
proved noticeably unresponsive to expert recommendations that fertilizers would 
mitigate drought.  Oklahoma fertilizer consumption had been growing steadily 
since World War II.  By 1952, Oklahomans used nearly seventeen times more 
fertilizer than they had a decade earlier.  As drought crept into the state, analysts 
expected fertilizer consumption to rise further.  In the fall of 1952, for instance, 
Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture (OSBA) Seed, Feed and Fertilizer Division 
head Parks A. Yeats predicted higher than ever demand for nitrogen fertilizer from 
farmers looking “to speed the growth of fall and winter pastures and thereby offset 
hay and feed costs.”  During the drought, lengthy Farmer Stockman articles with 
titles like “Dry Years Call for Reseeding, Fertilizer,” “Fertilizer Proves its Worth 
as Good Dry Weather Insurance,” and “Here are the Facts on How Fertilizer Can 
help Beat the Drouth” contained promotional testimony from farmers and 
researchers.  “Farmers have told us,” they exclaimed in one instance, “that even in 
a dry year, proper use of fertilizer will enable them to make as much as they would 
from unfertilized ground in a wet year.”  “Fertilizer helps to get a crop going 
quickly,” the magazine continued, “enabling it to send down a more extensive root 
system.”  In 1956, SeminoleCounty farmer Homer McMullen explained that 
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“fertilizer gave [his] corn a jump on hot weather and built a good root system that 
could go deep in the ground for all the moisture that was there.”  Oklahoma State 
University (OSU) agronomy professor Lester Reed said that fertilizers provide “[a] 
deeper and more vigorous root system,” which meant “more drouth resistance and 
more resistance to freeze damage.”  And OSU extension agronomist Gaylord 
Haynes explained that by accelerating vegetative growth, fertilizers helped to 
protect soil from wind and water erosion.  Since fertilizers fueled leaf growth, they 
increased shade and reduced evaporation.
58
 
Despite the promotional rhetoric, fertilizer consumption dropped in 
Oklahoma during the drought.  Park Yeats reported in early 1953 that dry weather 
had caused a drop in commercial fertilizer sales in Oklahoma since the previous 
summer.  Analysts blamed dry weather for a further 45% drop in fertilizer sales 
during the summer of 1954.  The pattern continued until, in March 1957, Farmer 
Stockman editors finally admitted that “drouth has had the effect of limiting the 
use of fertilizer in the Southwestern states.”  It quickly proclaimed, however, that 
“[a]s the dry spell ends, sales are expected to pick up again.”59 
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Farmers were not completely beholden to new technologies during the 
1950s.  Some farmers custom-built and modified the technology to cut costs and 
increase efficiency.  For instance, an Ada-area farmer unable to find an affordable 
pump had a local blacksmith manufacture one to fit on his tractor for about ten 
percent of the dealer cost estimates.  A CaddoCounty farmer stood his irrigation 
pump engine on its end instead of laying it flat like conventional engines to 
generate more power from his drive shaft.  Another farmer built “a monster-sized 
irrigation rig that [could] water 100 rows of corn at a time.”  And the decision on 
when or how much to irrigate did not necessarily require technology.  OSU 
agronomy professor Dr. Marlow Thorne urged farmers to “observe [and feel] both 
crop and soil closely for signs of moisture deficiency” before irrigating.  Curled or 
rolled corn leaves were moisture deficient, he explained.  And with their hands, 
farmers could determine whether their soil was “[p]owdery dry” with zero 
moisture, “[c]rumbly” with a quarter to half of the necessary moisture, or “pliable” 
and in excellent shape.
60
 
And farmers did not uniformly follow expert advice.  In 1956, for instance, 
the ecologist Paul Sears warned: “Evangelists of conservation ought to remember 
that….many human beings have a built-in mechanism which protects them against 
extreme forms of evangelism.”  Agricultural engineers explained too that regional 
custom and educational levels often determined responses to new technologies.  
Farmers’ decisions on whether to irrigate, they argued, “often lie outside of the 
                                                          
60
Farmer Stockman, October 1954, p. 73; Farmer Stockman, September 1957, p. 23.The rig 
included two 70-foot sprinkler booms supported by a 21-foot tower which sat on a trailer.  The 
sprinkler booms housed a variety of nozzle sizes and covered a circle 450 feet in diameter.  In 
Farmer Stockman, December 1956, p. 25; Farmer Stockman, August 1957, pp. 28-9. 
 89 
 
realm of [economic] calculation and even of logic.”  The technical training 
necessary to operate pump and portable irrigation systems dissuaded some 
operators.  Other farmers objected to the lifestyle change, including the longer 
hours.  Donald Green explained that since irrigators usually raised several crops, 
“work became more extensive as well as more intensive,” including year-round 
labor and 2:00 A.M. irrigation appointments.  In 1960, OSU irrigation specialist 
Robert Duffin explained that “night moving of pipe, shut-down systems [and] too 
high application rates for the soil made many Oklahoma irrigation farmers come to 
the conclusion that if this were irrigation they wanted no part of it.”61 
Despite these limits to their technical dependence, however, farmers 
requested drought-related research and advice during the 1950s.  In a 1954 survey 
of outstanding soil and water conservation problems, for instance, soil 
conservation districts from across the state requested research and advice for a 
range of drought-related concerns, including wind erosion, tall grasses adapted for 
dry conditions, irrigation and fertilizer requirements, and crops and grasses to 
improve infiltration rates.  In February 1954, Oklahoma Association of Soil 
Conservation Districts (OASCD) president F.C. Dunaway suggested to Oklahoma 
Senator Robert Kerr that more money for research would “increase crop 
production and prevent erosion to the extent that we can maintain a livestock 
program without ‘Drouth Relief’.”  He attached to the letter resolutions passed at 
OASCD annual meetings over the previous four years that requested more 
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research funding, including $100,000 to support activities at the Red Plains 
experiment station in Guthrie and the Wheatland experiment station in Cherokee.  
Amidst spring 1955 dust storms, Dunaway again complained to Kerr: “The soil 
and water conservation research experiment stations…servicing this area [are] 
operating on shoestring appropriations wholly inadequate to meet the problems 
presented in salvaging this multi-million acre, drought-stricken dust-bowl area.”  
Similarly, in 1952 the National Reclamation Association had requested federal 
research for a range of soil and water conservation topics.  “Wind and water 
erosion are common in many parts of the West[,]” the organization proclaimed, 
“[and] [w]e all remember the Dust Bowl days of the thirties[.]”   These drought-
related calls for research and advice contrasted with circumstances during the wet 
1940s, when farmers dropped connections with conservation experts.  Before the 
Senate committee to investigate soil blowing in March 1954, for instance, 
Colorado Wheat Growers Association president Murray Giffin explained: “As 
long as the wheat farmers of Colorado were doing very well, they did not need any 
help so they just dropped by the wayside.”62 
As they advised and assisted drought-stricken farmers and ranchers, SCS 
officials, extension agents, and academic researchers collaborated with 
manufacturers and implement dealers to promote new technological systems and 
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expert consultation.
63
   In July 1953, for instance, SCS officials encouraged 
interested Panhandle farmers to contact the local SCD or a local farm equipment 
dealer for information on stubble-mulching.  Later that year, Oklahoma A&M 
extension irrigation specialist Robert B. Duffin arranged “irrigation information 
school[s]” throughout the state.  At the Cimarron County school, a Portland 
Cement Company representative discussed underground concrete pipe, while SCS 
and extension officials discussed sprinkler irrigation systems, land preparation and 
methods of applying water.  In the fall of 1954, more than ninety people attended 
an irrigation short-course in HaskellCounty.  Two electric cooperatives sponsored 
the course, which included talks on irrigation research, well installation, and a 
ground water lecture by USGS geologist Joseph Barclay.   To convince farmers 
that they should consult experts, Duffin later stressed: “an irrigation well is an 
engineering structure, not just a hole in the ground.”  Oline-Mathieson Chemical 
Corporation agronomist William O. Trogdon counseled: “Irrigation is not a 
plaything.”  More fully, Farmer Stockman editors encouraged farmers to consult 
government and industry technicians through the entire irrigation process.  
“Because of the uncertainty of water supplies and the technical skill required to 
find it and get it to the surface,” they recommended, “the best advice to a 
prospective irrigator is to contact experts in the Soil Conservation Service before 
doing anything else.”  As the wells were installed, they advised farmers to “have 
the pump dealer and sprinkler dealer on hand.”  And they explained that “as 
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irrigation systems get more use it is wise to have wells checked for efficiency by 
SCS engineers or another expert.”64 
Practically, the new technology increased the relationship between farmers 
and technicians.  Farmers increasingly requested that county farm agents test their 
soils to determine fertilizer needs.   In 1952, Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture 
(OSBA) Seed, Feed and Fertilizer division head Park Yeats reported “many farm 
agents have been receiving [requests for] soil analysis preparatory to fall planting.”  
And new crops consolidated authority in state agencies and experiment stations.  
During 1953, for instance, OSBA received heavy demand to investigate and certify 
sweet potato seed stocks.   That year the Farmer Stockman reminded farmers that 
the Oklahoma Crop Improvement Association was the official state agency for 
seed certification, with a “program [that] includes only those crop varieties which 
are recommended for the state by the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment Station.”  
In 1956, the magazine warned farmers to “be careful when someone tries to sell 
you a new variety of drought-proof grass, cotton, wheat or anything else.”  The 
reason for the warning, they explained, was because of a Sorghum “‘miracle-
crop’” being promoted which tests at the Oklahoma Agricultural Experiment 
Station had found “not up to par with other varieties.”65 
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During and after World War II, the pace of scientific research accelerated 
and industrial growth increased the nation’s capacity to produce new chemicals.  
By the mid-1950s, reported a conservative estimate, “[m]ore than 50 basic 
chemicals for agriculture that were not in commercial existence before World War 
II [were] being manufactured.”  For this reason the National Reclamation 
Association requested regional facilities to consolidate research on new equipment 
and procedures.  “In our age of science,” the organization explained, “more precise 
equipment and better means of chemical and physical investigations are being 
developed daily [and the] brains and know-how of scientists could be better 
utilized if concentrated in a regional laboratory.”  Similarly, in 1958, Cornell 
agricultural economics professor Howard Conklin explained: “The choice of the 
most profitable input levels and practices…is a job that can be done more 
efficiently by specialists who can study the combined experiences of many 
farmers, who can conduct controlled experiments on various kinds of land, and 
who can relate both the experimental and farm experience to physical differences 
in land.”  ACP and SCS officials concurred, saying; “The amount of scientific 
information on land-use practices has itself become something of a problem.  Not 
only is it voluminous; much of it is fairly technical and not ready for use in 
specific situations without further interpretation or adaptation.”66 
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Once they began to irrigate, some farmers were compelled to produce at 
maximum capacity.  Southwest Oklahoma FHA administrator Carl Harris put the 
point clearly, saying: “With high [irrigation] costs you’ve got to keep production 
high every year.”  The result could mean a complete transformation to their 
production regime.  In Kansas, irrigators remembered to John Opie that “when 
they put in their first well in 1956, farm experts from Kansas State University 
came and stressed ‘push, push, push for more yields.”  Another Kansas couple 
who began irrigating cattle feed in the mid-1950s told Opie that “their untested 
skills involved costly new machinery – pumps, engines, gearboxes, pipes, and later 
sprinklers – set permanently on their fields.  They had to learn how to finance and 
manage their operation as if it were a small industrial factory.”  For them, the 
process was all-encompassing: “Irrigation…was at the center of the new venture to 
which they had committed their lives.”  It was also an irreversible financial 
commitment: “[they] could not turn back; if [they] failed [they] could only go 
bankrupt and [would be] out of farming entirely.”67 
 
 Soil and water conservation strategies and technologies during the 1950s 
drought reflected divergent strands.  Farmers who requested advice and assistance 
to battle dry conditions were steered toward a concert of technical solutions that 
functioned best when accompanied by additional inputs.  Some farmersfelt 
captivate to the new systems they had adopted.  The Great Plains Conservation 
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Program, by contrast, was a flexible plan for farmers to manage soil and water 
conservation activities.  GPCP respected geographic and economic circumstances 
on individual farms and ranches.  It also gave farmers time to implement new 
conservation practices.  By doing so, the program implicitly respected that the 
drought’s physical and economic consequences extended beyond the immediate 
erosion crisis.  And it represented a significant innovation to Great Plains soil and 
water conservation policy decades after the 1930s Dust Bowl disaster.  In contrast 
to this flexibility, USDA administrators applied rigid geographical and 
occupational boundaries to determine relief eligibility during the drought.  Like 
soil and water conservation, however, drought relief administration was a process 
that reflected contemporary circumstances during the 1950s.  By the drought’s 
end, pressure from agricultural producers outside of the official drought area, part-
time farmers, and town-based small business operators forced officials to 
reconsider the disaster’s boundaries and to introduce more flexible and inclusive 
assistance policies.
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Chapter 3 – Drought Relief in Oklahoma during the 1950s 
 
In the March 1954 congressional hearings to assess wind damage on the 
Southern Plains, Oklahoma senator A.S. Mike Monroney asked Colorado farmer 
Lail Schmidt the following: “is it not always a fact that as devastating as it is to a 
farmer, in cities and towns 150 miles distant from that area, business takes a 
nosedive and it takes a week to recover any kind of retail sales pattern after one of 
those duststorms?”  Schmidt replied that soil blowing in the region “is affecting 
the whole economy, the whole State and all of these States.  Eventually it comes 
right on down to the Nation.”1  While referring specifically to dust storms, not 
drought, their exchange reflected a sense for the disaster’s widespread physical 
and economic consequences.  Initially, for the sake of expediency, and to exclude 
speculators and “suitcase” farmers from its benefits, federal policies confined 
drought relief to full-time farmers in designated counties.  By the drought’s end, 
however, new measures extended drought assistance to municipal businesses and 
to part-time farmers.  The shift signified the growing sense that drought is not just 
an agricultural disaster and that its consequences extend throughout a region’s 
economy.  The state government’s authority to administer relief also grew during 
the drought, as Oklahoma City-based officials assumed certification 
responsibilities from local officials.  The process revealed themes from the 1930s, 
including patronage, corruption, local resentment toward government “experts” 
and consolidated authority during the drought and economic disaster. 
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Federal drought relief had been working since the previous summer, when 
desperate livestock industry officials and southern plains governors convinced 
Congress to pass the Farmers and Stockmen Emergency Assistance Act (HR 6054 
– P.L. 115).  The law contained three key provisions: emergency feed to drought 
areas; ‘economic disaster’ loans for any agricultural purpose to disaster area 
farmers and stockmen without alternative credit; and nationwide “special 
livestock” loans of $2,500 or more, on a temporary, two-year basis to “established 
ranchers or stockmen [with] a reasonable chance of working out of their 
difficulties[.]”2 
Through its emergency feed program, the federal government helped pay 
the cost to transport hay to drought-stricken areas and provided discounted surplus 
CCC grains to help eligible farmers and ranchers in designated drought areas 
maintain their foundation (breeding) herds of cattle, sheep and goats.  Economic 
disaster loans were available only to drought-area farmers and could be used for 
any agricultural purpose except to refinance outstanding debts.  They bore three 
percent interest, and were to be repaid within five years.  Special livestock loans 
bore five percent interest and were available nationwide.  They represented the 
understanding expressed by House Agriculture Committee Chairman Clifford 
Hope that the drought “has had an adverse effect on the cattle [price] situation over 
the entire country…even in the areas which are not affected by the drought.”3 
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 Special livestock loans were flexible and inclusive solutions to drought-
related economic and environmental problems.  With them, policy-makers 
respected the drought’s implications beyond the immediate feed, crop and dust-
storm emergencies.  The emergency livestock feed program and economic disaster 
loans, by contrast, were restricted to specific producers and regions.  USDA 
officials charged to assess drought conditions and administer the federal drought 
relief program also grappled with the drought’s boundaries.  They emerged from 
the crisis with a more comprehensive view of drought disasters. 
To administer drought relief, USDA drought committees comprising the 
state ASC chairman, the state directors of the Agriculture Extension Service, the 
FHA and Civil defense, a prominent rancher or farmer, and a prominent banker 
operated in each drought state.  These committees surveyed drought conditions in 
their respective states and forwarded the information to the Secretary of 
Agriculture who, with information from additional USDA assessments, could 
recommend that the President designate the State a drought disaster area.  Once the 
President included a state in the drought disaster area, the Agriculture Secretary 
designated which of that state’s counties qualified for disaster assistance.  Local 
FHA committees then determined individual eligibility within each county.
4
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rd
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 To complicate the task facing assessors, administrators and policy-makers, 
the drought area occurred gradually and changed continuously.  U.S.G.S. Water 
Resources Group Chairman S.K. Jackson explained the problem: “in contrast 
to…dramatic…floods, [droughts] are insidious events which develop 
gradually….just when a drought can be said to have begun in a given region is 
rather difficult to establish.”  The Council of State Governments called such 
conditions “creeping disasters.”  A New York Times writer called the disaster 
“Slow Lightning” because it was gradual, but fierce.  USDA Emergency Drought 
Program director Kenneth L. Scott attributed a “pulsing” quality to the disasterand 
asserted “conditions change; sometimes they get better and sometimes they get 
worse.”  And during the summer of 1954, Scott described “[a] spotted drought 
condition” in which “[o]ne county will have had quite good rains and maybe an 
adjoining county or even part of the same county is decidedly different.”5 
To further complicate the assessment task, politicians and local residents 
distinguished their plight and pressured officials to include their home counties in 
the drought area.  When House Agriculture Committee members from the 
Midwest and East inquired about assistance under the drought program, for 
instance, Colorado representative William Hill blasted “Don’t let anybody 
consider a few counties in Illinois the same as what we have out West….Colorado 
                                                                                                                                                                
p. 18; The Drought Program, Committee Print, 10 August 1954, p. 1;Local FHA committees 
consisted of three farmers in each county with experience assessing FHA loan applications to 
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Hearing, 6 August 1954, p. 6. 
5
 S.K. Jackson, “The Present Drought in Oklahoma” [1953], p. 1, in Robert S. Kerr papers, 
Conservation Series, box 11, folder 3; Message from the President of the United States Relative to 
Alleviating Emergency Conditions Brought About by Prolonged Drought and Other Severe Natural 
Disasters, U.S. Congress, House Document No. 110, 85
th
 Cong. 1st. Session, 5 March 1957, p. 
24;New York Times, 15 August 1954, p. SM7;Drought Program, Hearing, 6 August 1954, pp. 13, 
27. 
 100 
 
farmers…haven’t had a good crop for [three] or [four] years.”  And irritated that 
portions of New Mexico were included in the 1953 drought disaster area while 
their own southeastern Oklahoma county was not, Mr. and Mrs. Z.H. Nabershnig 
complained to Senator Robert S. Kerr: “If the drought is estimated according to the 
average rainfall in an area….there was less rain in Bryan County 
[Oklahoma]…because actually New Mexico is a known arid area.”  Congressman 
Carl Albert’s southeastern Oklahoma constituents besieged him with similar 
requests.  One concerned observer wrote, “[s]ome of the counties in the Southeast 
[part of the state] are in worse shape than those in the [drought] area[.]”  Another 
complained: “[w]e can’t understand why Arkansas just a few miles from us [has] 
every county except [four] in the drouth area when the same weather conditions 
have prevailed here as there.”6 
Farmers and ranchers organized to strengthen their claims.  In early July 
1953, for instance, the recently-formed Resolution Committee of Distressed 
Farmers and Ranchers in Poteau, Oklahoma demanded that PoteauCounty 
immediately be included in the drought area.  And in September 1953, the United 
Livestock Producers Association urged the federal government to “immediately 
reinvestigate for reinstatement…counties, which have been temporarily suspended, 
for additional drought relief funds[.]”  In August 1954, CimarronCounty ranchers 
appealed to state and federal officials the recent USDA decision to omit their 
county from the drought disaster area.  And in September 1954, Oklahoma 
                                                          
6
Drought Program, Hearing, 6 August 1954, p. 12;Mr. and Mrs. Z.H. Nabershnig 8 August 1953 
letter to Robert S. Kerr (carbon copy to Carl Albert), p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, 
box 14, folder 45;Viley Johnson 30 June 1953 letter to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, 
Department Series, box 14, folder 45; Marvin Cox 7 December 1953 to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl 
Albert papers, Department Series, box 14, folder 67. 
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Farmers Union secretary Z.H. Lawter stressed that “[s]urveys by the different 
county farm agencies and the Farmers Union disclose there is practically no 
difference in the drouth area in different counties of the state.”7 
Against these complaints, USDA officials defended the agency’s drought 
area designation procedures.  When Colorado representative William Hill 
complained that “[a] county line has nothing to do with where the rain 
stops….There should be a leeway of [ten] or [twenty] percent from the county 
line[,]” for instance, USDA Emergency Drought Program director Kenneth L. 
Scott responded “that is by far the most difficult decision our drought committee 
and the Department has[sic] to make.”  Scott described the subtle factors that 
informed FHA designations, including a county’s spring hay harvest, its potential 
for late fall rains and the number of years certain areas had suffered drought.  
“[W]e have not[sic] rule of thumb in determining these things,” he continued 
“[w]e certainly realize…that these drought conditions do not stop at county 
lines….but we do have to draw the line some place or other.”  Once designated, 
however, the line was firm.  When Missouri representative Paul C. Jones asked, “if 
it so happens that a fellow is living in a disaster area that is not within the county 
that is declared a disaster area, he is just out of luck; is that right?”  Scott replied, 
“[t]hat is right.”8 
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 F.L. Holton 2 July 1953 letter to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, box 
14, folder 46; Resolutions of United Livestock Producers Association Annual Meeting, 14 
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Impatient with USDA’s approach, the House Committee on Agriculture in 
a July 1954 executive session resolved that Agriculture Secretary Benson “use to 
the fullest extent the authority and funds available to him for combating or 
alleviating the results of the drought as soon as conditions in the various affected 
areas warrant action on the part of the Federal Government.”  That August, the 
entire Oklahoma congressional delegation visited Benson’s office to request 
disaster relief for all Oklahoma counties.  On Benson’s behalf, Scott replied that a 
bigger state relief contribution could resolve their concerns.  “[L]egislation which 
would result in the States sharing at least substantially the same load as the Federal 
Government in these emergency programs,” explained Scott, “would 
undoubtedly…give the States much more discretion in handling important phases 
of these programs which obviously are extremely difficult to handle directly out of 
Washington.”  Before the House Agriculture Committee that month, Scott 
explained the agency’s position further: “[m]any of these decisions need to be 
made out in the country, but it is our judgment in the matter that so long as the 
Federal government is putting up the funds that we need to make some decisions 
on territory eligibility…which perhaps should be made…definitely could be made, 
to better advantage in the States.”9 
Scott’s explanation did little to diminish criticism toward Benson and the 
USDA.  “They say nothing and promise less,” an exasperated Carl Albert declared 
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 House Committee on Agriculture 16 July 1954 press release, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, 
Departmental Series, box 19, folder 37; Oklahoma Congressional delegation (Kerr, Belcher, Albert, 
Jarman, Monroney, Edmondson, Steed, Wickersham) 11 August 1954 letter to Ezra Taft Benson, 
pp. 1-2, in Carl Albert papers, Departmental Series, box 19, folder 39; K.L. Scott 10 August 1954 
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19, folder 39; Drought Program, Hearing, 6 August 1954, p. 7. 
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to one needy constituent during the fall of 1953.  To another he proclaimed: “The 
administration of this program has been the unfairest[sic] thing I have ever seen 
done in the Department of Agriculture[.]”10  Other congressmen shared Albert’s 
sentiments.  With his constituents desperately needing feed during the fall of 1954, 
for instance, Kentucky congressman Frank Chelf wrote to Benson, “why don’t you 
and your group of political hacks serving as assistants get the facts on agriculture 
by getting out into the fresh country air[.]”  Chelf shared the telegram with Albert, 
and asked, “In the name of heaven what has to happen to a country or to a farmer 
before he is entitled to consideration for drought emergency relief?”11 
In addition to its geographical limits, the federal drought program’s 
economic shortcomings concerned Albert.  As federal officials formulated the 
emergency program during the summer of 1953, he identified the issue to a 
concerned constituent: “there is a fallacy in the emergency law….that the 
limitations extend to the type of relief given in a natural disaster as opposed to 
economic disaster.”12  Albert’s observation pointed to several inconsistencies in 
the federal drought program.  First, it produced economic disparities by confining 
relief to strictly-defined drought areas.  Congress had partly acknowledged this 
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 Carl Albert 6 October 1953 letter to Gladys Meyers, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, Department 
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issue by making special livestock loans available to producers outside the drought 
area in order to protect nationwide cattle prices.  But the drought program’s other 
benefits including production emergency loans and feed were available only 
within designated drought areas.  Albert received complaints about the problem.  
In late July 1953, for instance, Tulsa-area resident Morris Fears wrote, “I don’t see 
how I can afford to pay $100 a ton for cake when the man a few counties to the 
West pays only $50 a ton – our cattle will sell for the same price on the market[.]”  
In congressional drought hearings during August 1954, Albert presented the issue: 
“if your neighbor just across the [county] line is getting [a] subsidy on feed, if he is 
getting freight subsidy on hay…and if he is also in an FHA disaster area and is 
getting emergency credit, it….can be very serious if a man is in competition.”  
Aside from the obvious disparity in feed costs to producers on either side of the 
drought line, businesses outside of designated disaster areas suffered under the 
program.  During 1953, for instance, feed grain dealers outside of disaster areas 
lost some of their trade because railroads granted reduced freight rates only to 
disaster counties.
13
 
Second, as administered by FHA, emergency feed and production loans 
benefitted only those farmers that met the agency’s mandate to develop solvent 
family farms.  An FHA official explained to Oklahoma congressman Victor 
Wickersham, “the [FHA] insures and makes loans to qualified persons on farms 
that when purchased, improved, or developed will be adequate family-type 
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 Morris S. Fears 19 July 1953 to Carl Albert, pp. 1-2, in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, 
box 14, folder 45; Drought Program, Hearing, 6 August 1954, pp. 13-14, 30. 
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units.”14  Local FHA committees and Washington-based administrators applied 
this mandate to drought relief by restricting emergency loans to full-time farmers 
whose farm size guaranteed their success and the loan’s repayment.  FHA county 
committees were instructed to reject applicants who “did not have an economic 
unit for [an] area.”  In congressional drought relief policy hearings, Colorado 
representative William S. Hill explained the rationale for this policy: “we do not 
want the Federal Government to be in the position of trying to finance something 
that can never come out in the world[.]”15 
At the same time, however, FHA rejected loans to part-time farmers whose 
off-farm incomes may have helped them to withstand the crisis.
16
  To Oklahoma 
Panhandle farmers and ranchers, for instance, The Boise City News explained in 
July 1953: “there is no intention to provide feed to those who have feed, those for 
whom farming or ranching is only a sideline, or for commercial feeders[.]”  That 
November FHA denied emergency assistance to part-time Sapulpa-area rancher 
                                                          
14
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Albert L. Means because “[he] has resumed his off farm work and plans to 
continue earning the major portion of his income from that source for an indefinite 
period.”  And in early 1954, the local FHA committee denied a loan to 
Pushmataha dairy farmer Jessie Hairrell because his first occupation was as 
CountyClerk.
17
 
Forced to account for cases like this one, in August 1954 USDA 
Emergency Drought Program director Kenneth L. Scott explained that the program 
“is intended for people who are really in the farm-stock-raising business, and not 
just have a little sideline deal.  As a rule, we think the professional people in towns 
and cities, who have a little operation out here in the country are generally able to 
go along and take care of themselves.”  FHA rigidly applied the rule.  Asked by 
Arkansas representative E.C. Gathings whether a shoe salesman whose savings 
had been invested in eighty acres of land and cattle would qualify under the 
program, Scott replied, “[t]his assistance is intended for farm people….There may 
be some hardship cases show up, but I believe that this is intended to be of 
assistance to…the farm people.”  On 14 December 1954, Lowell Childers, a part-
time rancher from Durant, Oklahoma, complained to Albert that he had been 
denied FHA emergency feed “because 51% of my earnings were derived from the 
job I have with Amarando Petroleum Oil Co[.]”18 
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To downplay the idea that its policies discriminated against operators based 
on their farm sizes, on 20 July 1956 FHA Acting Administrator H.C. Smith 
explained to Oklahoma congressman Victor Wickersham that “[t]he question of 
whether an applicant is a large or small operator has no bearing on eligibility.  In 
either case, an applicant…whose principal occupation is other than ranching or 
farming, does not qualify for assistance.”19  USDA officials including Secretary 
Benson had repeatedly explained that this provision was designed to exclude 
speculators with non-farm occupations.  Still, because it excluded part-time 
farmers, the drought relief program neglected and accelerated post-war 
circumstances including high land prices, land consolidation, and rural poverty 
that forced many small farmers to supplement their incomes through off-farm jobs.  
The relief program also neglected the drought’s economic implications for 
businesses in the rural communities where many part-time farmers worked and 
shopped.
20
 
Farm consolidation during the 1950s owed to a range of factors, including 
new technologies that increased production scales and farm finance systems that 
favored bigger operations.  Oklahoma A&M and USDA farm economists Robert 
L. Tontz and William Schofield attributed the trend to several factors, including 
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acreage allotments, increasing agricultural productivity in the Southwest, and 
insurance company and Federal Farm Bank lending policies that benefited bigger 
farms.
21
 
That so many factors contributed to farm consolidation makes it difficult to 
isolate drought’s role to the process.  But statistics show accelerated farm 
consolidation during the late stages of the 1930s and 1950s droughts.  For 
instance, the average size of Oklahoma farms increased by 28 acres during the dry 
years from 1935 to 1940, but increased by only 25 acres during the relatively 
wetter period from 1940 to 1945. Similarly, from 1950 to 1955, as drought crept in 
to Oklahoma again, average farms sizes increased by 46.6 acres, but from 1955 to 
1960, after its impact had been more fully felt, they increased by 77.7 acres.  
Historians and contemporaries made the connection.  In CimarronCounty during 
the 1930s drought, for instance, Donald Worster observed that average farm sizes 
increased from 1204 acres in 1930 to 1536 acres in 1940 “as small fry were eaten 
up by big snappers.”22   And in April 1950, New York Times reporters observed 
that drought-related crop losses “may have a healthy over-all effect by squeezing 
out some marginal producers[.]”  In April 1955, Verden, Oklahoma resident 
Parker Woodall testified to Congress that farm sizes in Grady County had 
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 According to the economists, insurance companies and the Federal Land Bank had since 
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increased nearly seventeen percent since 1945 because “small farmers were not 
able to withstand recurring droughts and were forced to abandon their farms.”23 
Rapidly rising land prices, farm consolidation, and the pressure on small 
farms likely also boosted the trend toward part-time farming and blurred the 
meaning of the term ‘farmer’ to some observers.  In 1959, Farmer Stockman editor 
F.J. Deering explained: “Once there were comparatively few very large operators 
and a small proportion of the total number were part-time…farmers.  The term 
‘average farmer’ was a fairly good description of most….Now the term ‘average 
farmer’ means almost nothing….Consolidation of thousands of farms into larger 
units and breaking up of thousands of others into smaller units has left only a small 
part of the total as ‘average farms.’”24 
Rigid adherence to the idea that only ‘family farms’ should benefit from 
federal drought relief and that relief should be restricted to specific ‘drought areas’ 
characterized the federal relief program during the disaster’s early stages.  
Gradually, however, pressure from small producers, part-time farmers, small 
municipal businessmen and their congressmen compelled federal officials to 
rethink drought’s boundaries and the criteria for relief eligibility.  
Albert’s sensitivity to these problems reflected economic conditions in his 
southeastern Oklahoma congressional district where the drought ravaged part-time 
farmers’ livelihoods on and off their small farms.  By the fall of 1954 over 33,000 
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eastern Oklahomans needed emergency USDA relief food, and state officials 
predicted nearly 60,000 needy recipients in the region during the coming winter.
25
  
Consequently, that September state and federal representatives surveyed twenty-
three eastern Oklahoma counties and met with local leaders to assess the region’s 
drought-related economic problems.  
The surveyed region was hilly and mountainous, comprising mostly small 
livestock farms.  Less than one-third of the region’s inhabitants lived in urban 
communities and only two of the twenty-three surveyed counties reported median 
family incomes at or above the state average of $2,050.  Over 20,000 farm 
operators in the region had worked at off-farm wage and salary jobs to supplement 
their incomes during 1949, over half of them for over 100 days.  “Many of the 
small farmers in this area are marginal operators,” observed investigators, “and 
they and members of their families are forced to seek wage employment off their 
farms as an income supplement, even in good years.”  Investigators concluded that 
while the region had been declining economically for years, “the present acute 
[unemployment and relief] situation…has reached the distress stage primarily 
because of three years of insufficient rainfall[.]”  From 1950 to 1954 the number of 
employed workers in the region had fallen from 48,259 to 27,550.  Investigators 
emphasized the drought’s pervasive effects.  “[F]ood cannery employment is only 
a fraction of what it would be in a good crop year,” they reported, “and then trade 
and service activities have suffered because of a general shrinkage in local buying 
power.”  Further afield, the drought had reduced employment in Great Lakes 
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canneries and southwestern Oklahoma harvests, both of which normally attracted 
seasonal migrant workers from the surveyed region.
26
 
Locals saw broad solutions, mostly to be supplied by the federal 
government.
27
  During the September surveys, county leaders requested a range of 
economic stimulus measures, including federal contracts to area canners, more hay 
and feed grain relief, highway improvement and construction programs, water 
resource development and upstream soil conservation, school improvement and 
repair programs, more food and clothing, and home improvement programs.  In the 
report that followed the investigation, representatives from at least nine federal and 
state agencies identified a range of state and federal programs to meet the 
emergency and proposed new programs to mitigate the drought’s broad economic 
effects.  U.S. Corps of Engineers District Engineer (Tulsa) Stanley G. Reiff 
described a variety of short-term and long-term public-works projects to employ 
area people, ranging from immediate jobs on public-use facilities (including access 
roads, parking lots, toilets and shelters) to longer-term work on current and 
authorized (but not yet funded) Corps projects including dam-building, bank 
stabilization and channel rectification.  Bureau of Reclamation Area Development 
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Engineer M.G. Barclay recommended “[a] program of irrigation…to stabilize the 
economy….[n]ot only to…circumvent the drought, but….[to] insure the operation 
of canneries, and, in turn…insure a market for the produce[.]”  And Small 
Business Administration officer O.C. Jones reported that his agency could counsel 
and assist area businesses eager to attract federal procurement contracts.
28
 
On their own, developments with the Small Business Administration 
(SBA) revealed a growing sense for drought’s economic implications and tension 
over who should administer economic assistance to drought areas.  Congress had 
created the agency in 1953.
29
  Its purpose, explained SBA administrator Wendell 
Barnes in a 1954 article, was to “preserve free competitive enterprise [and] to 
insure that a fair proportion of [government] purchases and contracts be…placed 
with small-business enterprises.”  In addition to financial counseling and 
assistance, the agency made loans to help small businesses build, equip and 
expand their operations.  It also had “the humanitarian task of making loans to help 
rehabilitate business concerns and homes damaged by storms, floods, or other 
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catastrophes.”  During SBA’s first years, however, its staff excluded drought from 
their disaster loan mandate because of the administrative challenge to assessing a 
drought’s economic implications and because they considered drought to be an 
agricultural problem best solved by authorizing FHA to make refinance loans in 
drought areas.
30
 
Drought-area congressional representatives soon pressured SBA to take a 
more inclusive approach to its disaster loan assistance policy.  In the August 1954 
drought program hearings, for instance, Texas representative Walter Rogers 
complained, “we have a great number of little-business men who…have been 
carrying farmers on open account [and who] are going to go broke because those 
farmers cannot get funds to pay these back debts….[T]he small merchants cannot 
get any relief from the Small Business Administration.”   For several years, 
bankers and business leaders in small Texas towns had been complaining of the 
drought’s adverse economic effects, including increased REA disconnects, rising 
unemployment, plummeting farm implement and automobile sales, and dropping 
bank deposits.  In the spring of 1955, Texas senator Lyndon Johnson co-sponsored 
a bill to make drought area small-business disaster loans an additional SBA 
priority.  At Senate subcommittee hearings on the bill that May, Johnson 
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 Barnes quoted from the text of the Small Business Act.  The SBA could lend a maximum of 
$150,000.  By October 1954, the agency had approved over 700 loans, totaling more than $40 
million. Significantly, Barnes described SBA disaster assistance to counties in Oklahoma, Texas, 
Arkansas, and Iowa that had been hit by tornadoes but did not mention any assistance related to the 
drought disaster (p. 2).  In Wendell Barnes, “The Small Business Administration: What It Is – 
What It Does,” Oklahoma Business Bulletin, vol.20, no.10 (October 1954), pp. 1-2.  By the spring 
of 1955, the agency had approved 2,528 loans totaling $79,875,000.  In Extension of Small 
Business Administration, Hearings, 5, 9 and 11 May 1955, p. 113. 
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explained, “the cumulative effects of several years of severe drought….upon 
business and commerce in the drought areas has been largely overlooked.”31 
SBA officials remained reluctant to accept the added responsibility.  In a 3 
May 1955 letter to Senate Small Business Subcommittee Chairman Wayne Morse, 
Barnes explained the agency’s position, saying:  
the disaster loan authority now contained in the Small Business Act 
of  1953 relates to damage or destruction caused by physical 
flashtype phenomenon, such as storms, tornadoes, hurricanes, etc, 
where questions of ‘proximate cause’ of the financial need can be 
virtually pinpointed to the “hour and minute.”  Drought cannot be 
so pinpointed; it is a kind of economic erosion and it is submitted 
that the [causal] question, i.e., whether the economic reverses are 
attributable to drought also involves essentially agricultural 
considerations….it is [also] submitted that this essentially 
agricultural problem should be resolved by amendment of the FHA 
authority to permit farmers to pay past indebtedness. 
 
In his subsequent testimony, Barnes added: “The drought is an insidious thing that 
comes over a period of time and it may be other business judgments which caused 
the situation in which the business owner finds himself.”32 
With sympathy for drought area businesses left outside FHA and SBA 
lending procedures, on 17 May 1955 the Senate Executive Committee on Banking 
and Currency approved Johnson’s bill.  That summer Congress authorized SBA to 
provide emergency loans to businesses in USDA designated drought areas.  
Accordingly, Barnes held meetings with bankers in the Southwest to draft a loan 
program for drought-afflicted businesses.  Barnes wanted local banks to distribute 
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Drought Program, Hearing, 6 August 1954, pp. 36-37.  The Texas Employment Commission 
attributed to the drought a 20,000 person rise in unemployment the previous June. InThe New York 
Times, 3 August 1953, p. 17;Extension of Small Business Administration, Hearings, 5, 9 and 11 
May 1955, pp. 60-1. 
32
Extension of Small Business Administration, Hearings, 5, 9 and 11 May 1955, pp. 66-7, 148. 
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application forms and to assess potential borrowers.  Sample application forms 
stipulated ten-year terms at three percent interest, with no limits on the amount a 
business could borrow.  Any “bona fide” business was eligible for the loans, 
except for businesses established during the drought period.  Loans were to be 
used “[s]olely to effect relief from injury attributable to drought conditions.”  To 
prove their losses, applicants had to explain how drought had injured their 
businesses and submit financial and operating statements covering “[the] period of 
normal operations prior to the drought and the current [drought] period for 
comparative purposes.”33 
 This change to SBA policy signified a growing appreciation for drought’s 
broad economic implications, especially the sense that the drought was not strictly 
an agricultural disaster.  As the drought persisted, pressure for more liberal lending 
policies continued.  On 15 August 1956, for instance, Madill, Oklahoma resident 
Glenn Northcutt wrote to state representatives Marvin Bryant and Roy Lockhart to 
stress the drought’s adverse impact near his community.  “As it appears now there 
is going to be very little work in the harvesting of crops in this community this 
fall[,]” Northcutt wrote, “[i]t looks now [like] several families in this community 
will be moving out of the country seeking employment.”  Their forced out-
migration, Northcutt emphasized, would be felt throughout the community, 
including “our Churches, our Schools and our communities in particular.”  A 
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 To safeguard against widespread calls for SBA loans in future droughts, the executive committee 
emphasized the need for Presidential drought designations to qualifying areas.  U.S. Congress, 
Senate, Executive Committee on Banking and Currency, S. 16 and Various Other Small Business 
Administration Bills, Transcript of Proceedings, 17 May 1955, p. 6.  Barnes explained that the SBA 
authority to provide loans to drought-area farmers derived from 1955 (84
th
 Congress) amendments 
to the 1953 Small Business Act.  In Wendell B. Barnes 9 September 1955, ‘To Banks’, pp. 1-2, 
Carl Albert papers, Departmental Series, box 22, folder 63. 
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nearby Fob and Willis-area resident similarly wrote to Governor Gary: “[w]e have 
had only 3.41 inches of rain, exclusive of some snow in January, for 1956.  The 
entire Fob, Willis Community won’t make 25 bales of cotton, no corn, peanuts or 
any other crops….The school will have to close if even one leaves….If the women 
could get work, as at the garment factory we could hold them until maybe some 
things could develop creating employment[.]”  On 21 August 1956, Marshall 
County attorney O.C. Barnes, wrote to Governor Gary from south-central 
Oklahoma: “[w]ithin the near future many families will leave these communities.  
This drouth [sic] has caused a local condition that is even more desperate than in 
any other part of this country….There is no employment for these farmers.”  
Barnes wanted Gary to help advance a local highway project to generate short-
term jobs.
34
 
Recognizing the connection between small farms and off-farm jobs, during 
the summer of 1956, Congress expanded FHA’s scope within its new Rural 
Development Program to allow FHA loans for refinancing existing debts and to 
provide loans to farmers and stockmen with part-time jobs “in industry, trades and 
other employment.”35  In nationwide pilot counties funded by the Rural 
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 The pressure on available jobs fostered parochial sensitivities.  Northcutt stressed that women 
from beyond MarshallCounty worked in the local garment shop while Madill women and their 
families were being forced to leave.  “These women are home owners and hate to leave here,” he 
stressed, while out-of-county laborers “do not spend their money in MarshallCounty, they even 
bring their lunches with them.”  In Glen Northcutt 15 August 1956 letter to Marvin Bryant and Roy 
Lockhart, p. 1, in Raymond Gary papers, box 72, folder 7;G.B. [?] 15 August 1956 letter to 
Raymond Gary, p. 1, in Raymond Gary papers, box 72, folder 7;O.C. Barnes 21 August 1956 letter 
to Raymond Gary, p. 1, in Raymond Gary papers, box 72, folder 7. 
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 27 August 1956 USDA press release (#USDA 2512-56), p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, 
Departmental Series, box 23, folder 47.  The aim was to “promote well-coordinated farm-industry 
expansion in disadvantaged rural areas” (p. 3).  Most of the states with pilot counties had  State 
Rural Development Committees with representatives from farm organizations, civic, business, 
banking, educational, and church leadership along with such agencies as the Extension Service, 
College of Agriculture, Farmers Home Administration, Soil Conservation Service, Industrial 
 117 
 
Development program, state and federal extension workers and SCS soil scientists 
developed economic and agricultural improvement programs for individual 
families and communities, and Agricultural Marketing Service and Agricultural 
Research Service personnel planned regional economic development.  USDA also 
provided “technical, educational, administrative and farm credit aid [to move] 
forward with balanced agricultural, industrial, and other development.”36 
The new Rural Development program recognized that economic 
circumstances during the 1950s inhibited viable, full-time and small-scale farms.  
But it qualified its support to part-time farmers by stipulating that “loans…for 
operating and developing less than family-type farms [would be issued only] if the 
applicants are established bona fide farmers who have historically resided on farms 
and depended on farm income for their livelihood, and who are conducting 
substantial farming operations and spending a major portion of their time 
farming.”  And the new program applied only to “farmers who live in areas 
designated for the Rural Development Program, who are unable to obtain enough 
land resources to develop full-time farms.”37 By 27 August 1956, only two 
Oklahoma counties (among fifty-five nationwide) were included in the Rural 
Development Program and the program received no large-scale appropriations 
until the Area Redevelopment Act of 1961.
38
 
                                                                                                                                                                
Development Board, Department of Health, Education Department, Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Committee, and others” (p. 3). 
36
 27 August 1956 USDA press release (#USDA 2512-56), p. 2, in Carl Albert papers, 
Departmental Series, box 23, folder 47. 
37
 7 August 1956 USDA press release (#USDA 2313-56), pp. 1-3, in Carl Albert papers, 
Departmental Series, box 23, folder 33. And the “interest rates and terms…for operating and 
developing less than family-type farms [would] vary depending upon the purpose for which the 
loan is obtained.” 
38
Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 701. 
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 The following year, officials appreciated the need for a more inclusive and 
integrated federal drought policy.  In January 1957, following another disastrous 
drought year, President Dwight Eisenhower toured the drought-stricken Southern 
Plains to observe conditions, and Agriculture Secretary Benson invited farmers, 
scientists and policy-makers to Wichita, Kansas to examine the drought problem.  
The Wichita meeting involved 190 participants, including farmers, ranchers, state 
drought committees, bankers, businessmen, agricultural college researchers and 
state and federal representatives.  Their recommendations became the Report on 
Drought and Other Natural Disasters, which Benson presented to Eisenhower in 
late February 1957.
39
 
The report contained a mix of old and new lessons.  “Most 
recommendations made would modify or supplement what is already being done,” 
Benson wrote to Eisenhower.  In this regard, the report recommended soil surveys, 
emergency tillage payments to farmers, and incentives to establish cover crops and 
bigger stock-water ponds, among other soil and water conservation measures.  The 
report also offered recent lessons. It suggested, for instance, that the “closer the 
administration and support of emergency programs can be kept to the people 
concerned, the better in terms of meeting the situation satisfactorily and making 
full use of resources.”  To build administrative accuracy and consensus, 
conference participants recommended joint inspections by Washington 
                                                          
39
 Eisenhower toured the drought area from 13-15 January 1957.  The Wichita Conference was held 
14-16 January 1957.  According to the report, the meeting involved “190 participants [including] 
farmers and ranchers, members of the executive committee of the Great Plains Agricultural 
Council, representatives from of State drought committees, bankers, businessmen, farm and 
commodity organizations, agricultural colleges, and workers from State and Federal agencies.”  In 
Message from the President of the United States Relative to Alleviating Emergency Conditions 
Brought About by Prolonged Drought and Other Severe Natural Disasters, U.S. Congress, House 
Document No. 110, 85
th
 Cong. 1st. Sess., 5 March 1957, p. 9. 
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representatives and State drought committees.  To prevent economic disparities 
produced by rigid relief boundaries, they recommended that henceforth “[e]very 
effort…be made to see that normal market processes are allowed to operate during 
periods of drought emergency feed-purchase assistance.”  And to moderate 
drought-related income fluctuations, they recommended new income-tax laws “to 
provide for payment of income tax on the basis of income tax averaged over a 5-
year period.”40 
Respecting the drought’s broader economic implications, the conferees 
reached some general conclusions and recommended some specific changes.  They 
proclaimed, for instance, that “[t]he impacts of drought…are felt in all segments of 
the economic life of the region attended” and they recommended that “in 
developing long-range programs designed to cushion the impact of recurring 
natural disasters, action should be taken to strengthen the allied fields of 
commercial and industrial activities of the region along with those of agriculture.”  
This conclusion reflected a broader perspective than the agricultural adjustments 
recommended by the Great Plains Committee in its 1936 report The Future of the 
Great Plains.  The 1957 report reflected other new lessons.  It suggested, for 
instance, that “[t]he interdependence of farmers and ranchers and businessmen 
make it necessary to consider the problems of small business in drought areas as 
well as those of the farmers and ranchers.”  To mitigate farmers’ economic 
exposure to droughts, they recommended “[f]acilities…to assist farm and ranch 
people to find non-farm employment….Off-the-farm employment is an important 
source of income [and] [a]ny program which leads to an expansion of employment 
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opportunities in disaster areas…will make an important contribution[.]”  
Specifically, they recommended extending FHA loan amortization periods, 
authorizing FHA to refinance debt and modifying the FHA loan provision 
“requiring the owner and operator to live on the land[.]”  These recommendations 
were significantly different than the agricultural solutions proposed in 1936.  They 
represented a broader sense for drought’s implications.  Aside from changes to 
FHA lending policy, however, participants to the Wichita meeting stopped short of 
recommending any specific plans to integrate agriculture, industry and commerce 
in drought-prone areas.
41
 
 The lack of a specific federal action plan to integrate agriculture, industry 
and commerce in drought areas frustrated Oklahoma governor Raymond Gary.  
That March, he wrote to Benson:  “I am somewhat at a loss to explain why, in 
reading your message [introducing the Wichita Report] to the President, that with 
the exception of the so-called ‘Rural Development Program,’ there was no 
recognition of the fact that a portion of agriculture’s problems lie quite outside the 
area of agriculture itself.”  For that reason, he explained, “I am dismayed to find 
no recognition on the Part[sic] of the Federal[sic] agricultural leaders to a partial 
solution of the problem which lies within the capacity of the Federal Government 
to affect[sic].”42 
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Ibid., pp. 16, 19-20. 
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 Missing from Benson’s recommendations, Gary specified, was “an accelerated program of 
industrial dispersion coupled with an accelerated program of water resource development in the 
Great Plains area.”  To strengthen his point, Gary stressed: “Due to the mechanized character of 
agriculture in our State, it is our judgment that ninety percent of our farmers can combine a forty-
hour week in industry, or in commerce, within the framework of their present agricultural 
operations.”  In Raymond Gary 19 March 1957 letter to Ezra Taft Benson, pp. 1-2, in Raymond 
Gary papers, box 72, folder 7. 
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The 1957 Report on Drought and Other Natural Disasters had as its “main 
purpose…more effective coordination of efforts and more adequate sharing of 
responsibilities between individuals, local communities, and governments – local, 
State, Federal – in helping prevent disasters and alleviating distress when disasters 
come.”  Effectively, this purpose reflected what historian Elmo Richardson has 
called the Eisenhower administration’s “conviction that the [federal] government 
should do only those things which the states and the people could not do for 
themselves.”  When he presented the document to Congress, Eisenhower stressed 
two of its conclusions: “first[,] that administration of emergency disasters must be 
kept close to the local people [and] second[,] that State and local governments 
[should] assume a greater part in alleviating human distress and hardships[.]”  
Benson added: “Participation by the States should include administrative 
responsibility so as to provide necessary local guidance and supervision.”43 
Oklahoma governor Raymond Gary’s dissatisfaction with the report, by 
contrast, reflected the sense that economic development to mitigate drought was 
not primarily a state responsibility.
44
  This sense was reflected too in the state’s 
contribution to relief administration, which since at least the 1930s had largely 
seen local county officials qualify recipients for federal money.  During the mid-
1950s, however, federal officials tested this assumption by threatening to withhold 
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Message from the President, 5 March 1957, pp. 3-5, 10.  Elmo Richardson put the same point 
another way, writing that the Eisenhower administration tried to reduce federal spending, 
“dismantle federal bureaucracy and restore reliance upon local and private initiative.”  In Elmo 
Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics: Resource Development in the Truman-Eisenhower Era 
(Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1973), pp. 114-15. 
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 As his recommendation to drought-plagued eastern Oklahoma, for instance, Oklahoma Highway 
Department administrator Mike Donnelly offered to “cooperate fully…and to be of assistance 
wherever we possibly can,” but also reminded readers, “the Highway Department is not a relief 
organization.” In Drought Relief and Area Development Recommendations, p. 9. 
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USDA relief food shipments until local officials met federal eligibility standards.  
The episode fit a long-running pattern of patronage and corruption.  Its resolution 
illustrated how the drought crisis enlarged the state government’s scope.  
Ultimately, the Oklahoma legislature’s response to the threatened cut-off shifted 
administrative authority from local officials to state bureaucrats. 
From the late 1940s, the federal government operated several domestic 
food programs to benefit needy persons, school-children, and low-income families 
across the country.  Through the programs, USDA acquired and distributed surplus 
commodities to county warehouses where local governments distributed the 
foodstuffs to eligible recipients including hospitals, orphanages, schools with 
lunch programs and victims of natural disasters such as floods and droughts.  State 
or local public welfare authorities approved commodity recipients.  In Oklahoma, 
county commissioners performed this task until the early 1950s.  State-wide by 
1955, the program fed over 177,000 Oklahomans in fifty counties.
45
 
Due partly to the drought, USDA surplus food donations reached record 
highs during the 1950s.  Excluding school donations, nationwide USDA surplus 
commodity distribution jumped to 644 million pounds in 1957 from a previous 
high of 238 million pounds in 1951.  Oklahoma received a disproportionate 
amount of this assistance.  During 1957, Oklahoma ranked third in surplus 
foodstuff receipts, behind only Pennsylvania and Alabama.  And during the peak 
drought years from 1953 through 1956, Oklahoma’s USDA commodity surplus 
                                                          
45
 Willard W. Cochrane and Mary E. Ryan, American Farm Policy, 1948-1973 (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1976), p. 281.  Historians Wayne Rasmussen and Gladys Baker 
traced the program back to USDA’s distribution of surplus pork in 1933.  In Rasmussen and Baker, 
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receipts towered above the state’s southern plains neighbors, including Texas.  
Despite its relatively small population, Oklahoma received approximately $10.2 
million worth of commodities during those four years, compared to approximately 
$2.7 million and $2.5 million respectively for Texas and New Mexico, $510,000 
for Colorado and only $31,000 for Kansas.  The discrepancy drew national press 
attention, with the Wall Street Journal reporting that southern states including 
Oklahoma benefited unfairly from the program.  It also drew federal (USDA) 
investigators.
46
 
In February 1955, barely a month into Raymond Gary’s governorship, 
federal officials ordered the state to assume county commissioners’ certification 
duties amidst allegations that some commissioners had used their positions to 
coerce votes for the Democratic Party during the previous fall’s general election.  
More broadly, explained Gary, “‘[t]hey feel we have too many people on relief 
lists.’”  To cull ineligible commodity recipients, Gary assigned the certification 
task to the Oklahoma Emergency Relief Board (OERB).  OERB relief certification 
responsibility lasted just over one year. In August 1956, USDA officials again 
confronted Gary with audit and administrative review results that threatened the 
state’s surplus food program eligibility.  The governor responded quickly, this time 
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 According to a USDA press release, “Distribution domestically was increased to 1,043,000,000 
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issuing an executive order for the Oklahoma Department of Public Welfare (DPW) 
to supervise OERB’s relief certification responsibilities until the legislature 
reconvened the following year.
47
 
Another political scandal surrounding the State Senate race in Okmulgee 
and Wagoner counties in northeast Oklahoma overshadowed Gary’s response.  
During the contest, incumbent Senator John Russell’s campaigners used OERB 
relief funds that had been illegally issued to some of the candidate’s supporters.  
The scandal tarnished Gary’s credibility because Russell was his political ally and 
because the governor had personally appointed OERB director Frank Easley who 
was ultimately convicted for conspiracy in the affair.  Contemporaries saw Gary’s 
executive order as a way to minimize short-term political damage.
48
  More deeply, 
his move reformed relief distribution issues that went back to at least the drought 
and depression of the 1930s.  Public Welfare Department chief E.L. Rader’s 
experiences as a relief agent help to illuminate the process.
49
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Supreme Court where Easley pleaded guilty to conspiracy charges.  In James R. Scales and Danney 
Goble, Oklahoma Politics: A History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1982), pp. 300-301.  
Reporters attributed the reform measure to an “absentee vote and relief check” scandal in Wagoner 
County, but quoted Gary as saying: “‘It is a reform measure and the department will operate more 
efficiently and I believe it will no longer be known as a patronage department.’” In Oklahoman, 23 
January 1957, p. 42. 
49
 Department of Public Welfare head E.L. Rader subsequently explained that “[c]ontrary to the 
belief of the majority of people and the general public in general, [Gary’s executive order] was not 
the result of the Wagoner deal.” in Meeting of Field Representatives, 29 January 1957, p. 1, 
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Rader’s career in relief and public welfare management began during 
Oklahoma governor “Alfalfa” Bill Murray’s administration (1931-1935).  Like 
other governors of his time, Murray used Federal Emergency Relief 
Administration (FERA) funds to consolidate political power.  President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt’s administration had established FERA in 1933 to distribute 
unemployment relief funds to the states.
50
  To control the money that came to 
Oklahoma, Murray carefully and secretively selected local relief agents.  He hired 
Rader to set up the first county relief departments in western Oklahoma.  “[H]e 
told me not to talk to any chamber of commerce or any politician but certain 
people he told me to talk to….[h]e also told me if it got out what I was doing he 
would fire me,” Rader later recalled.51  His task in western Oklahoma finished, 
Rader was himself subsequently assigned as a relief agent in CusterCounty.  That 
position revealed to him the important and powerful role that local officials 
occupied in the relief process.  “We were our own case workers, certifiers, etc[,]” 
he recalled, “Who did we lean on?  Naturally, the school superintendents, and 
Boards of County Commissioners, to find out about…people and eligibility.”  The 
county commissioners were especially powerful, Rader recalled in another 
instance: “our primary source of information was the county commissioner….[a]s 
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the [relief program] developed down through W.P.A. and C.W.A., they more or 
less controlled the thing[.]”52 
Patronage and corruption during Murray’s administration led eventually to 
an investigation by FERA liaison officer Aubrey Williams, who reported to 
Washington “‘thieving and favoritism on all sides….[E]very Tom, Dick and Harry 
in the state was getting relief whether they were unemployed or not.’”  In early 
1934 federal authorities took over relief administration in Oklahoma for the year.  
Relief administration remained a problem through the 1930s, however.  Under 
Governor Leon Phillips’ administration (1939-1942), recalled Rader, “The rolls 
began [again] to get out of hand….They came down here and shut us off in 1939.  
They said….[s]ome people were being put on who were not eligible and some 
persons were denied assistance who were eligible.”  To receive further funds, the 
state had to recertify its case load.
53
 
In addition to corruption and mismanagement, conflicting expectations and 
attitudes complicated relief administration during the 1930s.  “[T]he discontented 
had come to look to the federal government as the instrument of their deliverance 
from misery,” observed Oklahoma historians James Scales and Danney Goble, but 
state legislators, businessmen and local officials resisted consolidated federal and 
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state power.  ‘Alfalfa’ Bill Murray’s successor, E.W. Marland, won the 1934 
gubernatorial race on a slogan to “Bring the New Deal to Oklahoma,” but he faced 
“insurmountable obstacles,” including legislators who “refused to limit their own 
prerogatives to the higher cause of efficient state planning[,]” and local officials 
who “declined to relinquish their powers to appointed experts in Oklahoma City or 
Washington.”  The Oklahoma business community was particularly opposed to the 
tax increases necessary to fund Marland’s proposed new state agencies to combat 
the depression.  During Marland’s administration, observed Scales and Goble, 
“Oklahomans were psychologically unprepared for the swift transition of an 
agrarian, patronage-minded commonwealth to a social welfare state supporting 
vast new agencies and requiring a high degree of administrative skill.”54 
This situation changed quickly, however.  By the end of the 1930s, contend 
Scales and Goble, “the state’s responsibility for what had always been purely local 
obligations was now accepted – in welfare, education, and…in law enforcement.”  
Symbolizing this transformation, legislators created the Department of Public 
Welfare (DPW) to meet the Social Security Act requirement that each state 
establish a central agency to administer federal matching grants.  But the 
transformation extended throughout state government.  By the late 1940s, they 
continued, “Oklahomans [had] moved generations away from Bill Murray and his 
rustic values….As in social welfare, the state’s new activities in public education 
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and economic planning had forever ended any resemblance between modern 
public administration and running a farm.”55 
Despite these observations, the relief situation during the 1950s limits the 
conclusion that the experiences of the 1930s had completely transformed attitudes 
or administrative procedures.  Expectations for federal assistance had grown 
among individual recipients and state legislators, but the state government’s sense 
of responsibility for relief and welfare dragged.  Despite the phenomenal growth in 
welfare spending since the 1930s, the number of case workers had barely grown.  
During the 1950s, explained E.L. Rader, “there was[sic] not any more people in 
the field to take care or take on this large job of certification…than there had been 
[during the 1930s].”  In 1953 the DPW resisted responsibility for relief 
certification in CusterCounty because the agency had neither the mandate nor 
funds for the task.   The limited number of field workers to certify recipients had 
led to the USDA’s August 1956 ultimatum, explained Rader in another instance, 
since “it was impossible to meet the standards of certification as required by the 
USDA for the distribution of commodities.  Some…people…had any place from 
700 to 800 cases.  One or two had 4,000 families. And I don’t suppose he could 
even write their names down, much less spend any time investigating.”56 
Associated with these institutional obstacles to relief administration were 
persistent ideological and political obstacles.  In early 1957 staff meetings, Rader 
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recalled his own initially limited sense for drought relief’s regional economic 
implications:  “I took the attitude….why be grumbling and tight about surplus 
food commodities because we have been dumping them and throwing them 
away…and I did not consider [that] there were two sides to all questions – there is 
the side of the merchant and there is the side of the needy hungry people.”  In a 
more principled objection to the expanded DPW functions, long-time DPW staffer 
S.H. Singleton argued: “it is not the duty of the [DPW] or the objective to show 
eligibility….if you had any duty at all, it would be to try to keep [recipients] from 
becoming eligible and being sure they meet the requirements…the burden is on 
them[.]”  The issue had broad economic and moral implications for Singleton.  
“We are $276,000,000 in debt now,” he continued, “[t]his is a gratuity coming to 
the people of Oklahoma and should not go to others than those who meet 
eligibility qualifications from an economic standpoint down to the last number, 
because if you don’t…you will eventually destroy the Government [and] the moral 
fibre of the citizens[.]”57 
Politically, governor Johnston Murray exacerbated the problem as he 
successfully campaigned for the governorship in 1950.  For his pledge to “increase 
pensions by reducing the spending on ‘snooping’ caseworkers,” Murray received 
substantial support from the Oklahoma Welfare Federation (OWF).  The OWF 
was a powerful group that reflected the state’s high proportion of older welfare 
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recipients, especially in eastern Oklahoma, and the power of rural constituents in 
Oklahoma politics after World War II.
58
  Those voters resisted efforts to reform 
spending and centralize authority in state agencies.  For instance, farmers and 
county commissioners resisted efforts to consolidate road and highway building 
authority in the State Highway Commission.  In 1954, OWF head Ora J. Fox 
campaigned for the governorship by pledging “to raise monthly stipends to the 
elderly…provide their medical care [and] to eliminate the Welfare Department’s 
caseworker system.”  By the time he left office, following that election, Johnston 
Murray was frustrated with the type of rural power wielded by OWF.  In his final 
State of the State address before leaving office, he criticized the state’s “archaic” 
tax structure.  And a few months later, he wrote a scathing Saturday Evening Post 
article titled “Oklahoma is a Mess,” to criticize the power of county 
commissioners “who inevitably retained narrow views,” and “the legislative 
apportionment that allowed rural politicians to govern an urban state…undergoing 
industrialization.”59 
Rural officials resented efforts to reform relief administration, at least in 
Rader’s interpretation.  Privately to his key staffers, Rader suspected that during 
the fall of 1956, following governor Raymond Gary’s executive order to transfer 
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relief administration from OERB to DPW, that OERB head Robert Wilson and the 
State Organization of County Commissioners deliberately delayed and obstructed 
recertification and compliance with the USDA standards in order to embarrass the 
Gary administration and Public Welfare Department experts.  “They would like to 
get in a position to say, ‘The Welfare Department’s smart boys have…failed to get 
it straighten[sic] out and they lost the commodities,’” Rader suggested to staffers.  
DPW staffers were generally better trained and educated than county 
commissioners and OERB employees and they brought higher standards to the 
certification process.  In his 10 August 1956 press release to explain Governor 
Gary’s executive order, Rader publicized the difference, by asserting that the 
OERB “does not have the trained personnel that the Department of Public Welfare 
has in making proper investigation and certification.”60 
When it reconvened, in January 1957, the state legislature abolished the 
OERB and transferred its responsibilities to the state Department of Public 
Welfare.  Indicating the situation’s gravity, this was the first bill to reach Governor 
Gary’s desk that year.  County commissioners would still manage the emergency 
relief program and commodity distribution, but they would receive direction from 
a constitutional board in Oklahoma City.
61
  The State Department of Public 
Welfare published a brochure indicating the state’s increased authority over USDA 
commodity distribution.  The Plan for Making USDA Commodities Available to 
Cities and/or Counties for Distribution to Needy Persons stipulated that 
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“[a]llapplications for USDA commodities for welfare distribution will be 
processed through the State Office of the Commodity Distribution Division of the 
State Department of Public Welfare,” and that “[t]he standard of eligibility 
adopted by a city or county may not exceed the limitations of the State Standard of 
Eligibility[.]”  Counties were required to designate a local authority and to provide 
the office space and personnel to support a state program to determine regularly 
individual and family eligibility.  Rader explained the change: “I am old 
fashioned….Dad was Chairman of the town Board.  Each little town was like a 
little board of CountyCommissioners.  But time marches on and that day is 
gone….to participate…you meet certain rules and regulations and basic 
requirements [so] you can qualify for Federal funds….[t]hat is what the majority 
of the people wanted during the depression and it developed as a result of the 
depression times or what have you.  We developed a highly centralized form of 
government.”62 
Like it had during the 1930s, relief administration during the 1950s drought 
crisis increased the state government’s size.  The drought also heightened a sense 
that stronger connections between agriculture and industry could mitigate future 
disasters, especially for the state’s growing number of small farmers.  Oklahoma’s 
cattlemen made their own connections during the drought as they struggled to keep 
their herds.  By the disaster’s end, their industry was reoriented and integrated. 
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Chapter 4 – Oklahoma Cattlemen and 1950s Drought 
 
To open the Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association Luncheon, on Friday 
February 8, 1957, Dr. C.Q. Smith offered the following supplication:  
“Oh Lord! Our GreatRange Boss 
 “We are the Cattle of Thy Pastures 
 “Thou has spared us for another Roundup…. 
 
 “Thou hast led us through green pastures 
 “And by still waters 
 “Thou has sheltered and fed us 
 “Through drought and threatening blizzards 
 “Though has vaccinated us against range diseases…. 
  
 “Grant that we may continue to browse  
 “On the succulent plants 
 “That give only health and growth 
 “The protein and forage that will raise us  
 “To premium quality 
 “And when Shipping Time comes 
 “Register us in Thy Great Book[.]63 
 
Smith’s prayer covered many issues central to the cattlemen’s recent experiences.  
Through much of the decade, drought had parched Oklahoma pastures, bringing 
with it grass and water shortages, high feed costs and low cattle prices that 
threatened to bankrupt many livestock producers and cripple the foundation herds 
they needed to fully recover from the disaster.  Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association 
(OCA) members had been “spared” from bankruptcy and the loss of their herds by 
federal feed relief, emergency credit, and government cattle purchases.  They had 
also struggled with a variety of drought-related herd and pasture issues.  And they 
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had integrated their industry to make feedlot finishing and marketing important 
steps for producing and selling ‘premium’ beef. 
 This chapter explores these developments.  During the crisis, state and 
federal officials advised and assisted Oklahoma ranchers and farmers on issues 
including disease, weed and predator control, animal nutrition, and fire prevention.  
The drought also brought cattlemen together to push for their chief concern in the 
early 1950s, a federal cattle purchase program to stabilize prices.  Just as the 
drought forced federal officials and relief agents to qualify deserving emergency 
farm loan recipients, the crisis fostered a debate among cattle producers over what 
it meant to be a legitimate rancher, who should qualify for federal assistance, and 
the shape that assistance should take.  Agriculture Secretary Ezra Taft Benson’s 
firm resistance to price supports, along with practical and philosophical divisions 
among cattlemen, meant that the solution to low prices came through increased 
marketing to generate demand, not federal price supports to absorb surplus cattle.  
Beef promotion integrated the industry by connecting producers with marketing 
specialists and retailers.  With the assistance and advice of animal health and 
nutrition specialists, farmers and ranchers fed more cattle in confined lots during 
the drought.  The experience convinced many local producers to change their 
operations: instead of raising cattle for shipment to northern feeders, they began to 
fatten their cattle in Oklahoma. 
 
Indirectly, the drought pressured Oklahoma grasses and herds even before 
conditions became critically dry across the state.  In 1951, for instance, many 
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Texas ranchers looked to neighboring states, including Oklahoma, for feed and 
pasture.  By February 1952, Oklahoma State Board of Agriculture (OSBA) 
president Harold Hutton had received over twenty inquiries from Texas and New 
Mexico livestock owners eager to move their herds to Oklahoma.  One Fort Worth 
rancher found “the grazing and quality of grass so good in [Oklahoma] that we are 
moving our cattle up to your state….permanently.”  Word of quality Oklahoma 
grazing conditions attracted friends and family.  In June 1954, for instance, 
Oklahoma Senator Mike Monroney received a letter describing a Hugo-area 
rancher who had relocated to Oklahoma the previous May “due to sustained drouth 
conditions” in New Mexico.  His father had come to the Hugo area three years 
earlier, and his grandfather had arrived the previous winter.
64
 
Not only did incoming cattle pressure Oklahoma grasslands and feed 
supplies, but malnourished and stressed cattle brought diseases and pests.  In 
January 1952, for instance, Oklahoma State Veterinarian Dr. D.H. Ricks reported 
that anthrax was “striking at a time of year when it does not ordinarily affect 
cattle.”  The spore-based disease can quickly and violently kill infected livestock 
and humans without previous symptoms.  Connecting the outbreak to the dry 
conditions, Hicks explained that the anthrax organism “has been known to live in 
the soil for a number of years” and usually involves “heavy losses…during dry 
seasons when the grass is poor and livestock graze close to the ground.”  Since the 
disease could also be transmitted by direct contact with infected carriers, by flies, 
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or through inhalation, cattle coming from drier regions of Texas and New Mexico 
threatened Oklahoma herds.  In his annual report for 1952, Hicks reported anthrax 
outbreaks in twelve Oklahoma counties, eleven of which had no previous history 
of the disease.  In April 1953, an Atoka farmer was hospitalized for an anthrax 
infection he had acquired while skinning one of his infected cows.  And during 
1957, an anthrax outbreak killed 400 head of cattle in three northeastern Oklahoma 
counties.
65
 
Incoming livestock threatened Oklahoma producers with other diseases and 
pests including ticks, screw-worm fly, mange, and shipping fever.  In June 1952, 
OSBA entomology and plant industry division head Clyde Bower reported a 
“heavier than normal infestation” of spinos ear ticks in Oklahoma cattle herds and 
two instances of the GulfCoast ear tick, even though “that pest is not usually found 
as far north as Oklahoma.”  Increased numbers of Texas cattle moving to 
Oklahoma during the drought increased the screw worm threat which “spreads 
northward from southern Texas into areas of Oklahoma in average years[.]”  
Similarly, drought-related livestock shipments threatened Oklahoma livestock 
producers with mange.  Mange (“scab”) is a contagious skin disease caused by 
mites that can be transmitted directly or indirectly.  It causes “intense irritation and 
hypersensitivity, which can lead to debilitation and possibly death.”  In early 1954, 
OSBA’s Veterinary Division warned farmers that “sheep scab, found in a number 
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of imported flocks last winter, is making its appearance again over the state.”  That 
February, the agency encouraged Oklahoma farmers and ranchers to examine 
carefully health certificates meant to accompany inter-state livestock shipments.  
By doing so, farmers could avoid the problems facing a Laverne, Oklahoma 
rancher who had imported 212 infested cattle from Colorado, then mixed them 
with his own herd before selling several bunches in Kansas.  To prevent similar 
problems, OSBA assigned a veterinarian to help Panhandle sales operators and 
truckers ensure that “any cattle moving through or into the area are accompanied 
by health certificates.”  The Laverne case also prompted Oklahoma to issue a 
temporary embargo against eastern Colorado cattle imports.
66
 
Animal diseases commanded OSBA’s attention during the drought crisis.  
In yet another case, during October 1954 OSBA reported recent Oklahoma 
outbreaks of the sheep disease Blue Tongue and explained that the disease “ha[d] 
been traced to importations of sheep from southern Texas areas, where [it] ha[d] 
existed in flocks since 1950.”  In the 1954 OSBA annual report, Acting State 
Veterinarian Dr. George Moreland reported that field inspections of diseased 
animals and “regulation of the importation of livestock to prevent the introduction 
of diseased animals into Oklahoma,” were among the agency’s major activities 
during the year.  The agency also encouraged producers to be vigilante for signs of 
shipping fever.  That disease afflicts animals that have recently been weakened by 
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stressful experiences like transportation, including “fear, crowding, change in feed, 
inadequacy of feed or water, exhaustion and exposure to cold[.]”  Its symptoms 
include potentially-fatal bronchopneumonia and influenza viruses which easily 
become epidemics, especially in confined herds.  A recent observer said the 
disease “can run through a herd like flu through a kindergarten.”67 
Dangerous plants and parasites in poor and inadequate pastures posed 
another significant risk to drought-stricken livestock producers.  In March 1952, 
D.H. Ricks reported outbreaks of ‘oak-bud’ poisoning in cattle that had grazed 
green sprouts on trees and shrubs in grass-deficient pastures.  That fall he warned 
farmers that “[h]ot, dry weather, dust, inadequate water supplies and poor pastures 
have caused many cattle to be in a weakened condition and herds should be 
watched closely for signs of respiratory trouble[.]”   Weakened and malnourished 
cattle were also vulnerable to parasites.  In October 1952, Ricks predicted that 
“livestock parasites are due to take a heavy toll during the next four to five months 
in Oklahoma unless measures are taken to offset the feed shortage and scarcity of 
good winter pastures.”  In November 1954, Acting State Veterinarian George 
Moreland reported that “[i]nternal parasites are causing greater losses to the 
livestock industry than most producers, particularly in eastern Oklahoma, realize.”  
Pasture infestations usually increase during wet, warm weather.  But during the 
drought, OSBA officials later explained, over-grazed pastures had the potential to 
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infect cattle with stomach worms and other internal parasites “when…animals are 
eating close to the ground where the parasites can be found.”68 
Pastures deficient in Vitamin A and protein also threatened Oklahoma 
herds, especially calf crops.  In May 1952, Ricks reported that “‘malnutrition 
has…this year…given more trouble than we have seen in several years.’”  
Particularly lacking in drought-area livestock diets was the Vitamin A that occurs 
in green feeds.  Specialists recommended that cattle receive “from two to five 
pounds of green, leafy alfalfa hay daily per animal” to meet their Vitamin A needs, 
and that “protein and mineral requirements be rounded out with from a pound and 
a half to two pounds of cake along with steamed bone meal and salt, fed free 
choice.”  Pregnant cows and cows with calves required six to ten times more 
Vitamin A than dry cows or steers.  To aggravate the situation, some producers 
mistakenly blamed disease instead of malnutrition for their sick and dying cattle, 
and so neglected to add the necessary supplements to their herds’ diets.  In January 
1953, as Oklahoma cattlemen prepared for calving season, OSBA predicted 
significant losses over the next ninety days unless farmers and ranchers 
supplemented the state’s phosphate and vitamin A-deficient pastures and hay 
stocks.  The following month, OSBA Veterinary Division Head Dr. D.H. Ricks 
reported that because of vitamin A, protein and other feed deficiencies, “calf losses 
have been exceptionally high” in communities “where dry weather has prevailed 
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for several years[.]”  In the most severe cases, CottonCounty ranchers were losing 
fifty percent or more of their calf crops.  To protect their cattle, Ricks advised 
farmers and ranchers to add commercial vitamin supplements to their herds’ diets, 
as well as alfalfa where it could be found.  He added that by allowing their herds to 
graze wheat fields where available, farmers and ranchers could reduce the 
nutritional deficit.  But farmers and ranchers grazing grain fields had to be careful.  
In November 1953, OSBA warned farmers not to graze cattle on corn stubble 
where fungus poisoning had appeared.  And in September 1954, State Veterinarian 
Dr. George Moreland explained that ‘Prussic Acid’ livestock poisoning could 
occur where cattle grazed stubble fields or Johnson and Sudan grass “particularly 
when new growth is showing up after prolonged dry weather, such as Oklahoma 
has experienced this summer.”  Where farmers faced these problems, OSBA 
instructed that “cattle should be moved to dry lots and provided good feed.”69 
Since the drought made nutritious home-grown feed scarce, some 
Oklahoma cattlemen relied on processed supplemental feed to survive the crisis.  
In a bizarre pattern that signified the drought’s indirect nutritional and health 
hazards, this heightened reliance aggravated an occasional but severe condition 
that had afflicted state herds and baffled ranchers and livestock health specialists 
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since the late 1940s.  Initially called X-disease because officials could not 
determine its cause, the condition’s symptoms included “severe loss of weight, 
constant watering of the eyes…loss of calves as well as older animals…and skin 
and mouth lesions.”  During the spring of 1953 the disease fatally struck herds in 
several Oklahoma counties and parts of Texas.  Officials finally traced the problem 
(hyperkeratosis) to supplemental feed that had been contaminated with chlorinated 
naphthalene (a machine lubricant) by a Texas-based cotton-seed pellet processor.  
Because the chemical made it impossible for afflicted animals to digest vitamin A, 
some ranchers and specialists had mistakenly attributed the symptoms to 
malnutrition.
70
 
 More broadly than the X-disease episode, unprocessed feed and seed that 
entered the state during the drought threatened farmers and ranchers with weeds 
and other unwanted plant varieties.  To help offset the problem, during 1953 the 
SBOA Market Division sent inspectors to northern states to purchase emergency 
hay for Oklahoma.  Monitoring shipments was difficult, however, because relief 
hay came to Oklahoma not just by rail, but also in relatively small and scattered 
truck-sized shipments, and because the federal government did little to administer 
the program besides reimbursing states that purchased hay.
71
   These 
circumstances put the onus on individual dealers and relief recipients to ensure the 
quality of incoming feed and seed supplies.  In September 1953, for instance, after 
the drought had reduced seed grain harvests in the state, OSBA Feed and Seed 
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Division head Park A. Yeats “urged dealers to make a careful check of varieties of 
seed,” because “[t]ruckers…coming into Oklahoma from the north...may be 
offering for sale spring varieties of barley, rye or oats or varieties that are grown 
further south and would not be winter-hardy in Oklahoma unless we should have 
an exceptionally mild winter[.]”  And in August 1954 Yeats warned that farmers 
and ranchers buying feed grains “direct from truckers may be taking a needless 
risk of infesting their land with bindweed, wild mustard, and other weeds if weed-
infested grain is fed to livestock or if it is planted.”  By September that year, at 
least two truckloads of oats from northern states had been banned from sale in 
Oklahoma because they contained Bindweed.  Feed could also contain unwanted 
insects.  In December 1954, the OSBA Entomology and Plant Industry Division 
prepared to “quarantine against unfumigated seed and feed grain imports from 
areas of [the] khapra beetle infestation in California, New Mexico and Arizona.”72 
Like diseases, weeds and pests, fire threatened the state’s livestock 
producers.  In December 1951, the OSBA reported “a good many grass fires” due 
to hunters’ carelessness.  By that point, hunters’ disregard for the fire danger and 
other farmer and rancher concerns – including fastening gates and careless 
shooting – had caused many farmers to prohibit hunting on their land.  In 
September 1953, OSBA encouraged Oklahomans to “help save livestock 
producers… many dollars in feed cost by being careful to avoid starting grass and 
timber fires[.]”  Oklahoma Rural Fire Control Committee Chairman John Burke 
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reported that 316,000 acres of grassland and timber had been burned over the 
previous year.  Fire threatened farmers and ranchers throughout the drought.  
Because of the fire hazard, in August 1954 the OCA protested the state Game and 
Fish Commission’s approval of open season deer hunting for the upcoming fall.  
And near the end of the blistering 1956 summer, a concerned Duncan, Oklahoma 
resident wrote to Governor Raymond Gary: “one cigarette could set the world 
afire….Will you caution the people in papers and on t.v.?  I almost got burned up 
or could have fighting pasture fire 3 yrs ago.  also[sic] last year.  most[sic] every 
year theres [sic] a fire.”73 
By threatening already scarce feed supplies, fire touched the issue of cattle 
prices that primarily concerned most cattlemen during the 1950s.  Pasture and feed 
shortages hit Oklahoma cattle producers hard.  For the 1952 season, the OSBA 
reported “a disastrous decline in cattle prices….[a] serious shortage of feed…[and] 
record hay and forage prices.”  Feed costs rose dramatically during the drought.  In 
1949, Oklahomans had spent $55.4 million on feed.  In 1952 that figure was $92.9 
million.  Unable to afford the ballooning feed costs, many Oklahoma ranchers sent 
cattle to market at big losses.  In 1952, receipts from livestock sales in Oklahoma 
were down by $25 million over the previous year, despite an eighteen percent 
increase in cattle sales.  And the situation got worse.  For the first half of 1953, 
Oklahomans sold sixty-eight percent more cattle and calves than for the same 
period in 1952.   Yet overall for 1953, cash receipts from sale of cattle and calves 
                                                          
73
Farm News, 10 December 1951, p. 1; Farm News, 19 November 1951, p. 1. Governor Johnston 
Murray had recently named the committee to study means for preventing fire losses.  In Farm 
News, 11 September 1953, p. 1; 18 August 1954 OCA Board of Directors Meeting Minutes, p. 4, in 
OCA papers, Series III, box 2, folder 14; Mrs. Joe Aldridge 4 September 1956 letter to Raymond 
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dropped by nearly $70 million, to $162,777,000 from $234,619,000 the previous 
year.  In 1953, observed historian Rana Williamson, “cutter canner cows that had 
sold for 15 cents a pound in 1951 brought only five [cents a pound] and bull calves 
worth $35-$40 fetched a mere $5 a hundredweight.”  That summer, a Valliant, 
Oklahoma rancher wrote to Carl Albert: “I have attended six local livestock 
auctions in the last two weeks, cattle did not sell, they were given away.  Some as 
low as three [cents] a pound.  Today at the Idabel Auction I saw first quality white 
face yearling steers at the best 450 to 600 pounds…sell for $6.75 to $9.90 per 
hundred pounds.  One year they would have sold for $22.00 to $25.00 per hundred 
pounds.”74 
As cattle prices plummeted during the spring of 1953, members of the 
Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association (OCA) met in Oklahoma City to establish 
offices and spread their organization throughout the state.  The organization had 
been conceived in 1947 and incorporated in 1950 but had not met regularly or 
campaigned seriously for members until the drought crisis.  Its goals reflected 
many of the industry’s drought-related concerns.  Broadly, the association aimed 
“to promote the welfare of the cattle industry throughout the state of 
Oklahoma….[to] promote educational and scientific programs affecting the cattle 
industry of the State; provide for the dissemination of useful information; prevent 
cattle theft; promote breeding and pasture improvement; to aid in the control of 
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cattle diseases[.]”  Specifically, the association wanted federal help to stabilize 
beef prices during the drought crisis.
75
 
In early June 1953, the OCA Executive Committee urged the federal 
government to purchase 500 million pounds of canner, cutter and utility grade 
beef, and another 500 million pounds of frozen domestic beef for export.  To 
frame their appeal as broadly as possible, the cattlemen claimed that “canned meat 
[would help] to guard against [a] food shortage in the case of national emergency 
or disaster due to atomic attack.”  At the end of June, the USDA announced that its 
drought relief program included the purchase of 200 million pounds of beef over 
twenty weeks for the school lunch program, $8 million in Commodity Credit 
Corporation [CCC] feed grains for drought areas, and reduced railway shipping 
rates on hay, feed and livestock into and out of the drought area.  These measures 
did not satisfy the OCA Executive who subsequently criticized Agriculture 
Secretary Ezra Taft Benson for “the mild form [of] the Government buying 
program” and for refusing to purchase processed and frozen beef at non-
competitive prices.  By late August, the OCA executive committee resolved that 
Benson’s approach had “utterly failed to give cattle producers the needed relief.”76 
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In addition to a federal beef purchase plan to relieve distressed producers, 
many cattlemen wanted government price supports to stabilize the industry.  The 
issue divided cattle producers for practical and philosophical reasons.  Generally, 
smaller operators favored the security provided by price supports while larger 
operators opposed them because they feared government control over the industry.  
Oklahoma congressman Carl Albert’s southeast Oklahoma constituency contained 
many smaller operators who favored price supports for livestock.  On 9 July 1953, 
for instance, Choctaw County Livestock Association president William Wyatt Jr. 
informed Albert that his association, representing at least 150 producers, had 
recently voted to encourage government purchases of low-grade cattle and support 
prices for cattle at 90% of parity.  The same week, the Pittsburgh County 
Livestock Association declared, “Our association is practically 100% in favor of 
government price supports of cattle at 90% or parity.”  Other southern Oklahoma 
farm organizations requesting 90 percent parity prices on livestock included the 
McCurtain County Livestock Association and the Latimer County Farm Bureau.  
And nearly 200 livestock producers meeting in Tishomingo (southeast Oklahoma) 
to demand livestock price supports declared, “the Oklahoma Cattlemen’s 
Association does not represent the cattlemen of Oklahoma or the man who directly 
makes his livelihood from the cattle business.”77 
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benefit most from price supports would be those with 50-100 head in their herds. Packers and 
bigger producers, he thought, would most oppose the plan. In Farmer Stockman, September 1953, 
p. 39; William Wyatt Jr. 9 July 1953 to Carl Albert, p. 1, W.E. Allford 11 July 1953 to Carl Albert, 
p. 1, J. Baird 11 July 1953 to Carl Albert, p. 1, Fred Knight Jr. 11 July 1953 to Carl Albert, p.1, 
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In March 1953, while their numbers were still relatively small, OCA 
members had voted against the idea of price supports, because, as one member 
later explained, “price supports…would inevitably bring controls, which would 
possibly make a man a living but would not enable him to regain excessive losses 
he had encountered during the disastrous period.”  Many full-time OCA ranchers 
also shared the opinion of McAlester rancher and farmer Carl Smith, who 
complained to Carl Albert that in the Pittsburg County Cattlemen’s Association, 
“[f]ifty percent of [the] men are Lawyers, Doctors, Judges, Bankers and big 
business men…who have only been in the cattle business a short time.”  These 
men, he argued, “caused all the trouble in the first place and need no help.”78  The 
publishers of the American Hereford Journal explained the attitude that price 
supports would degenerate the industry.  In August 1953 they wrote:  
most cattlemen always have been unenthusiastic about the 
idea of having someone tap them on the shoulder and tell 
them what to do – and they still are….It is their conviction 
that they can’t have supports without ultimate 
controls….[T]he end result in all probability would be to 
pull the most successful cattlemen down…and possibly also 
‘tail up’ the least progressive toward the general average.  
 
They argued, too, that “if the beef price is supported to the point that everyone is 
assured of a profit at all times…there is bound to be too much beef.”  Tulsa Daily 
World writer William G. Davissen observed: “the most weighty reason so many 
producers do not believe in subsidies or price supports…is that they regard this 
                                                                                                                                                                
Tom Ferris 5 July 1953 to Carl Albert, p. 2, all in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, box 14, 
folder 45. 
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 31 October 1953 OCA Executive Committee Meeting, pp. 1-4, in OCA papers, Series III, box 2, 
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whole system of price controls as socialistic and inimical to the best interests…of 
the country as a whole.”  Even more fundamentally, McAlester resident William 
Thompson wrote to Albert, “We don’t need parity….That is against all rules of 
God.”  And OCA President Wayne Rowe exhorted his associates to “tell the evils 
of controls[.]”79 
The issue challenged OCA executives who wanted to increase 
membership.  In August 1953, OCA Executive Secretary W.E. Van Vacter 
reported that during recent eastern Oklahoma meetings to encourage new members 
at Clinton, Waurika, Okmulgee, and Colgate, “it appeared that about 80 per cent of 
those attending…had been led to believe that price supports at 90 per cent of parity 
was the only program which would bring recovery to the cattle industry.”  Vacter 
felt that “the price support controversy was the deterring factor to the procuring of 
new members at open meetings such as those attended.”  At a fall 1953 OCA 
meeting, Harold Davis spoke for many new members: “I am a wheat and cotton 
farmer and a cattle producer.  One group wants price supports, another wants 
removal of a cow crop, and they don’t talk to each other.”80 
Many small-scale ranchers saw the OCA executive position as an effort to 
capitalize on circumstances.  On 9 July 1953, Valliant, Oklahoma cattleman M.R. 
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Barton wrote to Albert, “I have a ranch and raise beef for a living….It is not a 
hobby with me like some of our oil industrial millionaires who are head of the 
Cattlemen’s Association….when all small ranchers have been forced out they can 
take over and make a very handsome profit for years to come.”  Atoka State Bank 
president C.C. Stephens agreed with this view: “The fellow who does not want 
support prices for cattle is the wealthy fellow who has income to weather him 
thru[sic] this terrible situation, and then he will make plenty of money on the 
upturn of the prices[.]”  Echoed an officer of the Panhandle-based North Plains 
Cattle Growers association: “They aren’t making a living from cattle….[t]hey can 
afford to urge rugged individualism.’”  Producers throughout the Southern Plains 
shared these opinions.  In early 1954, Arizona State Senator and United Livestock 
Producers’ Association president Jim Smith explained to Albert, “The American 
National Cattle Growers’ Association with its state affiliates….are the well-to-do 
cattle people.  They can speak only for the aristocracy of the business….This same 
group of men have made no attempt to reduce their breeding herds….[t]hey have 
allowed the small cattlemen, who are going broke, to liquidate their entire herds.  
After the small men are out of the business then, naturally, the cattle business will 
be remunerative for a few years to come.”  Smith included for Albert a memorial 
recently passed by the Arizona legislature that attributed the cattlemen’s problems 
to drought and government price supports for feed-related grains and urged 
Eisenhower and Benson to implement an accelerated government beef purchase 
program and cattle price supports at 90 percent of parity.
81
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Some reluctant producers and their bankers saw supports for cattle as the 
only fair response to government supports for grain.  One concerned observer 
wrote to Albert, “I am utterly opposed to price guarantees by the government, but 
on the other hand, if the prices of all things which the cattlemen must buy are to be 
upheld by the government, then…grant [cattlemen] the same supports.”  Atoka 
State Bank president C.C. Stephens told Albert, “corn, oats, cotton seed products, 
soy beans, rice, wheat, all feed are supported and how can anyone expect the 
cattleman to feed this high price feed to these low price cattle…it’s just out of 
reason.”  Similarly, McAlester National Bank Executive Vice-President C.L. 
Priddy explained, “they cannot feed $75.00 cake…to these 8c and 10c cows, it just 
cannot be done that way[.]”  To these concerns Albert replied, “the Secretary of 
Agriculture has not only been cold, but is rabidly against the idea of supporting 
cattle prices.”  Following a July 1953 meeting to press Benson for price supports, 
Albert wrote to another constituent, “the Secretary is convinced that what I said to 
him does not represent the thinking of the cattle people.”  Albert recalled Benson 
as having said “that on his trip to Texas, every group before which he appeared 
was opposed to support prices.”  To still another concerned constituent Albert 
wrote, “the present Agriculture Department has shown itself opposed to the idea of 
price supports, not only on cattle but generally.  I am hopeful that the present 
trouble will cause some shift in their thinking.”82 
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To encourage this shift in thinking, in early fall 1953, a delegation of 
livestock producers traveled to Washington to request livestock price supports at 
90 percent of parity or a federal price floor that would guarantee livestock 
producers prices no lower than ten percent below the cost of production.  Among 
the delegates was United Livestock Producers Association president (and Dallam, 
Texas rancher) S.E. Brown, who explained, “[w]e’re just asking for fair play.  
Every product we use in our business is subsidized or supported.  Prices for 
livestock will have to be supported if the industry is to survive.” And in late 
October 1953 the National Farmers’ Union sent to Washington a “cattle caravan” 
comprising over 250 livestock producers from twenty western and mid-western 
states.
83
 
Holding firm to his original position, Benson rejected the caravan’s request 
and “read to reporters a sheaf of telegrams urging him ‘not to submit to pressure 
tactics.’”  Aside from his philosophical opposition to government intervention in 
the agricultural economy, Benson stood firm in his opposition to cattle price 
supports because he did not perceive a nationwide problem and because he saw no 
outlets for the supported cattle.  “Information from our field agencies and an 
evaluation of all reports,” he explained to Albert in July 1954, “leads us to feel that 
while some localities have experienced hardship from drought, the cattle industry 
throughout the country as a whole is basically in a sound position.”  Respecting the 
storage and marketing problems that would follow federal price supports, he 
explained, “[i]t would be wholly impractical for the Department to attempt to 
support cattle prices, particularly at the minimum level suggested, in view of the 
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perishable nature of the commodity and products involved and without having 
outlets available for the large quantities which might be acquired in such a support 
operation.”84 
Instead of federal price supports to guarantee feed-strapped cattlemen a 
profit, Benson urged producers to generate demand themselves through 
promotional strategies to increase beef consumption.
85
   While the cattlemen 
disagreed on the issue of federal price supports, most of them agreed that they 
needed to promote beef consumption.  At its January 1953 annual convention, for 
instance, the American National Cattlemen’s Association urged the National 
Livestock and Meat Board “to pay particular attention to the necessity for 
expanding markets for commercial and utility meats.”  And Benson personally 
pushed the strategy.  In the summer of 1953 he urged the National Restaurant 
Association to give beef a prominent place on menus and for waiters to 
recommend beef to customers.  Retailers also promoted beef consumption in stores 
across the country.  In December 1953, Safeway Stores division manager W.A. 
Christensen sent to Carl Albert the ‘Retailers’ Report on America’s Beef 
Problem.’  According to the report (from 7,024 stores across the country), fall 
1953 beef, calf and veal sales were up 51 percent, 132 percent and 49 
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percentrespectively compared to fall 1952.  The report attributed rising beef 
consumption to lower retail prices that had followed declining beef prices but also 
to an aggressive marketing campaign.  As the retailers saw it, “our job in the 
present beef crisis is helping America to ‘eat its way out.’”86 
Encouraged by these trends, early in 1954, OCA appointed a committee to 
study beef promotion.  Oklahoma cattlemen needed professional marketing help.  
Among OCA’s meeting minutes for the period 1952 to 1955 is an anonymous 
report revealing an immature relationship with consumers.  Entitled “How to 
Double Consumer Consumption of Beef in 10 Years,” the report explains: 
“Vegetarians are poor customers for beef.  Religious injunctions limit meat 
consumption.  People with gout are not apt to eat much beef….Thus, there are 
physical, economic and psychological problems involved in increasing the sale of 
beef.”  To meet and cultivate demand, the document recommended a variety of 
new and technological merchandising strategies, including “‘beef 
bacon’….incorporating [beef] into breakfast cereals and crackers…. [and] research 
to determine the adaptability of beef…to ‘electron’ cooking…in automatic 
vending machines by the Raytheon tube[.]”87 
Addressing the OCA Executive Committee later that spring, American 
National Cattlemen’s Association assistant executive secretary Radford Hall 
indicated that ranchers throughout the Southwest shared the OCA’s concerns.  
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“We must have beef promotion or strict regulations on production and controls 
which would go with price supports,” he argued.  Making his own organization’s 
preference clear, Radford continued, “[We] consider price supports and controls a 
negative approach.  We believe in increased consumption and increased 
production….We need…more advertising of beef….[and] cooperation through all 
segments of the industry[.]”  With Radford was a representative of the Chicago-
based National Live Stock & Meat Board who discussed several strategies his 
organization used to promote beef consumption, including cooking schools, radio 
programs, and two motion pictures, entitled “Meat and Armies” and ‘”Way to A 
Man’s Heart”.88 
Through 1954 the OCA expanded its promotional effort.  At the 18 August 
1954 OCA Board of Directors meeting, Beef Promotion Committee chairman John 
Robertson reported that his committee had arranged for local auction markets and 
for the Farm Bureau to distribute nearly 70,000 “ENJOY BEEF” stickers and for 
retail grocers in Oklahoma’s major cities to conduct meat cutting demonstrations 
in their stores.  Robertson introduced USDA commodity sales promoter Thurston 
Blakely who described to members USDA’s fall plans to conduct a special nation-
wide marketing campaign for economy cuts of beef, including beef stew and beef 
pot pie.  He also offered to help promote the OCA in food journals that reached 
grocers and chambers of commerce across the country.  In the discussion that 
followed Blakeley’s presentation, one member moved that OCA request USDA to 
assign a full-time meat extension specialist to Oklahoma.  That fall, the 
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organization formally made this request, along with other services and 
appointments from state and federal agencies, including better facilities to test 
feed.  At one meeting, OCA directors discussed plans to have processors and feed 
manufacturers set aside a fraction of their receipts to finance a beef promotion 
program.
89
 
Meanwhile, beef consumption continued to rise.  In his address to the 
association’s March 1955 annual meeting, OCA president J.B. Smith explained 
that during the previous fall’s nation-wide marketing campaign, beef consumption 
reached a “new all-time high [of] 80 pounds per person.”  Smith credited this 
success to a long list of sources, including “newspapers, radio, television, 
magazines, processors and marketing people, and retail market and chain store 
associations [the] National Live Stock and Meat Board, American Meat Institute, 
OklahomaA & MCollege, extension service…and U.S. Department of 
Agriculture.”  But he warned his audience, “We must not look through rose-
colored glasses….Cattle numbers are still high.  The public is not well enough 
acquainted with the many virtues of beef.”  The association subsequently resolved 
to appoint a research committee to work with the A. & M.College on market 
research problems.
90
  At the end of 1956, OCA President Jack Houser reported, 
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“‘[w]e have set a pattern….(1) Promotion; (2) Work with College on research and 
education; (3) Close association with State officials; [and] (4) Relations with 
markets[.]’”  The OCA continued to request services from the A & MCollege at 
Stillwater and from USDA information agencies, including more efficient and 
coordinated market research information, full-time beef cattle extension 
specialists, short courses for county agents, and more research and education in 
native grassland management.  Into 1958, the OCA continued to hold promotional 
meetings with retail grocers, auction markets, processors and restaurant buyers, 
and it pushed for federal legislation to use a portion of cattle receipts for meat 
research and promotion.
91
 
 The drought had thus fostered a more integrated industry, with stronger 
relationships between Oklahoma cattlemen, state and federal veterinarians and 
extension officials, and marketing and retail specialists.  Cattlemen forced to 
substitute drought-relief feed grains for vulnerable and depleted pasture and hay 
stocks also relied on advice and information from specialists in the fields of animal 
nutrition, health, and processing.  The experience fostered a new attitude and 
approach to cattle feeding and fattening which helped to permanently alter the 
state’s livestock industry. 
In the early 1950s, few local cattlemen fattened or processed their herds in 
Oklahoma.  In the 1948 USDA Yearbook of Agriculture, D.A. Savage and D.F. 
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Costello explained: “The Southern Great Plains is outstanding in the production of 
feeder cattle, most of which are fed on native grass alone or with a limited supply 
of protein concentrates.”  In 1952, the Oklahoma extension service reported that its 
“feeder calf marketing program [was] gaining momentum,” with the animals 
“going direct to farm feed lots in the corn belt.”  In March 1953, an Oklahoma 
businessman observed that “livestock is shipped out to Kansas City and 
somewhere else and if you want a good Kansas City steak in Oklahoma, you just 
ask for a Kansas City steak, it isn’t an Oklahoma steak.”  Later that year, another 
observer declared “‘[i]n some sections, cattle have been treated too much as a 
sideline, and they have been handled haphazardly.  If some farmers handled their 
crops like they do their cattle, they would get lots of crop failures.”92 
This attitude changed through the decade.  In January 1953, for instance, 
Oklahoma A&M Animal Husbandry Department researcher L.S. Pope told the 
state’s farmers, “Cattle Get Fat Here Just as Well as in the North.”Local feeding 
had several advantages, wrote Pope, including “completely utilizing feeds 
produced on the farm [and providing] an outlet for labor during the slack winter 
season” as well as benefits to local feed dealers “through increased sales of protein 
supplements, and minerals, as feedlot production increases.”  For drought-stricken 
Oklahoma farmers and ranchers concerned that they did not have enough feed to 
fatten marketable beef, Pope reminded them that “lighter ‘baby beef’ carcasses are 
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the ones most in demand,” and that “good-to-choice slaughter grade 
[carcasses]…take less time in the feedlot, carry enough finish to meet consumer 
demand, and…make more economical gains than cattle fed to higher grades.”93  
Observers noted too, that many southern plains farmers could convert to grass and 
livestock production many of the acres they currently used to produce surplus 
grains.
94
 
A regional cattle-feeding industry had not developed in part because 
Oklahoma farmers and ranchers did not have much experience with grain-based 
cattle diets.  The historian Geoff Cunfer explained that because of the region’s 
relatively warm winters, “farmers could pasture their cattle nearly year-round.”  
Ardmore soil scientist Dr. H.J. Harper offered another explanation: “[f]orty 
percent of the fall seasons [between 1901 and 1951] have been so dry that fall 
planted small grain did not produce enough growth to supply grazing before low 
winter temperatures retarded plant development.”  During the drought, Oklahoma 
dairy operators struggled to find the right balance as they transitioned from pasture 
and roughage-based diets to diets that included larger amounts of relief feed 
grains.  In June 1954, the OSBA reported “[t]here are too many dairy cows being 
fed beef cattle rations in Oklahoma, whereas a dairy cow needs a higher standard 
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of living to reach profitable production.”  In February 1956, by contrast, the 
Farmer Stockman magazine reported that in a recent survey Oklahoma dairy cattle 
were being overfed because their grain and concentrate to roughage ratios were too 
high.  “Due to the drouth a high rate of grain feeding was anticipated because of 
roughage shortages,” observed the magazine; however, some operators without 
feeding experience overcompensated for hay shortages with grains, legumes, and 
concentrate mixtures.
95
 
To maximize feed efficiency and avoid animal health problems, Oklahoma 
A&M researchers and county agents instructed cattlemen on various winter 
feeding strategies.  In January 1953, for instance, farmers with “unanswered 
questions about the best way to handle [their] livestock feeding” could request the 
Oklahoma Extension Service circular “Facing Winter Feeding Problems,” which 
described the content of incoming feeds and “the most economical rations to feed 
when feed is short.”  That spring, USDA experiments showed feed-strapped 
farmers how “growing calves, getting only enough feed to keep them from losing 
weight, will grow fast and economically later when put on adequate feed.”  
Encouraging its readers, the Farmer Stockman observed that “cattle may be able to 
survive drouths, feed shortages or severe winters and snap back to normal growing 
conditions when feed supplies again become plentiful.”  In another instance, a 
Pontotoc rancher whose registered cattle had been losing weight during winter 
months learned through OklahomaA&MCollege researchers that by adding 
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minerals to his soil, his home-grown winter feed would contain enough protein to 
maintain their weights without the need for additional expensive protein cake feed.  
Oklahoma A&M college researchers conducted other noteworthy feeding 
experiments.  By August 1954, for instance, the college had conducted seventeen 
operations, each to remove part of a single steer’s liver to “see which feed has the 
most vitamins[.]”96 
Without much pasture during the drought, Oklahoma farmers and ranchers 
innovated and experimented with confined feeding.  By April 1956 in 
BlaineCounty, for instance, the Farmer Stockman reported that “farmers are 
literally getting into farm feeding of cattle by the dozen.”  One farmer (Ronald 
Shawver) who had fed twenty-eight heifers and steers during the previous winter 
had simply gone into his harvested wheat fields to bale “uncut wheat, weeds and 
anything that would make some roughage,” then “raised about half enough maize 
to feed out his small bunch [and] bought more at low, harvest prices.”  With his 
roughage and feed together, he “rigged up a barrel and trough and bought molasses 
because…it was cheap feed.”  Ninety days of feeding added about 200 pounds to 
his animals and that spring he sent his first bunch of heifers to the packers at “a 
high choice grade” weighing nearly 800 pounds each.  Another BlaineCounty 
farmer (Edgar Edsell) had grown wheat and maize as cash crops until about 1955, 
when “[l]ow maize prices, wheat crop failures, [and] the drouth made him wonder 
if he could stay on the farm…”  Edsell began to run cattle on his stubble, then feed 
them home-grown maize, silage and guar before marketing them to packers.  
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“Feeding looks like the most profitable thing I’ve gotten into in a long time,” he 
declared the following year.  “Other Blaine county feeders are carrying on similar 
operations[,]” reported the magazine in April 1956; “[s]ome are feeding their own 
feed to their own calves.  Others are buying either calves or feed.  And at least one 
bought both calves and locally grown feed and showed a profit.  They’ve proven in 
Blaine county [sic] that farm feeding is a good bet in Oklahoma.”97 
The OCA sought and shared expert cattle feeding advice.  At a fall 1956 
meeting, the OCA executive committee unanimously approved Secretary Jack 
Houser’s idea of “getting out releases on how to feed.”  Houser had also proposed 
that the association meet with Oklahoma A. & M. livestock specialists “to discuss 
the possibilities of different grains and how to use them.”  And he “believed A & 
M would put out a leaflet and information on radio and television.”  Houser 
understood Oklahoma’s inexperience in feeding cattle winter grain rations to be 
shared by other southern plains states.  In late November 1956, he wrote to Horace 
Hening and Charles Stewart, the respective secretaries of the New Mexico Cattle 
Growers Association and the Texas and Southwest Cattle Raisers Association, to 
say that “the short supply of locally produced grains is making it necessary to ship 
in Northern grain at the present time.”  Anticipating that cattlemen in New Mexico 
and Texas would share Oklahoma’s need to feed cattle through the winter, Houser 
enclosed for both secretaries an Oklahoma A&M leaflet “which recommends 
maximum grain and minimum forage feeding in wintering cow herds.  Reflecting 
the growing cattle feeding industry in the state near the drought’s end, the OCA’s 
marketing committee in February 1957 resolved that United States Crop and 
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Livestock Reporting Service statistical reports should be made available earlier in 
the year, that Oklahoma should be included in reports of cattle and calves on feed, 
and that those reports should be made available monthly instead of quarterly.  It 
also requested special fall and winter reports to cover wheat and other small grains 
used for fall and winter pastures, as well as expanded research by Oklahoma A. & 
M. College and other agencies dealing with markets for beef.
98
 
The OCA also repeatedly pressured bankers and politicians to reassess 
lending policies and to reduce taxes on slaughter cattle, and they urged the 
Oklahoma legislature to exempt feed, seed, fertilizer and farm machinery from the 
Oklahoma Consumers’ Tax Law.  This last request was especially significant.  
Oklahoma farmers paid consumer taxes on their raw materials (including seed, 
feed and fertilizer) and equipment because of a tax commission ruling that dated to 
the 1930s, when relatively few farmers purchased commercial feeds, seeds or 
fertilizer.  These items had since become more important to agricultural producers, 
and by the late 1950s the tax had been an issue before at least six legislative 
sessions.  Many producers saw the tax as unjust.  Grady county resident D.L. 
Frederick explained the tax’s inequities: “a brewer can buy grain and machinery to 
make beer without sales tax, but when a dairyman buys grain and a milking 
machine to produce milk, he pays sales tax.  A baker can buy flour to make bread 
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without sales tax, but when a poultryman buys feed to produce broilers or eggs, he 
pays sales tax.”99 
To request the tax exemption was especially controversial, however, 
because taxes on feed, seed, and fertilizer contributed a significant portion of state 
revenues used for public assistance.  According to the Oklahoma Tax Commission, 
annual revenues from the tax totaled nearly $2.5 million in the mid-1950s.  To cut 
the tax meant cutting nearly two million dollars (43 percent) for old-age 
assistance; $310,000 (28 percent) for Aid to Dependent Children; $48,000 (50 
percent) for Aid to the Blind; $60,000 for Aid to the Disabled; and $154,000 in 
cuts to Child Welfare programs.  In October 1956, the Farmer Stockman observed 
the tax exemption’s political implications: “Old age pensioners have been told that 
such action would reduce their welfare fund, and it seems legislators are more 
fearful of defeat at the polls by indigent voters than they are concerned with fair 
treatment of farmers and stockmen.”  Furthermore, the tax exemption’s opponents 
often framed the issue as a benefit to wealthy ranchers.  “The first thing they have 
always said is “Look at the millionaire cattlemen, you are going to be feeding their 
show cattle,” explained one former state representative to OCA members in 
February 1956.
100
 
Cattlemen were not alone in pushing to eliminate the tax, however.  During 
the summer of 1953, the Oklahoma Agricultural Advisory Council, comprising 
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representatives from fifty-seven farm-related Oklahoma organizations, called the 
state legislature’s work “‘a failure’” for having largely overlooked agriculture.  In 
a statement, the Council criticized the legislature because “‘[m]ost of the bills that 
would have benefited agriculture were overlooked or were passed in such a form 
that they did not help[.]’”  Removal of the state sales tax on feed, seed, and 
fertilizer headed the list of the Council’s legislative priorities.  And by the end of 
1955, the Governor’s Economic Commission had determined that Oklahoma 
should do more commercial feeding and have more commercial feedlots.  The 
commission had also determined that the Oklahoma consumer sales tax on feed 
put Oklahoma commercial feed lots at a disadvantage relative to the same type of 
operation in other states.
101
 
Encouraged by this support, OCA members continued to request the tax 
exemption.  At their 1956 meeting, former state representative Bert Larson urged 
the association to frame the issue in regional economic development terms.  “Here 
is the way I would like to approach it[,]” explained Larson.  “[W]e are going to ask 
for exemption on those commodities that are very definitely making a finished 
product….That would encourage new industries in this state in the form of 
Commercial feed lots, finish feeding more cattle on the ranch, caged hens, broilers, 
and competition with the Wisconsin Dairy people.”  In October 1956, the Farmer 
Stockman asserted, “All of Oklahoma’s farm organizations agree that the sales tax 
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should be removed from raw materials farmers use…[because the tax] is driving 
much business out of Oklahoma into adjoining states.”102 
Oklahoma governor Raymond Gary recognized the growing pressure and 
made the tax issue a priority.  In his January 1957 State of the State address, he 
declared:  
During recent years, our farmers and ranchers have been badly hurt 
by the drouth and low farm prices. I feel we should, during this 
session, enact legislation to benefit these farmers and ranchers….I 
know none of you want to enact legislation that would reduce the 
amount of payments to our aged and needy people of this state. But 
I feel we should grant the farmers and ranchers of Oklahoma the 
same rights and privileges we grant to manufacturing industries of 
our state.
103
 
 
As a compromise to satisfy the agricultural community and the state’s older 
constituents, the loss to the state welfare fund would be replaced by funds from the 
state’s gross sales tax.  And Gary’s proposal required farmers, ranchers, and 
commercial feeders to file refund claims for sales taxes paid on livestock feed 
instead of cutting the tax at the point of sale.   
He saw economic momentum to follow from the tax exemption.  “If we 
enact this legislation,” he continued,  
we will not only aid our farmers and ranchers through a savings on 
their feed purchases, but we will encourage the establishment of 
commercial feed lots in this state….When such feed lots become 
established in Oklahoma, they will provide additional employment 
for our people, cause a greater demand for Oklahoma feeder cattle, 
and help develop a better market for our feeder cattle. It would 
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actually be of great benefit to our packing industries in this state, 
thereby contributing to Oklahoma’s economic growth. 
 
This view resonated broadly.  By May 1957, Farmer Stockman editor F.J. Deering 
observed that the tax exemption “has more support than any other farm issue 
before the public today.”  And later that spring, the Oklahoma legislature finally 
authorized a sales tax exemption on livestock and poultry feed and on used farm 
machinery.  The law represented a partial success to agricultural producers 
because farmers had wanted the tax exemption to also include seed, fertilizer, new 
farm machinery and insecticides.  But it signified a new attitude toward agriculture 
in the state.  Exclaimed Gary, “[t]he farmers are in the manufacturing business 
too.”104 
In the fall of 1957, after the drought had ended, OCA Executive Secretary 
Jack Houser summarized the association’s recent accomplishments for OCA 
President J. K. Haley.  In addition to the sales tax exemption on feed and used 
farm machinery, the OCA had helped to secure appropriations to inspect packing 
plant sanitation and had worked with packers to promote beef to school lunch 
personnel throughout the state.  OklahomaStateUniversity planned to hire 
increased meat education and research personnel.  And beginning in January 1958, 
Oklahoma would be included in quarterly USDA Cattle on Feed reports.
105
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Haley, in turn, summarized the drought’s significance to OCA members at 
the organization’s fifth annual convention, in March 1958.  “The livestock 
situation has changed,” he explained: “an over-supply of cattle – accelerated by an 
extreme drouth….caused the Producer to do some thinking.  First about production 
controls, and second, about distribution and merchandising….Re-evaluation of 
government grades of beef…and research on carcus[sic] qualities of beef was 
begun.”  Haley then added, “my working with the Association and with the 
Industry, has brought me to a very deep conviction….Cattlemen’s problems go 
much further than just producing cattle.  We must work with the packers – 
marketing and retail people, and take a positive stand in developing policy in 
merchandising our product[.]”106 
That work was already under way.  In March 1958, the association invited 
Armour& Company general manager Russell Mank to attend their feeder 
committee meeting.“We hope that you can attend this meeting along with the 
people in your cattle buying and beef departments[,]” wrote the OCA, “so that we 
can have the benefit of your advice and counsel of a program to enlarge cattle 
feeding and production of slaughter cattle in the state[.]”107  The relationship 
quickly grew.  By September 1958, Armour& Company announced that it was 
planning new cattle processing facilities for Oklahoma City.  Following the 
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announcement, Farmer Stockman editor F.J. Deering observed that while 
“[s]uccessful ventures have proved that Oklahoma cattle fattened on Oklahoma 
feed yield just as good beef as can be produced anywhere….Oklahoma’s major 
agricultural opportunity does not appear to be in the direction of greater wheat 
acreage.  It’s not in cotton or peanuts, nor in corn, sorghum or other grains as cash 
crops.  The opportunity glows brightly in the realm of livestock.”  And the 
Oklahoma City Armour plant, like others in the state, gave momentum to cattle 
feeding throughout the state.  By May 1961, for instance, a new 10,000 head 
capacity feedlot was being erected in TillmanCounty, southwest Oklahoma.  Its 
co-owner, Nebraska feeder John Quam said “the TillmanCounty location…was 
ideal because it is near several packing plants at Oklahoma City and other 
Oklahoma and Texas towns.”108 
Oklahoma’s cattle industry changed during the drought.  Forced by drought 
conditions to feed their cattle grain, and reluctant to adopt price controls, 
Oklahoma cattlemen developed new relationships with various segments of their 
industry including specialists in the fields of animal nutrition, health, marketing 
and processing.  The industry became more integrated during the crisis.  John 
Quam’s decision to build a feedlot in southwest Oklahoma was significant in 
another respect.  The decision reflected his confidence not just in nearby markets 
but also nearby feed and water supplies.  For many communities in the 
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WashitaBasin just north of TillmanCounty, secure water supplies had only recently 
been acquired.  In that process too, drought played a key role. 
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Chapter 5 - Flood Control, Drought and Water Supply in the WashitaBasin 
1930s-1950s 
 
With its headwaters just inside the Texas Panhandle, the Washita River 
winds on a southeasterly course for about 650 miles through southwestern 
Oklahoma before meeting the Red River along the state’s southern border.  The 
river drains about 8,000 square miles (approximately five million acres) of mostly 
agricultural land and it passes through a variety of soil types including significant 
areas of easily eroded clays and sands.
1
  Combined with agriculture and an erratic 
regional climate that includes intense spring storms and extended droughts, these 
soils contribute to dangerous flash floods, heavy erosion and excessively 
mineralized water.  During intense droughts and floods from the 1930s to the 
1950s, local residents, state officials, and the United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) made the basin a laboratory and leader in upstream flood 
control and water conservation.  Over the same period, and especially during the 
1950s drought, reliable water supplies became a priority to most basin townsfolk 
and their elected officials.  Their struggle to acquire as cheaply as possible two 
Reclamation Bureau dams during the early 1950s drought reversed local and state 
support for USDA upstream flood control and conservation activities, successfully 
tested the Eisenhower administration’s efforts to coordinate and limit federal 
spending on multiple-purpose water development projects, and pointed to 
increased federal provisions for municipal water supplies. 
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Through the late 1940s, the Washita basin economy was based almost 
entirely on agriculture and it was compromised, especially during the 1930s, by 
drought, crop failures, floods, and declining soil fertility.
2
  Insecure tenancy 
aggravated erosion problems and regional economic stability.  And economic 
downturns exacerbated tenant insecurities.  Observed the Oklahoma Planning and 
Resources Board (OPRB) in 1939, “[w]hen times are prosperous [Washita basin] 
land-owners move to town and tenancy increases.  When conditions are 
unfavorable and crops are cheap and poor, the owners must return to the farm and 
the tenants are forced to find homes on poor soils, making mere existence a 
struggle.”  Rural poverty made the region receptive to federal assistance during the 
1930s.  For instance, of the eleven Oklahoma counties selected to receive farm 
tenant loans from the Farm Security Administration in early 1938, WashitaCounty 
had the greatest number of applicants.   And the connection between unstable 
farming, erosion and runoff made it clear to USDA observers that the region 
needed agricultural flood control remedies.  In 1941, SCS officer Louis P. Merrill 
observed about the basin’s upper portions: “many farms…are abandoned [or] so 
severely eroded that they cannot be operated profitably.  The owners consequently 
are not able to establish the necessary soil and water conservation measures 
                                                          
2
 By 1953, Victor E. Hulett, who was Assistant to the Vice-President of the Public Service 
Company of Oklahoma, estimated that nearly ninety-eight percent of the basin’s economy derived 
from farm cash incomes.  In U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 
Washita Project, Unpublished Hearings, 83
rd
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, 23 March 1953, p.84; Report of 
Regional Director of Bureau of Reclamation, 18 September 1951, in Report of the Secretary of the 
Interior, Washita River Sub-basin, Red River Basin, Oklahoma and Texas, 83
rd
 Congress, 1
st
 
Session, House Document No. 219, July 1953, p.36. 
 172 
 
[which] contribute[s] much of the water and silt which damage nearby farms [and] 
are a flood hazard and a menace to reservoirs.”3 
Drought compounded the problem.  Like cultivation and heavy grazing, 
drought magnifies erosion and run-off problems by limiting the plants that help to 
catch and draw rainfall into the soil.  During the 1930s, for instance, drought-
stricken Kansas farmers who lived outside of the Dust Bowl “found most 
extraordinary” the giant gullies that accompanied dry conditions.4  In 1941, to a 
Washita basin audience, SCS officer Louis P. Merrill explained: “soil and water 
conservation and flood control are the same.”  More fully, Oklahoma soil 
conservationist Harrel Allen noted: “[t]here is a direct relationship between drouth 
conditions and flooding….[d]routh reduces the vegetative cover, thereby reducing 
in-soak and compounding erosion losses.”5  During the 1950s drought, federal 
observers reported that in some of the river’s upper sections, “the entire valley 
floor is reduced to a sandy waste.”  Over longer terms this process creates other 
problems, as eroded sediment fills reservoirs and reduces their capacity to supply 
water during shortages.
6
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Erratic and intense precipitation patterns contribute to the basin’s erosion 
and runoff problems.  Average annual precipitation in the Washita basin ranges 
from approximately twenty inches at its headwaters to nearly forty inches at its 
mouth on the Red River.  But annual precipitation ranges widely.  Before it was 
dammed significantly, the river’s annual and seasonal flows varied drastically.  For 
instance, during 1936-37 the river’s flow at the town of Clinton measured 23,600 
acre-feet, but during 1949-50 it measured 752,400 acre-feet.  And much of the 
basin’s precipitation occurs in condensed patterns.  To the 1950s, nearly fifty 
percent of the river’s annual flow occurred from April to June, often following 
severe local storms.  One basin resident proclaimed, “when we get our [annual] 30 
inches of rain, it may come 12, 8, or 7 inches at one time.”  Joked another resident, 
“[w]e get 29 inches.  The farmers…remember the night it fell.”7 Seasonal and 
intense precipitation patterns meant that many of the river’s tributaries, and even 
the river itself near the Texas Panhandle, flowed for only part of the year.  It also 
meant flood damage from heavy, localized storms.
8
  Oklahoma senator Mike 
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Monroney explained to Congress: “During long periods of drought the Washita is 
a slow, sluggish stream….On the other hand, we experience disastrous flash floods 
which…cause untold damage[.]”  A basin newspaper editor identified eleven 
major floods in the basin from 1908 to the 1950s.
9
 
During the 1930s drought, the Washita basin suffered some of its worst 
floods.  During an April 1934 storm, flooding on the river’s upper portions killed 
at least twelve people and destroyed more than $500,000 in property and livestock.  
During the disaster, a measuring-station near Cheyenne, about twenty miles from 
the Texas Panhandle, reported fourteen inches of rain in only six hours.  The 
official state report on the disaster called it “by far the greatest flood that has ever 
occurred on the Washita.”  One survivor later remembered that during the flood “a 
wall [twelve] feet high…came across the valley that hit their house.”  After an 
October downpour later that year, farmland along the river near FortCobb was 
“inundated to a depth of six feet, destroying many late crops[.]”10 
Disastrous flooding brought federal attention to the basin.  By February 
1935, Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) district engineer W.C. 
Burnham had mapped twenty-three dam sites to mitigate droughts and floods.  
Burnham explained that “‘[with] this system of dams…a disastrous flood, such as 
the one in the Hammon and Clinton territory last spring, would be impossible,’” 
                                                          
9
U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Hearing, 25 April 1955, pp. 44, 46.Clinton Daily News editor 
Charles Engleman explained that, “records show that major floods causing significantly large 
damages occurred in 1908, 1923, 1927, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1941, 1941, 1943, 1945, 1949, and 
1951.  The area subject to flooding is about 183,000 acres of land most of which is under 
cultivation or grazed intensively” (p. 40). 
10
Drought of the 1950s with Special Reference to the Midcontinent, USGS Water Supply Paper 
1804 (1965), pp. 36-7; Oklahoman, 6 April 1934, p. 1; ‘WashitaRiver, Hammon Flood, April 3-4, 
1934’ published by the OPRB Division of Water Resources, February 1939, pp. 2-3, in Robert Kerr 
papers, Conservation Series, box 10, folder 13; U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Hearings, 23 
March 1953, p.73; Oklahoman, 20 October 1934, p. 1. 
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and “‘the uniform flow of the Washita River, and all of its tributaries would be 
assured[.]’”  Federal activity in the basin increased following the 1936 Flood 
Control Act, which made the federal government responsible for flood control 
throughout the country.  The law assigned major flood control responsibility to the 
Corps of Engineers but it also tasked the USDA to study and apply upstream flood 
prevention methods.
11
  Louis P. Merrill explained the law’s significance to a 
Washita basin audience: “For the first time provision was made for flood treatment 
measures on the land – the gathering grounds of flood waters.”  Following the law, 
SCS officials quickly developed the small watershed concept to control floods, 
which combined conservation practices including contour tillage, terraces and 
grass planting with small tributary dams to isolate and store run-off.  The concept 
broadened USDA’s scope from individual farms to entire watersheds.  To 
accelerate its activities, in 1937 Congress appropriated nearly $1.5 million for 
USDA land and water conservation on the WashitaRiver.  By the end of 1938, the 
Corps of Engineers, USDA and the Bureau of Reclamation were all surveying the 
basin for flood control and irrigation.
12
 
                                                          
11
Oklahoman, 3 February 1935, p. C7; Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 805.  To control 
costs, the 1936 Flood Control Act “directed that projects should only be approved ‘if the benefits, 
to whomsoever they accrue, exceed the estimated costs.’”  In Richard N.L. Andrews, Managing the 
Environment, Managing Ourselves: A History of American Environmental Policy (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1999), p. 166.  The historian Donald Pisani explained that “in 1939, 
Congress decided that the cost of flood control as well as navigation should be non-reimbursable; 
after the war, it added fish and wildlife conservation to the list of non-reimbursable expenditures, 
for which farmers and other water users did not have to pay back project costs.”  In Donald J. 
Pisani, “Federal Water Policy and the Rural West,” in The Rural West Since World War II, ed. R. 
Douglas Hurt (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), p. 128. 
12
 Merrill, ‘The Department of Agriculture and the WashitaRiver Watershed’; F. Dwain Phillips 
and Mark S. Harrison, Out of the Dust: The History of Conservation in Oklahoma in the Twentieth 
Century ([Oklahoma City]: Oklahoma Association of Conservation Districts, 2004), p. 56; This 
money was part of $4 million to be spent on three river valleys, one of which was the Washita.  
Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the WashitaValley Improvement Association, 28 
March 1941, p. 3. The Corps survey focused largely on how upstream developments would affect 
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Especially significant for the response it generated from Washita residents 
and state officials, in February 1936 the federal government authorized the Corps 
of Engineers to survey a flood control and power project at the river’s mouth, near 
Denison, Texas.  The next month, as surveys for the big dam began, local and state 
opponents argued that the dam would inundate thousands of acres of valuable 
agricultural land and would do little to control floods and erosion along much of 
the river and its tributaries, where it was most needed.  Former Oklahoma water 
commissioner E.E. Blake spoke for many state and basin residents when he argued 
that “a dam at [the Denison] location [would] not only be valueless for flood 
control, but [would] inundate more than 96,000 acres of the best Red River and 
Washita river valley land[.]”  Moreover, siltation would quickly destroy the 
reservoir.  As a cheaper and more practical alternative to the big dam, Blake 
advocated flood control through small dams and reservoirs along the upper 
portions of the river’s tributaries.  In late February 1938 more than 200 Washita 
basin farmers and businessmen testified at soil conservation and flood control 
meetings that “irrigation water impounded by a proposed series of dams in the 
Washita river valley would serve as protection against drouth.”  And in January 
1939, during his first message to the state legislature, Oklahoma’s new governor 
Leon ‘Red’ Phillips attacked the Denison dam project as an unwanted federal 
intrusion, calling it “the most shocking disregard of states’ rights that has yet 
occurred.”  Like the big dam’s other opponents, Phillips argued for small dams: “If 
the government intends to spend $56,000,000 for flood control, I would like to see 
                                                                                                                                                                
the proposed Denison reservoir, an Interior survey focused on irrigation in the basin, and the 
Agriculture survey was to provide economic justification for minor developments on the Washita’s 
tributaries. In Oklahoman, 15 October 1938, p. 4. 
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56 dams costing $1,000,000 each, or possibly 100 dams costing $500,000 each 
constructed up and down the Washita river and Red river.”  Two years later, his 
position unchanged, Phillips explained to the second annual meeting of the 
Washita Valley Improvement Association (WVIA): “To be economic and 
effective, a program of water conservation and flood prevention must have its 
beginning at the ‘headwaters’….We want to hold every drop of water as near the 
place it falls as we can[.]”  Despite this opposition, Congress authorized the 
Denison project in 1938 and the dam was completed in 1944.
13
 
Aside from its significance as a barometer for local and state opinions, the 
Denison dam controversy renewed interest in earlier state conservation 
commission plans for a series of smaller dams in the basin.  During the late 1930s 
and early 1940s, the Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board (OPRB) issued 
several reports proposing a system of twenty-five Washita basin reservoirs to 
control floods and to conserve water for agricultural purposes.  In its September 
1939 report, for instance, OPRB water resources director F.L. Vaughan explained: 
“the [twenty-five] proposed reservoirs…are intended for flood control and stream 
regulation….If rainfall can be supplemented with reservoir water…crops can be 
made to more than double the average yield.  This is the purpose of the regulated 
stream flow plan.”  The 1939 OPRB report anticipated urban water supply needs 
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Oklahoman, 26 February 1936, p. 5; Oklahoman, 5 March 1936, p. 9; Oklahoman, 8 March 1936, 
p. 58;Oklahoman, 25 February 1938, p. 3;Oklahoman, 11 January 1939, p. 7.  Oklahoman writer 
Harold Johnson later wrote that Phillips “went off the deep end in his inaugural address,” but on 31 
January 1939 the newspaper supported Phillips’ position and asked “If the government is going to 
build dams to prevent floods, why does it build so many of the dams below where the floods form 
and the worst damage is done?” In Oklahoman, 31 January 1939, p.8; ‘The State of Oklahoma and 
the Washita,’ Governor Leon C. Phillips address during 28 March 1941 Proceedings of the Second 
Annual Convention of the Washita Valley Improvement Association, p. 50; Oklahoma Water Atlas, 
Oklahoma Water Resources Board Publication 135 (May 1990), p.39.  
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but rooted future regional prosperity in flood control for agriculture.  It concluded: 
“the most advantageous form of development for the basin in general would be: (a) 
intensive agricultural use of the Washita River bottomlands, with irrigation and 
control of floods; (b) extensive (dry) farming of the uplands where the soil is good, 
with terracing and other erosion control practices; (c) consignment of the poorer 
soils areas to permanent pasture and timber[.]”14 
Washita basin residents and their congressional representative Jed Johnson 
assertively pursued flood control and water conservation.  To “promot[e] the 
improvement of the WashitaValley through flood control, soil conservation, and 
proper use of the land and water[,]” basin residents formed the Washita Valley 
Improvement Association (WVIA) in February 1940.  The association’s first 
President, Otto Wray, was from the town of FortCobb.  Its vice-presidents were 
from Pauls Valley, Foss, and Chickasha.  The thirty-six member WVIA board of 
directors represented the entire basin.  In just over one year, the association 
counted 473 paid members.  With no concrete federal plan for the Washita basin 
by year’s end, the association met in December 1940 to organize and push for a 
series of twenty-five tributary dams during the coming year.  Despite the 
organization’s urban leadership, municipal water supplies were not its key priority.  
                                                          
14
 Report of Regional Director of Bureau of Reclamation, 18 September 1951, p. 51.  According to 
the Reclamation Director, H.E. Robbins, the OPRB submitted reports in 1936, 1938 and 1942, but 
Kerr’s files contain a report dated 1939.The Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board (OPRB) was 
formed from the Oklahoma Conservation Commission in 1935.  Report of Regional Director of 
Bureau of Reclamation, 18 September 1951, p. 51; On 18 July 1937, The Oklahoman reported that 
the Army Corps of Engineers would review state conservation commission plans for a series of 
nearly twenty dams on the river and its tributaries.  In Oklahoman, 18 July 1937, p. 34; ‘Washita 
River and Drainage Basin’, pp. 2, 8-9, 25.  The report defined water’s ‘beneficial uses’ as those 
which would “insure consistent good crop yields…to supplement rainfall through the months of 
June, July, August and September” (p. 50). 
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“This is strictly a flood control program,” Wray declared at the meeting “the 
association is interested in dam sites on…tributaries of the Washita.”15 
Following his constituents’ lead, through much of 1940, the basin’s 
congressional representative Jed Johnson pushed to have federal surveys correlated 
so that a flood control project could be authorized and started as soon as possible.  
When questioned about a concurrent Army Corps of Engineers plan “to build two 
large dams across the Washita proper near Chickasha and Anadarko[,]” for 
instance, Johnson explained to reporters, “I told them they were just wasting time 
sending men up and down the river for that purpose because the people here were 
not going to permit the fertile Washita valley to be destroyed….I told them to stop 
these waters before they got into the river and there would be no floods.”16  
Following this logic, on 25 February 1941, Oklahoma state senator Homer Paul 
introduced in the Oklahoma Senate a resolution requesting that the federal 
government “lend its wholehearted support to the end that the soil and water 
resources of the Washita River Basin may be fully protected and developed by the 
construction of tributary reservoirs and by a coordinated soil conservation 
program[.]”17 
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Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the WashitaValley Improvement Association, 28 
March 1941, pp. 1-2; Oklahoman, 20 December 1940, p. 4. 
16
Oklahoman, 8 December 1940, p. 76; Oklahoman, 21 December 1940, p. 7. Several days later 
editors agreed, arguing that “Army engineers want to attack the flood problem on the Washita by 
building two mammoth dams on the Washita: one near Chickasha and one near Anadarko….It is 
the old plan of the army engineers, a plan…to curb a flood after that flood has already been 
formed….the valley of the Washita…never can be saved by the outmoded plan of the army 
engineers.”  In Oklahoman, 23 December 1940, p. 10. 
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 WVIA Resolutions Committee chairman F.T. Chandler said Paul’s statement “fairly 
represent[ed] the aims and purposes of this Association and is the basis on which we should 
proceed[.]”  In Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the Washita Valley Improvement 
Association, 28 March 1941, pp. 14-15. 
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The following month, on 28 March 1941, state and federal representatives 
from the OPRB, Army Corps of Engineers, the Reclamation Bureau and USDA 
attended the second annual WVIA meeting in Chickasha to explain their water 
development priorities and procedures.  In attendance were nearly 190 people that 
signified the WVIA’s broad base, including auto dealers, bankers, insurance 
agents, grocers, iron works operators, milling agents, teachers, nearly seventy 
farmers, and various government agents.  The second annual WVIA meeting 
confirmed local and state agricultural priorities including support for small, 
tributary flood control dams.  The organization opened the meeting by 
unanimously opposing legislation then pending in Congress to authorize corporate 
control over the basin through the Arkansas Valley Authority (AVA), a 
conservation and power project modeled after the Tennessee Valley Authority 
(TVA).  Congress had created the TVA in 1933 as a federal agency to fight 
poverty in the Tennessee Valley by building and administering dams to improve 
navigation, supply electricity and fertilizer, control floods and prevent soil erosion, 
among other functions.  By the late 1930s, TVA had improved living standards in 
the valley, but it had also brought disappointment, explains Donald Pisani, because 
“valley residents often opposed the suggestions of TVA officials regarding how 
they should run their farms and their lives” and because it was difficult to 
reconcile national leadership with ‘home-rule’ over state and local agricultural 
agencies.  Western congressmen who wanted to transplant the model to other river 
basins during the 1940s faced additional opposition from critics who feared that 
private power companies could gain control of federally-built hydro-electric plants 
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and subsequently “enslave a region[.]”  Critics feared “collectivization” and 
“sovietization” during the 1930s and 1940s, and “creeping socialism” during the 
1950s.
18
  Washita Basin residents opposed the project on the grounds that “the 
Washita Valley…is essentially agricultural territory…and it is necessary, for the 
welfare and prosperity of the population thereof, to utilize for agriculture and 
domestic purposes, all the entire water flow of the Washita River, and to benefit 
the people of such territory.”19 
At the meeting Oklahoma Governor Leon Phillips proclaimed, “Out here in 
Western Oklahoma we….know that if we could catch and hold these floods, and 
put the water on the ground where we have drouths, we could raise many things to 
eat that we now have to go to the store and buy[.]”  Phillips ranked water 
development activities in the basin, arguing that “[t]o be economic and effective, a 
program of water conservation and flood prevention must have its beginning at the 
‘headwaters.’….We want to hold every drop of water as near the place it falls as 
we can….The construction of farm ponds…would be the next step….[then] a 
series of larger ponds and lakes which would provide community water supplies 
and recreation….[then] the storage reservoirs, properly designed to fit the general 
basin-wide scheme.”  Regional SCS officer Louis P. Merrill stressed that 
agricultural conservation practices including contour tillage, strip-cropping, 
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 Other reasons for opposition included concerns that “river basin authorities would delay the 
construction of [other] water projects”; the idea that comparisons to TVA would “frighten off 
private capital”; and fears among other federal agencies like USDA and the Bureau of Reclamation 
that river basin authorities would cut into their respective spheres.  In Donald J. Pisani, “Federal 
Water Policy and the Rural West,” pp. 121-25.  For specific Bureau of Reclamation fears, see also 
Donald J. Pisani, “The Bureau of Reclamation and the West, 1945-2000,” in The American West in 
2000: Essays in Honor of Gerald D. Nash, eds. Richard Etulain and Ferenc M. Szasz 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2003), p. 58. 
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Proceedings of the Second Annual Convention of the Washita Valley Improvement Association, 
28 March 1941, pp. 13-4, 53-7. 
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terracing and grass seeding would provide a range of benefits, including fewer and 
smaller floods, less silt in streams and reservoirs, bigger crop yields and regional 
agricultural stability with consequent benefits to regional industry and 
commerce.
20
 
 These benefits resonated with state conservation officials.  In the early 
1940s, the OPRB recommended that “[i]n addition to the construction of the 
twenty-five reservoirs as proposed by this office, it is our recommendation that the 
‘Program for Watershed Improvement in Aid of Flood Control’ as proposed by the 
Department of Agriculture be installed.”  This position reflected the agency’s 
belief that USDA soil conservation and upstream flood prevention would benefit 
the basin.  This recommendation was partly qualified, however, by the OPRB’s 
growing support for an additional Army Corps of Engineers dam on the Washita’s 
main stem to control floods, reduce sedimentation buildup on the river’s alluvial 
floodplain, and store irrigation waters.
21
 
Against the perceived need for a main stem dam, the USDA aggressively 
asserted its role in the basin.  In a 1943 report the agency attributed over ninety-
five percent of flood damages in the basin’s upper half to agriculture best remedied 
through agricultural adjustments, including improved cropping systems, better 
land use selection to prevent erosion and run-off, vegetative cover for marginal 
lands, and structural installations to facilitate the land-treatment programs.  To 
                                                          
20
 “It will be obvious to all clear-thinking people that these reservoirs should be progressively 
distributed on the tributaries of the drainage shed,” Phillips explained, “so as to give to each 
community affected the maximum benefits.” In Phillips,‘The State of Oklahoma and the Washita,’ 
pp. 48-9, 50; Merrill, ‘The Department of Agriculture and the WashitaRiver Watershed,’ pp. 35-45.  
21
 ‘Washita River and Drainage Basin,’ [in pencil on cover is: ‘Office copy of Oklahoma Planning 
and Resources Board’] p. 33, 35, in Robert Kerr papers, Conservation Series, box 10, folder 15. 
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defend its turf from the Corps of Engineers, the agency declared that “any 
reservoir program…recommended by the War Department would not affect flood 
damages in the upper 70 miles of the main stream ….[and would] ignore 
agricultural flood control [benefits]…in the lower 200 miles of the valley.”  The 
following year, the 1944 Flood Control Act boosted USDA flood control work in 
the basin by tasking the Soil Conservation Service (SCS) to develop upstream 
erosion and flood prevention projects on eleven specific watersheds nationwide, 
including the Washita and its tributaries.  The law authorized over eleven million 
dollars in federal funds to help farmers implement soil conservation practices and 
build small dams to control erosion and to slow and capture run-off before it 
reached a river’s main stream.22 
During the late 1940s, the Sandstone Creek tributary watershed on the 
Washita’s upper reaches became the flagship USDA-SCS upstream flood control 
project.  The Sandstone Creek Watershed had been particularly prone to flooding 
and erosion.  During the period 1920 to 1939, for instance, observers had recorded 
floods on the watershed during 184 separate storms.  Average annual flood 
damages to the 69,000 acre watershed included $40,000 to crops and pastures; 
$2200 in streambank cutting; $3900 in lost livestock, fences and equipment; and 
$5700 in sediment deposition on valley lands.  To control flooding, SCD 
supervisors, land owners, and SCS officers planned and built nearly 400 miles of 
                                                          
22
 The USDA reported in 1943 that “Floods on the WashitaRiver and its tributaries do most of their 
damage to agricultural lands and crops.  Very few towns of more than 1,000 [people] are located on 
flood-plain areas subject to damage.” In USDA ‘Watershed of the WashitaRiver (Oklahoma and 
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terraces; seeded 5800 acres of eroded and idle cropland to grass; built 125 farm 
ponds, twenty-four flood-retarding dams, thirteen sediment-control dams; and 
improved pasture and range management on 58,500 acres.  By the early 1950s its 
effectiveness in controlling floods and regulating stream flow won broad support.
23
  
In 1952, when the project was completed, Oklahoma congressman Carl Albert 
confidently predicted to Oklahoma Soil Conservation District chairman C.E. 
Barnhill: “I think this movement will spread throughout the country[.]”  And in 
March 1953 the National Farmers Union (NFU) petitioned Eisenhower for 
“legislation to fill the present gap in national soil conservation flood-prevention 
flood-control programs [by authorizing] anyone to build small flood prevention 
installations on the up-stream and watersheds.”24 
In 1954 Congress made upstream flood control a permanent USDA activity 
with the Watershed Protection and Flood Protection Act.  And the WashitaBasin 
remained a catalyst and leader for future USDA upstream flood prevention 
programs across the country.  In February 1956 after hearing Cheyenne banker 
                                                          
23During seventeen major storms from 1953 to 1960, the project’s installations and procedures 
reduced flood damages from a potential of 870 acres to an average of only 90 acres.  Additional 
benefits included average savings of over $22,000 per year, healthier ranges and beef production, 
irrigation water, and recreation benefits.  In Harold Kautz, “Sandstone Creek: How a Watershed 
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 Carl Albert 7 April 1952 letter to C.E. Barnhill, p.1, in Carl Albert papers, General Series, box 5, 
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L.L. Males’ Sandstone Creek presentation, the National Association of Soil 
Conservation Districts voted unanimously to have Congress fund and finish the 
Washita project ahead of the ten other projects scattered across the country.  
Oklahoma Association of Soil Conservation Districts president Harral Allen called 
the Washita plan, especially the Sandstone creek project, the “‘keynote of the 
whole convention.’”  Later that spring, Males described the Sandstone Creek 
project to the Senate Agriculture Appropriations Subcommittee, leaving its 
chairman Richard B. Russell (D. Ga.) to exclaim,“‘[i]t was one of the most 
interesting and dramatic presentations this committee has ever witnessed.’”  By 
1961, 141 small watershed projects were being constructed nationwide, and by 
1964, Congress had approved 535 projects for construction.  Most significant, 
perhaps was USDA’s expanded scope.  Years later Carl Albert would observe: 
“Prior to the 1950s, the main emphasis of the [SCS] was on the planning and 
execution of conservation measures on individual farms and ranches.  It is only in 
recent years that this has been enlarged to encompass programs for entire 
watersheds.”25 
The Washita Basin’s easily-eroded soils and its erratic climate that 
included heavy downpours and extended droughts made it a natural place for 
USDA to develop the upstream flood control program.  Through the 1940s, USDA 
was a fitting federal agency to be working in the basin for the further reason that 
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most Washita Basin residents prioritized the basin’s agricultural productivity when 
considering flood control.  It followed that agricultural flood control dams would 
best serve the region’s agricultural economy.  Gradually, however, municipal 
water supplies for basins towns assumed greater priority, especially as drought 
crept into the basin during the late 1940s.  The situation pitted farmers and USDA 
agents against townsfolk and the Bureau of Reclamation.  And as they pushed for 
the Bureau of Reclamation dams to supply municipal water, basin townsfolk and 
their congressional representatives tested the Eisenhower administration’s efforts 
to control spending on federally-constructed dams. 
While the USDA upstream flood control and water conservation program 
grew in scope and stature, the Bureau of Reclamation’s WashitaBasin plan took 
shape.  Like the USDA, the Reclamation Bureau conducted reconnaissance studies 
of the basin in the late 1930s, and it reached similar conclusions.  By 1940, the 
Bureau of Reclamation called flood control the basin’s “greatest need” since local 
improvements and irrigation opportunities were vulnerable without it.  Water to 
maintain soil fertility and to stabilize the rural economy in the upper portion of the 
basin was second.  Limiting silt inflow from the upper basin came third.  And like 
the USDA, the Bureau of Reclamation found “no need for immediate 
consideration of new sources of water to fully supply municipalities,” but instead 
recommended a series of dams for flood control, irrigation, silt detention and 
recreation.
26
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During the mid and late 1940s the reclamation bureau cooperated with 
OPRB to classify irrigation areas and to inventory basin water supplies.  By the 
late 1940s, the drought assumed an important role in the basin’s development.  
During the summer of 1948 and into the 1950s, dangerous water shortages 
afflicted major basin cities, including Anadarko and Chickasha.By 1951, when 
regional reclamation director H.E. Robbins presented the agency’s overall plan for 
the basin, reliable municipal water supplies concerned most towns along the river.  
Robbins proposed a system of seven multiple-purpose reservoirs for municipal 
water supply, irrigation, flood control, power, recreation and fish and wildlife 
purposes.  The seven reservoirs, he argued, “can be provided more economically 
than numerous relatively small, single-purpose developments.”27  Because the 
basin towns of Chickasha, Anadarko, Clinton and ElkCity urgently needed water, 
Robbins argued that two dams should receive priority.  These were the Foss dam 
on the main stream of the WashitaRiver and the FortCobb dam on one of its 
tributaries.  In addition to controlling floods and providing irrigation water, among 
other purposes, the Foss Dam would supply water to Clinton and ElkCity, and 
perhaps seven other towns.  Similarly, the Fort Cobb Dam would control floods 
and supply water to Anadarko and Chickasha, and perhaps Verden and FortCobb.  
While his report passed through channels, drought aggravated the water supply 
situation in many basin towns and cities.  In five of the seven years from 1948 to 
1954, basin cities regularly experienced below-normal precipitation, with many 
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Report of Regional Director of Bureau of Reclamation, 18 September 1951, pp. 40, 57, 72.In 
January 1948, the Boise City News reported that the southwest corner of Oklahoma was 
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cities receiving fifty percent or less of usual rainfall in successive years.  For the 
twelve-month period ending June 1953, the WashitaRiver near Clinton recorded 
only eight percent of its average annual run-off since 1935.
28
 
The Bureau of Reclamation plan also appeared during heightened tension 
between big downstream dam and small upstream dam proponents.  Following 
May 1952 hearings to study federal water construction policies, for instance, the 
Civil Works Subcommittee of the House Public Works Committee argued that 
since USDA upstream flood control activities could not prevent large-scale 
damage, they should not be permitted to interfere with the more effective activities 
of other agencies.  Concerned that the Corps of Engineers would be assuming 
flood control activities, LeFlore County SCD Chairman Perry Chaffin 
subsequently wrote to Carl Albert: “We may need a line of demarcation as to how 
far upstream the Army Engineers can go with their program of big dams and how 
far down stream the Department of Agriculture can go with their program, but we 
certainly don’t need the Army Engineers in the soil and moisture conservation 
business.”29  For its part, the USDA published ‘Where Floods Begin,’ a May 1952 
                                                          
28
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control, 50,000 acre-feet for irrigation and municipal water, and 75,000 acre-feet for sediment 
reserve.  The Fort Cobb Dam would have a storage capacity of 95,000 acre-feet; 62,500 acre-feet 
for flood control, 15,000 acre-feet for municipal and industrial supply, and 15,000 acre feet as a 
sediment reserve.  The other towns to possibly receive water from the Foss reservoir included 
Bessie, Corn, Cordell, Rockey, Sentinel, Hobart and Gotebo.  Many of these towns were trucking 
in domestic water by 1953. In U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Unpublished Hearings, 23 March 
1953, pp. 11-21; U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Published Hearing, 25 April 1955, p. 40; S.K. 
Jackson, “The Present Drought in Oklahoma” [1953], p. 8, in Robert S. Kerr papers, Conservation 
Series, box 11, folder 3.  
29
Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 831; Perry Chaffin 27 June 1955 letter to Carl Albert, p. 
1, in Carl Albert papers, Department Series, box 21, folder 12.  Similarly, the National Farmers’ 
Union identified a ‘gap’ between federal authority and appropriations for downstream flood control 
levees and dams, and soil conservation activities under the ACP and SCS programs.  The 
organization was concerned that “practically no provision has been made for the large and 
important area between the farm itself and the lower stretches of the largest streams.”  In James 
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pamphlet that emphasized the economic benefits of its small upstream dams on 
WashitaRiver tributaries, particularly on the Sandstone Creek watershed.  “It 
amounts to this,” asserted USDA officials, “[c]reeks flood more land than rivers 
do, and they flood more frequently.”  To a gathering of southwest Oklahoma 
farmers, Daily Oklahoman associate editor Elmer Peterson explained, “[t]he only 
reason the big downstream flood attracts all the attention is that its damage is more 
spectacular.  The watershed flood does five or six times as much damage as the 
downstream flood, but the damage is done in millions of small places, so public 
attention is diverted to the big torrent.”30  Locally, residents and farmers’ groups 
opposed to the proposed Bureau of Reclamation dams began to organize.  For 
instance, landowners in the Cobb Creek watershed organized the Cobb Creek 
Flood Prevention Association to protest the Bureau of Reclamation’s proposed 
Cobb Creek dam because it would remove valuable land from production, it would 
benefit only cities and downstream irrigators, and it would cost more than a flood 
control project based on the Sandstone Creek watershed model.
31
 
Sensing the damage to state and local interests from these contrasting 
viewpoints, in June 1952 Oklahoma senator Robert Kerr wrote to Chickasha Daily 
newspaper editor Dave Vandivier that he hoped “an attitude of competition does 
                                                                                                                                                                
Patton 17 March 1953 letter to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, General Series, box 5, folder 
98. 
30
 ‘Where Floods Begin’ USDA – SCS – Western Gulf Region, Fort Worth, Texas, May 1952,  p. 
3, in Robert Kerr papers, Conservation Series, box 11, folder 2; Elmer Peterson, “Dams That Build 
and Dams That Destroy,” 16 February 1952 address to the Carnegie, Oklahoma Farmers’ Forum, p. 
1, in Robert S. Kerr papers, Conservation Series, box 11, folder 2.  Using another colorful analogy, 
he asserted to the Farmers’ Forum: “The surgeon who cuts out a man’s liver does a spectacular job, 
but the real scientist is the doctor who stops the disease before it gets well started and uses 
preventive medicine” (p. 1). 
31
 Floyd Clay explained that his organization had formed two years earlier.  He submitted to Albert 
a petition signed by 554 farmers and landowners opposed to the proposed FortCobb dam.  In Floyd 
Clay 19 February 1955 letter to Carl Albert, p. 1, in Carl Albert papers, General Series, box 7, 
folder 28.   
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not develop between the people interested in municipal water supplies and 
irrigation and the Soil Conservation Service interests in the Valley.”  A 
forthcoming Oklahoma Society of Professional Engineers (OSPE) report that 
recommended balancing upstream dams with downstream projects likely informed 
Kerr’s position.  The OSPE Conservation of Natural Resources Committee, 
including long-time Kerr assistant Don McBride, authored the January 1953 report 
with OPRB assistance.
32
  The committee praised USDA land treatment measures 
to conserve water and increase agricultural production, especially the state’s nearly 
100,000 farm ponds which it said “have gone a long way toward solving the 
drought problem as far as livestock are concerned[.]”  But it also argued that 
upstream USDA activities should respect downstream needs: 
Careful coordination of the Department of Agriculture water-flow 
retardation structures with any larger downstream reservoirs must 
be the rule.  Otherwise, in the Western part of the state with its high 
evaporation rates, it is likely that water needed for municipalities 
and industry will be wasted by evaporation.  This danger can be 
avoided if the permanent pools in these waterflow retardation 
structures are kept small.  They should be large enough at the 
permanent level to provide stock water and fish for the farm family, 
but the growing tendency to increase the size to many 
acres…should be balanced with downstream beneficial use.33 
 
To grow support for both the USDA program and the Reclamation Bureau project, 
Kerr took campaigning Democratic vice-presidential nominee Senator John 
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 Robert Kerr 19 June 1952 letter to Dave Vandivier, p. 1, in Robert Kerr papers, Conservation 
Series, box 11, folder 2.  Don McBride was a professional engineer who had served as a state 
official in two administrations before Robert Kerr became governor, in 1943.  Robert Kerr Jr., later 
called McBride, “a self-described ‘water rat,’ [who] was so indispensable in advising [Robert Kerr] 
on water development, he was sometimes called the ‘third senator from Oklahoma.’”  McBride 
later served as National Reclamation Manager and TVA director.  In Robert Kerr Jr., Mr. Water 
(Oklahoma City: Oklahoma Heritage Association, 2005), pp. 79, 82.  
33
Report to the Governor of Oklahoma on the Problem of Municipal and Industrial Water Supplies 
for Oklahoma, 8 January 1953, pp. 17-8.   
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Sparkman, to tour the Washita basin in September 1952.  Kerr wanted Sparkman 
to appreciate the USDA upstream program, but he also anticipated congressional 
hearings on the Reclamation Bureau plan.  In a tone that suggested more harmony 
than actually existed, Kerr’s press release for the visit declared that he would 
“advise [Sparkman] of…the unanimous attitude of the people of the State favoring 
the soil conservation and reclamation features of the project.”34 
Kerr’s attitude represented more than a desire to avoid the destructive 
competition that could compromise both upstream and downstream conservation 
programs in the basin.  The Reclamation Bureau plan arrived in an atmosphere of 
federal vigilance toward water development spending.  This atmosphere had 
heightened in January 1950, when President Harry Truman established a Water 
Resources Policy Commission headed by Morris L. Cooke to improve cost-benefit 
estimate procedures in federal water projects.  In December 1950, the Cooke 
commission urged Congress to consolidate water development in one federal 
agency or to establish interagency river basin commissions that would apply 
uniform criteria to construction cost-benefit estimates.
35
  The same month, a 
House-sponsored study listed wide-ranging water development project allocation 
abuses including “‘pork barrel’ practices…‘deceptive’ cost estimates….[and] the 
alleged habit…of allocating an unfairly high proportion of project costs to non-
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 Untitled two-page press release [with 1952, in pencil, top right], p. 1, in Robert Kerr papers, 
Conservation Series, box 11, folder 2. 
35
Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 822; Beatrice Hort Holmes, “A History of Federal Water 
Resources Programs, 1800-1960,” in Readings in Soil and Water Conservation, ed. Peter F. Black 
(New York: MSS Information Corporation, 1974), p.49.  Specifically, explained Donald Pisani, 
Truman had “charged the commission with determining better standards for evaluating the costs, 
benefits, and feasibility of water projects, as well as for allocating the construction costs of 
multiple-purpose projects.”  In Pisani, “Federal Water Policy,” p. 135. 
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reimbursable items like flood control and navigation, in order to minimize 
repayment burdens for local interests[.]”36 
 Following these studies, in December 1952 the Truman administration 
issued Circular A-47 which directed the Budget Bureau to apply uniform standards 
and criteria when evaluating water development proposals.  It also directed the 
agency to ensure that each purpose of a multiple purpose project exceeded its own 
cost.  The directive strengthened the agency’s role of ‘gatekeeper’ to ensure the 
feasibility of proposed new projects.   For several reasons, Circular A-47 made it 
more difficult to secure water project authorizations.  For example, it required that 
all plans assume a fifty-year project life-span in their cost-benefit analysis.  This 
provision frustrated planners who attributed higher project costs to longer-term 
benefits.  Since the directive complemented its plans to reduce federal spending, 
the Eisenhower administration adopted Circular A-47.
37
 
Budget Bureau director F.J. Lawton applied the new policy as he reviewed 
the Reclamation Bureau’s plan for the WashitaBasin.  In a December 1952 letter to 
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Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 831.  Several years later, the Hoover Commission 
reported that by June 1952, the cost to complete ninety (90) federal irrigation projects was 110 
percent higher than original estimates.  In Richard L. Berkman and W. Kip Viscusi, Damming the 
West: Ralph Nader’s Study Group Report on the Bureau of Reclamation (New York: Grossman 
Publishers, 1973), pp. 78-9. 
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Vermejo (New Mexico) reclamation project in part because the project authorized irrigators to 
repay the project’s cost over a period of seventy-six years.  In Congress and the Nation, 1945-
1964, p. 819. 
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the Interior Secretary, Lawton observed that the agency’s budget ascribed most of 
the project’s cost to flood control (which the federal government would pay), and 
not to water supply (to be paid by local users).  These figures did not fit with the 
project’s rhetorical justification.  “While the relative amounts of the allocations 
would indicate that flood control was the major purpose to be served,” Lawton 
wrote, “justification of the project in the report is based mainly on the need for a 
water supply to meet municipal and irrigation requirements.”  To reinforce his 
point, Lawton quoted the reclamation commissioner as having said of the project: 
“‘water supplies for municipal and industrial uses and for expansion of irrigation is 
of first priority.’”  Undaunted by the review, Robert Kerr introduced a Washita 
Project authorization bill the following month, in January 1953.  That March, the 
new Interior Secretary Douglas McKay submitted to the Budget Bureau a modified 
report which partially addressed Lawton’s concerns by removing some of the 
project’s irrigation and fish and wildlife features, but that only vaguely promised 
that “the allocations to flood control will be given further consideration[.]”38 
In March 1953, Washita basin residents testified to the project’s benefits 
before the Senate Interior Committee on Insular Affairs.  Their testimony 
portrayed a region with chronic water quality and supply problems made acute by 
the current drought.  For instance, Bessie resident B.E. Crane explained to the 
committee that even under normal conditions his town’s water supply was so hard 
(mineralized) that it could not be used for human consumption, household 
cleaning, or laundry.  Mineralized water corroded the town’s plumbing and 
                                                          
38
 F.J. Lawton 30 December 1952 letter to Secretary of the Interior, in House Document No. 219, 
July 1953, p. 12; Douglas McKay 3 March 1953 letter to Joseph M. Dodge, p.5 in House 
Document No. 219, July 1953, p. 5. 
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apparatus, making for costly maintenance and parts replacement.  “Our community 
has suffered a lack of development due to the shortage of our water supplies,” he 
asserted.  He explained that drought in 1951 and 1952 had forced the town to truck 
in water supplies, including nearly 236,000 gallons in 236 loads during the last 
half of 1952.  In fact, many of the towns anticipating municipal water from the 
Foss Dam were trucking in their water during the early 1950s.
39
   Clinton Chamber 
of Commerce secretary-manager Ted Savage said that natural resources in the 
Clinton area, including oil, gas, and gypsum could be the basis for economic 
development but not without adequate water, especially in cases like 1952 when 
“droughts…would have made the maintenance of industrial operations 
impossible[.]”  Hobart resident Percy Hughes explained that his community had 
only six weeks of water in the town’s reservoir.  Hobart municipal officials had 
recently passed an ordinance making it illegal “to have leaky faucets, [and] to 
water shrubs or flowers.”   The most urgent call to authorize the project came from 
Anadarko resident and Washita Basin Improvement Association (WBIA) 
Chairman, Albert L. Connel, who declared, “We need (DRINKING 
WATER)…which you will certainly agree carries first priority in all 
instances….(THIS IS AN EMERGENCY) and I beg and plead that you will 
observe it as such and that you will recommend expediency[.]”40 
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 The Bessie area had a per capita income of only two-third the state average, and it had lost nearly 
twenty-eight percent of its population since 1940, he said.  In Prepared Statement by Washita 
Basin Improvement Association, Bessie, Oklahoma to Chairman, Senate Sub-Committee on 
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Prepared Statement of Ted Savage, Clinton, OK, member of the Washita Basin Improvement 
Assoc., to Chairman, Senate Sub-Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation of Committee on 
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Despite the emergency and their sympathy for Washita basin residents, 
legislators questioned the project’s legitimacy. New Mexico senator Clinton 
Anderson recalled a previous plan for municipal water supply on the Texas 
Panhandle.  “[T]he Texas people were quite anxious to get that Panhandle project 
through[,]” he recalled, “then somebody reminded us that…it was not an irrigation 
project, and it would not be fair to allow these communities to group themselves 
together for the purpose of providing municipal water and have it be at the cost of 
the federal government.”  Seeing a parallel to the current situation, Anderson 
continued: “We know what to do when it is an irrigation project, but when the 
project, so-called, is primarily a municipal water supply project, we run into some 
trouble.”   Reassuringly, Robert Kerr emphasized to the sub-committee, “the plan 
will meet a pressing and emergency need brought about by continued adverse 
water conditions, as well as a greatly accelerated demand for more and more 
water, for industrial and municipal purposes.  However, this project is not 
primarily a municipal water supply project.”  To make his point, Kerr stressed that 
the project would irrigate 26,000 acres, control floods, contribute to fish and 
wildlife resources, and provide recreation.
41
  To confirm Kerr’s point, M.G. 
                                                                                                                                                                
11, folder 3; Hughes explained that Hobart’s population had declined by thirty-six percent since 
1930, and its per capita income was almost half the state average. In U.S. Congress, Washita 
Project, Unpublished Hearings, 23 March 1953, pp. 65-6; Prepared Statement of Albert L. Connel, 
Anadarko, OK, member of the Washita Basin Improvement Assoc., for Chairman – Senate Sub 
Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation of Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 19 March 
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U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Unpublished Hearings, 23 March 1953, pp. 28-9; Prepared 
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Barclay, the Reclamation Bureau’s area planning engineer for Oklahoma City 
explained, “[w]e have always considered this a multipurpose project, involving 
irrigation, water supply, and recreational benefit, fish and wildlife[.]”  And Barclay 
emphasized that the towns to receive water by the plan ranged in size from about 
200 to 5000 people, with most having below 500 inhabitants.  “A lot of them are 
small towns,” he explained to the committee, “[it] is difficult to work out their 
water supply problem, but their problem is just as real to them as anybody else.”  
Oklahoma Bureau of Business research director Francis Cella added: “these people 
are not asking for something for nothing, they are just asking that the Federal 
Government temporarily give them a start so that they can go ahead and proceed 
with development of their own area.”42 
Later that summer, on 28 July 1953, interior secretary Douglas McKay 
submitted to President Eisenhower his revised report on the Washita plan.  On 
several points, the new report addressed budget bureau director F.J. Lawton’s 
concerns.  For instance, of the seven proposed reservoirs, the bill recommended 
only the immediate authorization of the Foss and Fort Cobb Reservoirs.  It also 
provided for repayment to the federal government of municipal water supply costs 
within fifty years, it reduced non-reimbursable costs attributed to recreation and 
fish and wildlife enhancement, and it eliminated irrigation costs except for storage 
                                                                                                                                                                
(pp. 2-3).  This rationale echoed the shift to reclamation policy that followed the completion of 
Boulder Dam, when power sales were used to subsidize irrigation.  See Pisani, “Federal Water,” 
pp. 127-28. 
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U.S. Congress, Washita Project, Unpublished Hearings, 23 March 1953, pp, 21, 22, 29, 60.  Since 
irrigation was really a small priority in the project, and the recreational, fish and wildlife benefits 
were discounted by other agencies, his answer suggests that an underlying reason for presenting the 
plan as a multipurpose project; that perhaps this was a water supply project decorated with other 
purposes to facilitate its passage through Congress and to ease the financial burden on local 
consumers.  
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at the Foss and FortCobb reservoirs.  McKay admitted that the report’s “tentative 
allocation to flood control is probably substantially greater than would result under 
the procedure currently used by the Corps of Engineers, and the other tentative 
allocations are correspondingly lower[,]” but he assured the President that 
“[b]efore construction of this project is initiated, this Department will give further 
consideration to the allocation of project costs and to the comments of the Chief of 
Engineers and other reviewing agencies.”  This vague promise did not satisfy 
budget bureau official Roland Hughes, who reminded McKay of the Interior 
Department’s promise to cooperate with the Corps of Engineers to develop joint 
standards for all agencies in allocating costs.  Additionally, Hughes explained, the 
State of Oklahoma would “be expected to assume responsibility for repayment of 
the costs so allocated to reimbursable purposes which [were] beyond the ability of 
local beneficiaries to repay.”  Once these conditions were met, wrote Hughes, the 
budget bureau would support the project.  Undeterred by Hughes’ review, on 29 
July 1953, McKay submitted his report to House Speaker Joseph Martin.
43
 
As the bill moved through congressional channels, Senator Robert Kerr 
used the drought crisis and political pressure to win Eisenhower’s support for the 
project.  Near the end of July, Kerr appealed directly to Eisenhower, for a third 
time, to request that the President release the project from a list awaiting the 
administration’s policy revision.  In return for releasing “such critically needed 
projects as those in the drouth-stricken area pending a revision of over-all policy,” 
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 The report estimated costs of the recommended projects at $15,417,000 for flood control, 
$3,410,000 for irrigation, and $10,370,000 for municipal water supply. In Douglas McKay 28 July 
1953 letter to The President [Eisenhower] (through the Bureau of the Budget), in House Document 
No. 219, July 1953, p. 4; Rowland Hughes 28 July 1953 letter to the Secretary of the Interior 
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declared a late July 1953 press release from Kerr’s office, “Senator Kerr, as a 
member of the Senate Public Works Committee, pledged his assistance to the 
President in the consideration of revisions looking to various improvements aimed 
at clarifying local and federal participation, stressing the more practical projects, 
and establishing a uniform code of standards.”44 
 Oklahoma governor Johnston Murray also pressured Eisenhower to 
approve the project.  On 22 September 1953, in a reversal of his predecessor Leon 
Phillips’ 1939 position regarding the relative importance of upstream dams, 
Murray wrote to Eisenhower: “we do not feel free to approve further storage in 
conservation pools of the Department of Agriculture projects unless it can be 
shown that this will not endanger commitments of water to the Bureau Plan.”  
Later that fall, to Oklahoma senators Robert Kerr and Mike Monroney, he objected 
to requirements that the Washita project meet “as yet undetermined joint 
standards,” and argued that “when the joint standards have been adopted and all of 
the agencies and states conform to them, then Oklahoma should go along.  Until 
such procedures have been adopted and clearly are being followed, I see no reason 
why they should be anticipated in the case of these Oklahoma projects.”   
Similarly, he criticized the Budget Bureau’s request that the state underwrite the 
project’s reimbursable costs arguing that “this interpretation of the President’s 
policy is untried and has not been approved generally nor applied to any other 
projects.”  Furthermore, he stressed, “it is impossible under the Constitution of the 
State of Oklahoma for the state to assume liability for the costs of a project which 
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 31 July 1953 press release, p.1, in Robert Kerr papers, Political/Campaign Series, box 11, folder 
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would benefit a particular community or area of the State.”  In 1954 the Washita 
bill passed the Senate following the unanimous recommendation of the Senate 
Interior and Insular Affairs Committee, but it did not pass the House before 
Congress adjourned.
45
 
During the fall and winter of 1954-55, pressure grew for Congress to ease 
the repayment provisions for similar projects.  In their 1954 annual meeting that 
November, for instance, the National Reclamation Association (NRA) resolved 
that the definition of non-reimbursable costs should be extended to include salinity 
control, sediment control and public health protection, among other benefits.  The 
NRA also resolved that federal credit should be “used to purchase or guarantee in 
whole or in part bonds or borrowings for irrigation, reclamation, or multipurpose 
developments under reasonable standards of repayment security.”46 
Oklahoma officials grew adamant that municipal and industrial water 
supplies were the state’s priority.  In October 1952, while Oklahoma cities ran low 
on water, governor Johnston Murray wrote to Oklahoma Society of Professional 
Engineers (OSPE) president G.W. McCullough, “[t]he present long protracted 
drought has brought to our attention [our] grave deficiency in municipal 
water….This situation must have quick study….looking to future growth of our 
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population and especially the need to better balance our agricultural economy with 
industrial growth[.]”  Following Murray’s instructions, OSPE, with OPRB water 
resources division assistance, surveyed the state’s municipal and industrial water 
supply problems.  In their corresponding report, released in January 1953, the 
engineers argued that “[m]any flood control dams have been built on some of the 
tributaries of the WashitaRiver to control floods.  The water from these reservoirs 
is being wasted when it could be used to increase crop production on the 
bottomlands along these streams.”  Most pointedly, in a passage that summarized 
the overall transition occurring in the state, the committee concluded: 
In the past the emphasis has been placed on flood 
control…[h]owever, the increased importance of water supply for 
municipal, industrial and irrigation uses demands the adoption of a 
program of water conservation…with flood control conceived on a 
basis where water supply becomes a primary consideration rather 
than an incidental one as at present.
47
 
 
Eisenhower could sympathize with the state’s call for increased water supplies.  In 
a 31 July 1954 message to Congress he declared, “people are entitled to expect that 
their timber, minerals, streams, and water supply…should be safeguarded, 
improved, and made available not only for this but for future generations.”  He 
endorsed the Washita project in his 1955 budget message and recommended a 
supplemental appropriation for its initiation once it was authorized by the 
Congress.
48
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 They had finally won Eisenhower’s explicit approval for the project, but 
Washita Project’s supporters and their congressional representatives still had to 
overcome another hurdle.  In April 1955, the Washita project again came before 
Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.  Since 1953, when the bill had 
first been introduced, the project’s estimated cost had risen from $29,197,000 to 
$31,750,000.  More importantly, the cost allocated to municipal and industrial 
water supply had risen from $10,370,000 to $15,200,000 in the new budget, while 
the cost allocated to flood control had dropped from $14,417,000 to $9,475,000.  
With these changes, nearly five million dollars of the project’s estimated cost had 
been transferred from the federal government to local interests.  To the committee, 
Kerr stressed the broad policy implications from this change: “the budget 
department is seeking to compel or persuade this Congress to arbitrarily change 
the benefit element in the authorization estimates by saying that we will allocate a 
smaller amount of the cost to flood control in the future than we have in the past.  
The…result of that…would be that a great portion of the projects which Congress 
wants to authorize could not be authorized[.]”  He urged the committee to report 
the bill out according to its original 1953 budget.
49
 
Basin witnesses again stressed their drought-related water shortages.  
Cordell resident and WBIA member Houston Hulin explained that water levels in 
the existing reservoirs to supply Cordell and Hobart had gotten so low that locals 
removed fish in order to save them.  After the Washita bill had failed to pass the 
previous year, Cordell residents had voted bonds to drill several wells, but had not 
found a suitable water supply.  WBIA chairman Albert Connel explained that 
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Chickasha residents used sand bags to capture enough WashitaRiver water for 
their intake pumps.  On the matter of cost allocations, Connel pleaded, “[w]e 
realize that the Bureau of Reclamation is not directly responsible for supplying 
municipal water, but since this is a multipurpose project and so much of it is 
reimbursable to the government, the citizens of that area feel that the Bureau of 
Reclamation has worked out a very fine plan.”  And he repeated the regional 
economic and industrial benefits to accrue from the project, adding “our towns 
have had bitter experiences with individual stop-gap water-supply measures which 
provide only for the present or immediate future and which result in recurring 
problems with no provision for growth and development.”50 
Drought conditions and frustration with the Budget Bureau’s new standards 
made for a sympathetic audience in the hearings.  Informed that the change in 
flood-control allocations from $15,400,000 to $9,475,000 was an administrative 
decision which arose from the Budget Bureau’s conditional approval for the 
project, New Mexico senator Clinton Anderson fumed: “I have been kicking about 
the Bureau of the Budget taking over the functions of the Government without 
proper legal authority for a long time.”   To make his point, Anderson briefly 
stopped the proceedings and read into the record section 9(a) of the 1939 
Reclamation Act: “In connection with a new project, new division of a project, or 
supplemental works on the project, there may be allocated to flood control or 
navigation the part of said total estimate which the Secretary may find to be 
proper.”  His frustration growing, Anderson continued: “[the Interior 
Secretary]….proceeded to find out that this [Washita] project was feasible and 
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workable, and was about to be passed by the Congress.  So along comes the 
Bureau of the Budget and said, ‘Wait a minute.  Never mind what the Congress or 
Secretary wants.  We are going to handle this all by ourselves.’  I do not find 
anything in the Constitution or anything in the laws that says the Congress has 
been superseded by the Bureau of the Budget.”51 
Still, while he was unhappy that the Budget Bureau had reduced the federal 
contribution to flood control on the project, Anderson had to remind even 
Oklahoma senator Mike Monroney to respect the project’s flood control features 
when describing its benefits.  When Monroney explained to the committee that 
“the Interior Department’s new formula…would make the cost of the water [for] 
these municipalities uneconomic and, therefore would defeat the very purpose of 
this legislation[,]”Anderson quickly interjected: “I like to believe this is a great 
flood-control project and not a municipal water-supply project.”  He then 
reminded Monroney not to “lose sight of the fact that flood control is the real 
important factor in this whole program, and we ought not to cut it down so that 
somebody would pick up the figure that it is not very important...”  Quickly 
Monroney agreed “1,000 percent,” then explained, “we have supported numerous 
projects in reclamation that are on dry land that does not have population and does 
not have a going industry and a going economy.  This we are begging and pleading 
to salvage and save, an area that without this help will go down to a very, very 
serious economic crisis.”  The Senate passed the bill again in 1955.52 
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The bill did not come of out the House Committee on Interior and Insular 
Affairs in time for passage in 1955.
53
  Before the House one final time in early 
1956, final arguments for the project were practical and sympathetic.  Oklahoma 
representative Carl Albert defended the bill for practical reasons: “flood-control 
reservoirs have been recommended for many years in the Washita system at a cost 
of more than $20 million.  The flood-control portion of these projects under the 
[Reclamation Bureau] program will amount to some $15 million.  So the flood-
control cost to the Federal Government has been decreased.  The point is the 
Federal Government will get $20 million worth of flood control for $15 million by 
adopting this bill.”  Utah congressman William Dawson added: “This question of 
water is a matter of life and death with us….This is one of those projects where the 
Government must step in, where you have a combination of flood control and also 
municipal uses of water….We should at least give those folks in that drought-
stricken area a break.”54 
President Eisenhower approved the Washita Project on 25 February 1956.  
He saw it as an exceptional case, though.  Following his approval, he criticized it 
for departing from the “fundamental principle” that each purpose of a multiple-
purpose project “bear its own share of the costs[.]”  Eisenhower explained:  
To this extent, the bill could establish an undesirable precedent for 
similar handling of other projects without regard to the excess costs 
to the Federal Government which result from such a method of cost 
allocation.  I shall not consider approval of this bill as such a 
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1956, p. 2449. 
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precedent, but rather as recognition of special circumstances and 
acceptance of the result of the extensive negotiations between the 
Federal agencies and local interests which were conducted in the 
development of the project. 
 
With more foresight, California Representative Clair Engle had predicted in the 
House that year: “[the Washita] project indicates a format of which we are going 
to see more as time goes along, and that is instead of the single-purpose flood-
control projects, we are going to build these as multiple-purpose projects in order 
to catch the floodwaters and save this floodwater for subsequent use.”55 
Drought, political pressure and frustration with administrative obstacles 
had pushed the Washita bill through Congress.  And while Eisenhower may have 
stressed that it was not to precede other similar projects, the bill’s passage was at 
least a pretext to greater federal support for municipal water supply projects.  From 
1956 to 1958 Oklahoma Senator Robert Kerr introduced and drove a federal bill to 
make it easier for Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers dams to 
supply municipal water.   
Kerr’s experiences in southwestern Oklahoma’s WashitaBasin clearly 
informed his desire to expand the Reclamation Bureau’s capacity to provide 
municipal water supplies.  He wanted to expand the Corps’ capacity in part from 
his experiences on another Red River tributary, the Little River, in southeastern 
Oklahoma and southwestern Arkansas.  There, just as in the Washita basin, flood 
control, drought, and water supply concerns intersected during the 1950s, as 
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Oklahoma and Arkansas upstream dam advocates struggled to revise a Corps of 
Engineers plan to control Red River floods downstream, in Louisiana. 
The original plan, authorized in the 1946 Flood Control Act, called for a 
Corps of Engineers dam (Millwood) on the Little River in southwest Arkansas to 
control downstream floods on the Red River in Louisiana.  Upstream Oklahoma 
and Arkansas civic groups, along with their congressional representatives, opposed 
the plan because it offered them few benefits and because it would flood valuable 
hardwood timber stands that were critical to regional logging and milling 
industries.  Carl Albert later recalled that the Millwood and other dams authorized 
in 1946 would not benefit Oklahoma because they “were purely for downstream 
flood control[.]”  In fact they would adversely affect Oklahoma, he explained, 
because “they would back up the floodwaters for miles, spreading the floods’ 
damages.”  In 1949, Albert protested that southern Oklahoma had already given 
enough land to flood control above the controversial Denison Dam without 
receiving its share of benefits, and he wanted the engineers to try 
“‘conscientiously’…to find upstream locations that ‘will give McCurtain county 
protection from floods as well as the lower Red River.’”56 
Responding to this pressure, in 1950 Congress directed the Corps to study 
alternate sites for the Millwood Dam, including “additional reservoir sites in the 
Little River Basin[.]”  During the early 1950s, the agency also studied regional 
flood control as part of the Arkansas-White-Red Basins Interagency Committee 
(AWRBIAC) to coordinate multi-purpose water development in Oklahoma and 
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Arkansas.
57
 Robert Kerr had acquired the AWRBIAC in the Senate, as a way to 
“resolve conflicts among the various federal agencies responsible for water 
development, interstate disputes, federal-state disagreements, and clashes between 
advocates of ‘big dams’ versus ‘little dams.’”58 
As the Corps studied flood control options along the Red River and in the 
Little River Basin, Oklahoma representatives pressured the agency to consider 
thoroughly (and favorably) all of its upstream options.  In March 1953, before 
upcoming Red River bank stabilization plan hearings, for instance, Robert Kerr 
wrote to Corps Tulsa District Engineer Colonel E. G. Herb: “I hope that, in 
connection with the bank stabilization problem, which in a sense is a flood control 
problem as well, the Corps of Engineers will take into account the tributary 
reservoirs on the north side of [the] Red River in Oklahoma....The time has come 
when we must give more consideration to the beneficial use of stored water for 
municipal and industrial use for irrigation, and for hydroelectric power than in the 
past.”  For good measure, Kerr added that “[t]he tributary reservoirs above 
mentioned could be utilized to a greater extent and more economically than water 
stored downstream where they are less accessible for use[.]”  Reinforcing Kerr’s 
position, in May 1954, Oklahoma Planning and Resources Board officials 
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requested that Corps Tulsa District Engineer Colonel Stanley G. Reiff, “consider 
in your [Millwood and alternate reservoir] planning…the inclusion of all 
economically feasible space for the storage of industrial and municipal water in 
any upsteam dam site you may study.  This State would not want such reservoirs 
constructed without such storage and at the proper time will request proper State 
authority for funds with which to pay for such space.”59 
In September 1954 the Army Corps of Engineers presented to Oklahoma, 
Arkansas and Louisiana representatives, and to regional upstream and downstream 
interests, a compromise plan to reduce the Millwood dam’s flood control capacity 
by approximately twenty-five percent, “with equivalent flood control to be 
provided in a system of seven upstream reservoirs.”  This proposal, Corps officials 
hoped, would assure downstream interests that their protection from floods would 
not be diminished, and simultaneously assure upstream interests eager to protect 
timber stands and secure water supply storage. As he explained the proposal to 
Kerr, Reiff emphasized that “[i]n order to justify the proposed system, it would be 
necessary to obtain substantial water supply benefits.”  And he reminded Kerr that 
“[u]nder present criteria for project analysis as set forth by the Bureau of the 
Budget, the financing of the water supply portion of the proposed plan is the 
responsibility of state and local interests.”60 
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In October 1955, the Corps officially reported its modified plan.  Since the 
previous fall, the plan had been modified to reduce (from seven to six) the number 
of upstream dams and to exclude hydro-electric facilities from the upstream 
reservoirs, but water storage remained a key feature of the plan, with an estimated 
overall yield of nearly 500 million gallons per day from the upstream dams.  Reiff 
saw the plan’s drought mitigation and economic development potential.  “Judging 
by developments during the period 1952 to 1954, when the worst drought on 
record struck portions of the States of Oklahoma and Texas….[and] [i]n view of 
the increasing need of water for domestic and industrial purposes in the 
southwestern part of the United States,” he explained, “it appears reasonable to 
expect increasing demand for the excellent water of the Little River Basin.”  
Again, he emphasized that to make the project work “[m]ore than half of the cost 
of upstream reservoir projects would have to be repaid by non-Federal interests 
under existing requirements of local cooperation in conjunction with water supply 
storage.”  By law, the local or state contribution had to be made prior to or during 
the project’s construction.61 
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Months before Reiff presented the modified plan, Kerr had begun to build 
support and seek a co-sponsor for a bill to facilitate water supply storage in federal 
dams.  In June 1955, he wrote to several Senate colleagues of “the desirability and 
necessity of having legislation considered which would give the Corps of 
Engineers authority to enter into contracts to furnish water for municipal and 
industrial supplies from flood control, river and harbor projects.”  A new law was 
necessary, Kerr explained, because “presently many cities are not financially able 
to enter into contracts with the Corps of Engineers on a ‘partnership’ basis, at the 
time the projects are constructed.”  In their 1953 report to Governor Murray, OSPE 
had explained how this provision presented a significant obstacle to growth, 
especially for small communities trying to supply markets that did not yet exist.  
Corps of Engineers and Reclamation Bureau flood control, power and irrigation 
projects could include space for municipal water supply provided that those 
agencies had “a firm responsible agreement to pay for or contract to rent such 
space over the years” reported the engineers.  Cities might borrow from banks, 
they also noted, but “[s]ufficient collateral wealth to tax or immediate income must 
be apparent to enlist this aid.”  Without adequate water supplies to begin with, 
however, few water-hungry towns and cities had the urban development that 
would qualify as sufficient collateral wealth to attract water development 
investors.  “As a result,” concluded the engineers, “aside from a few wealthy 
communities and a few others located close to unusual and cheap sources of water, 
few towns and cities in Oklahoma can finance the storage of water for large 
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consumptive use….As a result drouth finds some communities using stagnate[sic] 
water…while other communities with insufficient water to meet the needs of even 
a small industry wonder why no one ever suggests locating such a plant within 
their limits.”62 
To remedy this situation, Kerr proposed to the senators a new law 
“patterned generally after Section 9 (c) of the Reclamation Project Act of 1939, 
which provided the Secretary of the Interior with authority to enter into contracts 
with cities and industries for water supplies from projects built by the Bureau of 
Reclamation for irrigation and the development of hydroelectric power.”  Whereas 
water supply storage in Corps dams required advanced payment, Section 9 (c) of 
the 1939 reclamation law gave cities “forty years from the year in which water 
[was] first delivered” to repay the federal government.63 
The nature and timing of Kerr’s proposal reflected more than Colonel 
Reiff’s assessment that any upstream dams, to be cost effective, would need to 
store municipal and industrial water for which users must pay in advance.  After 
several years of drought, Oklahoma cities clamored for water to secure their 
futures.  In May 1954, for instance, the Oklahoma Municipal League explained to 
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candidates in an upcoming gubernatorial race: “Undoubtedly Oklahoma’s greatest 
long range municipal problem is the chronic shortage of water.  Our cities and 
towns cannot live without it.  They cannot grow without an adequate supply.”  As 
it faced water shortages during the early 1950s, Oklahoma City commissioned 
water supply studies for the city and its environs.  In 1954, consulting engineer 
C.E. Bretz reported to the City Council that southeast Oklahoma’s Red River 
tributaries could best meet  the city’s needs.  And to the Oklahoma City Chamber 
of Commerce in 1955, army engineer Colonel F.J. Wilson proposed a “joint 
navigation-water conveyance facility” to move water and traffic from eastern and 
southeastern Oklahoma to the state’s center.64  These concerns informed Kerr’s 
proposal.  In March and June 1955 both the Senate and House Public Works 
Committees adopted resolutions instructing the Corps of Engineers to investigate 
Wilson’s navigation and water conveyance plan more deeply.65  Subsequent letters 
to army engineers from Arkansas Governor OrvalFaubus and Oklahoma Governor 
Raymond Gary strengthened the case for tributary water supply dams in southeast 
Oklahoma.  To Corps Major General Emerson Itschner, for instance, Faubus 
explained, “the great drought area recently inspected by President Eisenhower has 
to some extent crept into eastern Oklahoma and Texas and into western 
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Arkansas….many cities, such as Texarkana…and the cities of Magnolia, Hope, 
Ashdown, and others in Arkansas are very interested in this project because of the 
possibility of furnishing water for municipal and other uses[.]”  And to Acting 
Corps of Engineers Chief Charles G. Houle, Gary wrote, “[t]he state of Oklahoma 
at this time holds a copy of a request to the district engineer at Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
from a city in Texas, requesting substantially more storage in the project area 
under discussion than the total water supply storage provided for in the six 
upstream reservoirs contained in the report.  The expanded use of water and the 
pressing demands for municipal, industrial and power needs for it persuade us to 
believe that we cannot overdevelop these projects.”66 
Kerr’s bill also certainly reflected his growing power in the Senate.  In 
1955, Kerr became chairman of the Flood Control and Rivers and Harbors 
Subcommittee of the Senate Public Works Committee.  The position meant that his 
support was crucial to other congressmen pursuing their own water projects.  In 
1956 and early 1958, Kerr tied the water supply idea to omnibus river, harbor and 
flood control bills, both of which Eisenhower vetoed because they contained 
projects, including the modified Millwood Dam, “deemed unfeasible by the budget 
bureau and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers[.]”  To get the bill passed during the 
1958 election year, however, Congress met Eisenhower’s demands and cut from 
nearly $100 million in ‘unfeasible’ projects.  To secure President Eisenhower’s 
support for the bill, for instance, Kerr accepted a Budget Bureau cost formula that 
reduced the federal contribution by increasing the Millwood dam’s water supply 
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benefits.  Likely at work too was Kerr’s political strength in the Senate.  After 
Eisenhower had delayed funds to Kerr’s Arkansas Project in order to rebuild 
flood-damaged   northeastern states in early 1956, Kerr had threatened to “‘fight 
every inch of the way’” and to use his Public Works Subcommittee chairmanship 
to “bottle up” other projects until his interests were met.  Eisenhower signed the 
bill on 3 July 1958.
67
 
As finally passed, the Water Supply Act was Title III of the 1958 omnibus 
rivers, harbors and flood control act that authorized (in Titles I and II) just over 
$1.5 billion dollars in new navigation, beach erosion and flood control projects, 
including the modified Millwood Project.  Title III (the Water Supply Act) 
authorized the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers to 
allocate a maximum of thirty percent of a dam’s storage capacity to municipal 
water supplies for which local communities could defer payments and interest until 
they began to use the water or for ten years, whichever came first.  Once a 
community began to use the stored water, it would begin to repay construction 
costs, with the entire balance to be settled within a maximum of fifty years from 
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the project’s construction.68  Previously, Corps of Engineers and Bureau of 
Reclamation projects could provide municipal water storage, but the innovation in 
Title III, reported the Senate Public Works Committee, was the “provision of 
water-supply storage in reservoirs where it is apparent that there will be a future 
demand for such storage but where the demand is not pressing at the time of 
construction.”69  It provided small and stagnant communities like those along the 
WashitaRiver an opportunity to attract municipal and industrial consumers with 
the promise of stable water supplies.  Not only did this provision anticipate 
growth, observed historian Anne H. Morgan, “it also was a step in liberalizing the 
cost/benefit criteria used to determine a water proposal’s economic feasibility.70 
In CadillacDesert, a respected study of western water policy, the journalist 
Marc Reisner described the Water Supply Act as a congressional effort to prevent 
Corps of Engineers dams from unfairly subsidizing large-scale irrigation farmers.  
Specifically, he saw the law as a congressional reaction to a “covert liaison 
between the Corps of Engineers and the world’s largest irrigation farmers[,]” on 
the Kings and Kern rivers in California’s TulareBasin during the 1940s.  There, in 
1948, following an 11-year competition with the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps 
of Engineers successfully received funding to build two flood control dams that 
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benefited a few large-scale downstream irrigation farmers.  “There was so much 
resentment over the fact that [California’s] biggest growers had gotten an 
enormous supply of water virtually free from the Corps[,]” observed Reisner, “that 
a number of Congressmen vowed never to let it happen again, and the result was 
Title III.”71 
Events in Oklahoma indicate the Water Supply Act’s different roots.  
Instead of an effort to restrict Corps of Engineers activities, the law was intended 
to broaden both Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation capacity to supply 
water to growing cities.  It fit with the “broadening range of purposes that [federal] 
agencies were directed to consider” after World War II, and especially the 
Reclamation Bureau’s shift “from the rural to the urban West” after the 
1930s.
72
Oklahoma senator Robert Kerr introduced and pushed the bill through the 
Senate, not during the late 1940s, but during the mid-1950s.  The law reflected the 
needs of small, drought-stricken Washita Basin towns without the collateral to 
jumpstart a Bureau of Reclamation water supply project, and similar circumstance 
in southeastern Oklahoma and Arkansas, where the Corps of Engineers required 
drought-stricken consumers to pay in advance for water supply space.
73
  As the 
Senate discussed the bill during its final stages, South Dakota senator Case 
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explained that “the major credit for the bill being before the Senate in its present 
form is due to the leadership of the Senator from Oklahoma.”74  In 1958, the 
Senate Public Works Committee reported that it “considers title III to be one of the 
most important parts of the bill because of the increasingly acute water shortages 
which are developing not only in the more arid sections of the country but also in 
humid areas.”75  And contemporary observers noted that “[t]he purpose of the 
Water Supply Act was to provide in advance for meeting the needs of growing 
communities.  The Act was a good example of the developing trend in federal 
water policy to stress the need for municipal and industrial water supply projects 
as the nation’s population continued to enlarge rapidly.”76 
The law also reflected tensions surrounding the Eisenhower 
administration’s tight budgetary policies, especially the growing power of the 
Budget Bureau as it administered Circular A-47.  Tulsa Corps of Engineers 
historian William A. Settle rooted that tension among Oklahoma’s congressmen: 
“more and more with the growth of budgetary planning it became necessary for the 
Corps, in making recommendations, to stay within the budgetary limitations set by 
the President through the Bureau of the Budget.  Congress, not the Corps, fought 
with the Bureau of the Budget….[and] in 1955 and 1956 Congressmen from 
Oklahoma and Arkansas refused to be bound by budgetary restrictions.”  More 
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called by the Oklahoma City Chamber of Commerce and presided over by publisher E.K. Gaylord, 
that the city become interested in navigation to central Oklahoma.”  Settle was discussing the 
origins and (unsuccessful) development of the Central Oklahoma Project.  In Settle Jr., The 
Dawning, pp. 123-5. 
75
Congressional Record, Senate, 17 June 1958, p. 11497.  This passage also appears in: U.S. 
Congress, Senate, Committee on Public Works, Summary of Legislative Activities, 85
th
 Congress, 
2
nd
 Session, Washington, D.C., August 1958, p. 20.   
76
Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964, p. 858. 
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broadly still, the Water Supply Act revealed the limits to public support for 
Eisenhower’s partnership principle.  “Fiscal soundness and engineering feasibility 
were desirable,” observed historian Richard Elmo, “but not if they resulted in 
fewer appropriations.”77
                                                          
77
 Settle Jr., The Dawning, p. 100; Richardson, Dams, Parks and Politics, p. 127.   
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Conclusion 
 
 During 1959, the Senate Select Committee on National Water Resources 
held nationwide hearings to determine the country’s future water needs.  In 
November 1959, the committee assembled in Oklahoma City to hear local and 
regional concerns.  To the audience, Oklahoma Association of Soil Conservation 
Districts president Lavern Fishel explained:  
Back in the 1930’s, during the Dust Bowl days…the Nation 
became aware of the needs of soil conservation…. 
Likewise, during the drought years of more recent date 
when agricultural cities and towns were experiencing critical water 
shortages, the Nation took a new look at what needed to be done to 
develop and utilize our water for the beneficial use of mankind. 
This, even today, is more important because of the increased 
consumption of water and the rapid increase in population.  
Demands for pure and usable water will be greater with each 
passing day…. 
As our country grows the various segments of our society 
become more interdependent.  Agriculture cannot stand alone.  
Neither can a town or city.
1
 
 
Fishel defended the upstream dam program against growing urban and industrial 
priorities that he believed would threaten its future.  Directly, his testimony 
reflected recent tensions in the WashitaBasin.  There, drought-stricken residents 
had reversed their commitment to upstream flood control dams for agriculture in 
favor of bigger dams to supply municipal water for area towns.  More broadly, 
however, Fishel’s testimony reflected new priorities in Oklahoma after World War 
                                                          
1
U.S. Congress.Senate.Select Committee on National Water Resources.Hearings.Water Resources: 
Part 15, 86
th
 Congress, 1
st
 Session, Oklahoma City, 30 November 1959, p. 2380. 
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II as municipal and commercial intersts usurped agriculture’s social and economic 
importance.  The drought revealed those priorities.  
 From the 1870s to the 1950s, Oklahoma’s agricultural economy 
continually changed.  Nineteenth-century attitudes prized independence and self-
reliance.  Drought brought agricultural adaptations, technical innovations and 
legislative reforms, but almost no federal relief.  Drought also heightened expert 
authority.  Farmers who took expert advice to diversify their farms soon expected 
experiment station advice on a range of issues including disease control and seed 
testing.  Overproduction and low crop prices oriented farmers toward the federal 
government.  By the 1930s, contemporaries understood the drought that ravaged 
Plains farmers to be an agricultural problem best solved through agricultural 
adjustments.  New Deal planners responded to low crop prices and devastating 
dust storms by introducing programs to limit production, conserve soil and water, 
relocate desperate farmers, and assume control and ownership of marginal and 
vulnerable land.  After World War II, by contrast, growing cities and industries 
challenged the state’s rural and agricultural heritage.  Farms got bigger and the 
number of farms shrank as producers invested in new technologies to increase 
production.  To make ends meet, many smaller operators held off-farm jobs. 
When drought and dust storms hit the Southern Plains during the late 1940s 
and early 1950s, emergency erosion control and soil and water conservation 
neglected farmers’ long-term economic interests.  Requests for specific assistance 
to protect farmers’ crop allotments and allow time to recover from the disaster 
were significant for several reasons.  First, they revealed contradictions to federal 
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policy since crop surplus control programs collided with soil conservation efforts.  
They also reflected the contemporary sense that popular conservation techniques 
were not universally applicable and that even dry and marginal areas contained 
some worthwhile farmland.  It followed that conservation strategies should suit 
geographical and economic conditions on individual farms.  Instead of broad 
federal control over large areas of sub-marginal and vulnerable land, officials 
recommended the Great Plains Conservation Program (GPCP) which gave farmers 
independence and flexibility to customize federal conservation assistance on their 
farms and ranches while protecting their allotments during dry periods.  The 
program reflected practical and experimental experiences across the Plains.  It 
signified that soil and water conservation was still an active process well after the 
lessons learned during the 1930s.   
The independence and flexibility that farmers acquired through GPCP 
contrasted with their heightened and growing reliance on technological systems 
and expert advice during the drought, not just on the semi-arid Plains but also in 
the state’s usually humid east.  Throughout the drought, Oklahoma farmers 
requested expert advice to mitigate dry conditions.  They received a collaborative 
message from federal and state agronomists, academics, farm editors, and 
manufacturers that steered them toward a concert of interrelated conservation and 
production systems.  Irrigation exploded in Oklahoma during the 1950s, for 
instance, and required a range of components and chemical inputs to be fully 
effective.  High irrigation costs compelled many farmers to produce at maximum 
capacity to pay for their new equipment.  New technologies consolidated state 
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governmental, academic and industrial authority on a range of functions, including 
soil testing, technical instruction, and maintenance. 
Initially, the federal drought program neglected the disaster’s broad and 
dynamic character by restricting assistance to full-time farmers in designated 
counties.  By excluding part-time farmers, the drought relief program lagged 
behind post-war demographic and economic patterns, including land 
consolidation, high production costs, and industrial development that compelled 
many small farmers to hold part-time jobs.  By the drought’s end, new laws and 
programs reflected a growing appreciation for the drought’s broad economic 
implications.  Amendments to the Small Business Act authorized federal disaster 
loans to small businesses in drought areas, and farmers with part-time industrial 
jobs could soon receive Farmers Home Administration (FHA) loans through the 
Rural Development Program.  In the 1957 report ‘Drouth and Other Natural 
Disasters’, southern plains agricultural producers, businesses, researchers, and 
government representatives added rhetorical support for the new developments by 
recommending commercial and industrial expansion to mitigate drought’s 
economic consequences; in addition, officials relaxed FHA lending policies to 
permit farmers to live in towns or cities.  These developments signified a shift 
from the idea that drought was strictly an agricultural problem that required 
solutions to the idea that drought mitigation required an integrated and flexible 
economy.  Relief administration during the drought fostered another shift as 
Oklahoma’s Department of Public Welfare assumed from county-level officials 
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the authority to ensure federal standards for the distribution of USDA commodity 
relief foodstuffs.  In this way, the drought consolidated state authority. 
Oklahoma’s cattlemen also turned to federal officials for relief.  Just as 
Oklahoma’s farmers turned to technical experts for drought-related conservation 
and production advice, the state’s cattlemen connected with their industry’s 
various segments as they fought drought-related plant and animal diseases, and 
learned to feed relief grain.  Oklahoma cattlemen joined the call for federal cattle 
purchases to stabilize prices.  Federal price supports proved too contentious to 
some producers and to Agriculture Secretary Benson, prompting Oklahoma 
cattlemen to strengthen their ties with marketing and retailing sectors of the 
industry as a way to increase consumption and cattle prices.  They also connected 
with animal health and nutrition experts as they fought drought-related plant and 
animal diseases and learned to feed relief grain in confined herds.  Feeding relief 
grain to their cattle convinced them to develop a local feeding industry.  The shift 
represented new attitudes that quickly transformed the Southern Plains.  Asked 
early in the drought whether he considered the region to be cattle fattening 
country, Panhandle rancher Ladd Hitch reportedly replied, “Yes, this is a cattle-
feeding country, but there aren’t many cattle feeding people [here].”2   By the 
drought’s end, the Oklahoma Cattlemen’s Association had successfully pressured 
the state government to remove a sales tax on cattle feed so that they could 
develop a local feeding industry.  Shortly afterward, massive feedlot operations 
that currently supply much of the nation’s beef began to appear in significant 
                                                          
2
 Donald Green, Panhandle Pioneer: Henry C. Hitch, his ranch and his family (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1979), pp. 209, 213 (quoting from Green’s personal interview with Hitch, 
August 3, 1976), 216. 
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numbers on the Southern Plains.
3
  The drought helped to integrate Oklahoma’s 
cattle industry. 
 Finally, the drought and industrial ambitions changed the priorities of 
townsfolk living in southwest Oklahoma’s Washita Basin.  There, as urban water 
supplies diminished during the early 1950s, basin townsfolk and state authorities 
reversed their commitment to upstream flood control dams for agricultural 
purposes in favor of bigger dams to provide municipal water.  The episode 
revealed changing priorities that accompanied regional economic development and 
municipal growth after World War II.  It also revealed the inter-agency conflict 
that characterized federal resource development, especially as the USDA’s scope 
increased from individual farms to entire watersheds, and as the Reclamation 
Bureau’s scope shifted from rural to urban projects after the 1930s.  Most 
important for this study, the episode revealed the drought’s role – along with 
political pressure and frustration with Budget Bureau oversight – to help local 
communities acquire cheaper municipal water from the federal government in the 
face of presidential efforts to coordinate and limit water development spending 
after World War II.  Fueled by severe drought, the Washita Project, and similar 
struggles by drought-ridden southeast Oklahoma consumers, was an important 
prelude to the 1958 Water Supply Act, which increased federal assistance to 
municipal water supplies. 
 
                                                          
3
 Jerry Sinise, “Feedlots....Expansion in the Southwest,” Oklahoma Cowman 9 (October 1969), p. 
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 Subsequent and recent droughts have shared important themes with 
Oklahoma’s wide-ranging drought experiences during the 1950s.  During the 
1980s, for instance, the costliest drought in U.S. history stretched across the 
western U.S. and northern Great Plains, sparking massive wildfires at Yellowstone 
National Park and across the West, and disrupting Mississippi River 
navigation.And from the late 1990s to nearly 2010, drought afflicted large parts 
the western United States, Canada and Mexico, withwide-ranging effects including 
municipal water shortages, wildfires and insect outbreaks.
4
 
These recent droughts remind us that erratic, often insufficient rainfall is a 
recurrent problem on the Southern Plains.  They also suggest the importance of 
studying not only the famous drought of the 1930s but also the long dry spell of 
the 1950s, a time when local authorities and federal officials struggled to find 
solutions to the absence of rain.  Certainly, we can still learn from events that 
occurred on farms and ranches during the 1930s Dust Bowl.  But we also have 
much to learn from the 1950s drought, especially the disaster’s implications for the 
broader regional economy and, more importantly, for the region’s future. 
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 Justin Sheffield and Eric Wood, Drought: Past Problems and Future Scenarios (London: 
Earthscan, 2011), pp. 126-7. 
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